The ‘Meskhetian Turks’ are a Turkish-speaking minority group collectively deported by Stalin to Central Asia in 1944. Many were forced into exile after pogroms in relation to the period of Perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. They are now dispersed between several countries, including Azerbaijan and Russia. It is interesting to note that the term ‘Turk’ in the name correlates to some of the potential difficulties they face coming from a border region. In addition, their potential loyalty is also a factor in Georgia. As a result, a number of nationalistic articles and biased research papers have been published in Turkey over the years. However, something similar can be said about Georgian nationalists and media. As such, this issue will continue to play a part in the overall political and social relations between Georgia and Turkey.
Historically, during the last 15-20 years several attempts to promote the return of the Meskhetian Turks to Georgia has largely failed. However, some have manage to return, in spite of the inclusion of various international institutions such as OSCE. Regardless, they are generally referred to a ‘Meskhetians’ in Georgia.
In 1992-1993, during the “hot phase” of the war between Georgia and separatist forces in Abkhazia (aided primarily by the Northern Caucasians and Russians), Turkey had certain difficulties in developing consistent policies towards Abkhazia. On one hand, a considerable (several hundreds of thousands strong) Abkhazian community developed in Turkey, the descendants of Abkhazians exiled by the Russian empire in the 1860s. They have evolved into a relatively strong voice in Turkish society. In addition, several hundred representatives of this community fought in the 1992-93 war on the Abkhaz side. The coverage in the Turkish press was equally biased in favor of the Abkhaz. On the other hand, Turkey could not openly take different attitudes towards Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, because it would look inconsistent, and because of Turkey´s own separatist issue with the Kurds in the South-East. Hence, Turkey gradually changed its general attitude towards supporting Georgian territorial integrity. It is surmised that the Abkhaz issue might resurface as a sore spot of the Turko-Georgian relations, given the fact that many Turkish citizens of Abkhazian descent wish to return to their historical motherland.
Another potential issue which might contribute to the cooling of bilateral relations between Turkey and Georgia is the relation between Ankara and Washington. It should be noted that successive US administrations have openly encouraged Turkey to proclaim itself a westernizing role model for the former Soviet republics - in order to block Iranian (and covertly Russian) interests. To a certain extent, one could safely state that Turkey played the role of regional champion of the West, both in economic spheres and in the issued of democratization and modernization. However, Turkey´s disillusionment in regards to the European dream and disagreements with the United States over Iraq and Syria rendered Ankara a far less willing partner in the Western strategy of anchoring the post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus to the western orbit.
This tendency has been exacerbated by president Erdogan's crackdown on media, civil society and large parts of the opposition as a reaction to the 2016 coup. In addition, Turkey has concerns over the Black Sea basin, as Russia has strengthened is presence after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (on as secondary level Turkey has also voiced concerns over the rights of the indigenous Turkish-speaking Crimean Tatars after the coup). Despite these tensions, renewed rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow has occurred over (partly) joint interests in regards to peace in Syria. This is, however, a fragile alliance that can easily be broken over developments in and around Syria.
Turkey and Russia both have shown increasing interest in becoming stronger geopolitical players in the Eurasian region, where they also are potential competitors. The many articles on the Sultan and the Czar in the recent period also reflect how dominant both presidents have become in their respectively (managed) democracies, where both have worsened the conditions of free media and civil society. In this instance, both share an ambiguous relation with the European Union, where both feel strengthened after recent events. Even Georgia has to some extend attempted to readjust its relations to Russia, though the general aim of rapprochement to various European or Euro-Atlantic institutions is a dominant consideration.