Introduction
Throughout history, intellectual scientific efforts have been directed towards the discovery of patterns, systems and structures, with a special emphasis on order. A closely related question is what counts as a good scientific explanation. In addition to providing predictions about future events, society often takes scientific theories to provide explanations for events that occur regularly or have already occurred. Philosophers have investigated the criteria by which a scientific theory can be said to have successfully explained a phenomenon, as well as what it means to say a scientific theory has explanatory power. Unfortunately, philosophers and scientists are not in agreement on the nature of the philosophy of science. Even practising philosophers of science often disagree about the proper subject-matter of their discipline.
In this paper, we shall look at the Aristotelian method of science and how Bacon critiques this method. We shall further proceed to expose Bacon’s method of science which was proposed as replacement to Aristotle’s method. More so, we shall highlight Isaac Newton’s explanation on the method of analysis and synthesis. This method shall buttress on the basic similarities between Aristotelian and Baconian methods. We shall then conclude with the critiques of Bacon’s scientific method. For a better understanding of the subject matter, we shall begin with conceptual clarifications.
The Conception of Science
Science which is from the Latin scientia is translated to mean “knowledge.” However this direct translation of the term, there is a popular conception captured by the slogan that “science is derived from the fact.” These facts on which science is based on are presumed to be claims about the world that can be directly established by a careful, unprejudiced use of the senses. Science is thus based on what we hear, what we can see and touch rather on personal opinions and speculative imaginations. If observation of the world is carried out in a careful, unprejudiced way then the facts established in this wax will constitute a secure, objective basis for science. But it is not fact themselves that make up science, but the method in which they are dealt with. To this thus, science has also been defined as the discovery and systemisation of facts whose basis is sense-impressions.
The Conception of Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Science is an aspect of philosophy that reflects on and critically analyses, by way of trying to understand its aims and methods, along with its principle, practices, and achievements. Also, philosophy of Science is the formulation of world-views that are consistent with, and in some sense based on important scientific theories. This branch of philosophy asks questions which bothers on: the aims of science; the role of observation and experiment in obtaining scientific knowledge; the justification of scientific claims, and how scientific knowledge advances and grows; on whether there is an objectively discoverable reality, and an objective truth; and on the existing connection between science and value judgements. Consequent upon these questions posed that we turn to the very beginning of Philosophy of Science and its starting ideologies. This could be traced back to the Ancients –Aristotle.
Aristotle’s Method of Science
Aristotle is accorded the respect of being the first philosopher of science. He created the discipline by analysing certain problems that arose in connection to scientific explanation.
Aristotle’s method of science as exposed in his Posterior Analytics is the inductive and deductive method. Ideally, scientific inquiry is designed in the format of a progression from observation to general principle and then back to observations. Such scientific inquiry begins with the knowledge that certain events occur, or that certain properties coexist. Thus, scientific explanation or interpretation is achieved only when statements about these events or properties are deduced from explanatory principles. Scientific explanation transits from knowledge of a fact to knowledge of the reasons for the fact.
The Inductive and the Deductive Stages
In the inductive stage, Aristotle argues that, first, every particular thing is a union of matter and form –matter as what makes the particular a unique individual, and form as what makes the particular a member of a class of similar things; to specify the form of a particular is to specify the properties it shares with other particulars. From this, he maintained that it is from induction that generalisations about forms are drawn from sense experience. He further highlights two types of induction namely: simple enumeration and intuitive induction.
In the deductive stage, the general principles reached by induction are used as premises for the deduction of statements about the initial observations. However, for this, only statements which assert that one class is included within, or is excluded from a second class could feature as premises and conclusions of deductive arguments in science.
Furthermore, Aristotle asserts that the knowledge of the four causes is necessary for the adequate explanation of a scientific process. These causes are: the formal cause, the material cause, the efficient cause and the final cause. Of all, the final cause is most important in Aristotle because of his teleological doctrine.
Baconian critique of Aristotelian Scientific Method
Many philosophers of the 17th century made a critique of Aristotle’s inductive-deductive method of science. A.F Chalmers notes that “the philosopher Francis Bacon and many of his contemporaries summed up the scientific attitude of the times when they insisted that if we want to understand nature we must consult nature and not the writings of Aristotle.” Bacon in 1620 published his work titled Novum Organum in which he attempts to replace the Aristotelian scientific method discussed in the Organon with a new scientific method. The Organon is a medieval compilation of Aristotle’s writings.
Although, Bacon critiques Aristotelian method of science, he accepts Aristotle’s view that scientific enquiry is a progression from observations to general principles and from general principles back to observations. He accepts Aristotle deductive argument as that which plays a significant role in the confirmation of inductive generalisation. In fact, he assigns a role to deduction in his method of interpretation of nature. He writes: “the signs for interpretation of nature comprehend two divisions, the first regards the eliciting or creating of axioms from experiment, the second, the deducing or deriving of new experiments from axioms.”
However, Bacon criticizes both the inductive and deductive stages of Aristotle’s method of science. On the inductive stage, he faults the method through which data is collected. He describes this method as a haphazard and uncritical method of data collection. He rather proposes the use of systematic experimentation to gain scientific knowledge of nature. Thus, he recommends the use of scientific instrument in data collection. More so, he further argues that the Aristotelian method leads to hasty generalisation. This is so because the Aristotelians use few observations to form general principles from which they deduce generalisations of lesser occurrences. Also, he opines that the method of induction used by Aristotle and his followers is simple enumeration. In induction by simple enumeration, properties that are correlated to several individuals of a particular class are affirmed to hold to all individuals of that class. The problem with simple enumeration for Bacon is that it leads to false conclusions because it does not take into account negative instance. The possibility of one negative instance invalidates the whole inductive process.
Furthermore, in his Novum Organum, Bacon critiques the deductive stage of Aristotelian scientific enquiry. The following words capture his critique:
The logic now in use serves rather to fix and give stability to the errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions than to help the search after truth. So it does more harm than good. The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions consist of words, words are symbols of notions. Therefore if the notions themselves (which is the root of the matter) are confused and overhastily abstracted from the facts, there can be no firmness in the superstructure. Our only hope
He argues that the syllogistic demonstration is more hurtful than useful because it does not assist in confirming the errors of vulgar notions; it rather searches for truth. For him, Aristotelians ought to have begin by defining the terms of syllogism such as ‘attraction’, ‘generation’, ‘element’, ‘moisture’, ‘dryness’ in the propositions which they occur. Moreover, he accuses Aristotle and his followers of reducing science to deductive demonstration due to the much emphasis they placed on the deduction of consequences from first principles. However, Bacon was not right in criticizing Aristotle for reducing science to deductive argument. He failed to make a demarcation between Aristotelian theory of scientific procedure and the misappropriation of this procedure by the fake Aristotelians. Aristotle’s method of science begins with the progression of observation to general principles through the process of induction; but the false Aristotelians begin not with induction from observational evidence but with the first principles of Aristotle. This false Aristotelian method cuts off science from its empirical base.
Baconian Method of Science
After his critique of Aristotle’s method of science, Bacon proceeds to establish his new method of science which he calls Novum Organum. His new method consists of two major principles, namely: a gradual and progressive inductive method and a method of exclusion. In the first book of his Novum Organum, he identifies two methods of induction which differ from that of Aristotle. He explains these methods as follows:
There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried.
He further explains that though each of this method proceeds from the senses and particulars, to generalities, they have infinite difference. One of the methods merely deals with experiment and particulars while the other duly dwells in them. One establishes the certain abstract and unuseful generalities while the other proceeds gradually to what is prior and better known in the order of nature. Bacon recognises the importance of experiment in his method of science. Thus, he identifies two ways through which the sign for the interpretation of nature can be understood. One deals with the creation of axioms from experiment while the other is concerned with the deduction or derivation of new experiments from the axioms.
Furthermore, he formulates a pyramid known as “Ladder of Axioms” which consists of observations, accidental correlations and forms. He realizes that some correlations among the facts in the pyramid are only accidental correlation. Thus, in order to eliminate these accidental correlations he formulates the method of exclusion. With the method of exclusion, he excludes from the pyramid “any correlation for which there is an instance in which one attribute is absent when another is present, or instances in which one attribute decreases when the other increases.” He believes that what would remain after the exclusion of the accidental correlations would be essential correlations. These essential correlations, for Bacon are the appropriate subject matter for further induction. It is interesting to note that Bacon describes his method of exclusion as a method that is superior to Aristotle’s inductive procedures. He claims that Aristotle’s method of science is incapable of distinguishing the essential correlation from the accidental correlations but the method of exclusion is able to make this distinction because it emphasizes absence and relative intensity. Further still, Bacon describes the principles at the apex of the pyramid as form. Baconian form is different from Platonic form or Aristotelian formal cause.
In Aristotelian classes of causes, it could be likened with the material and efficient cause. It is worthy of mention that Bacon in his Novum Organum uses form in two different senses. In one sense, it is described as the qualities inherent in objects we perceive. Here, form is used as a quality of perceptible objects. In another sense, Bacon describes form as laws that govern nature. He affirms: “when I speak of Forms, I mean nothing more than those laws and determinations of absolute actuality, which govern and constitute any simple nature, as heat, light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptible of them. Thus the Form of Heat or the Form of Light is the same thing as the Law of Heat or the Law of Light.” Bacon believes that the combinations of forms constitute our object of experience and that he who knows the form can modify and control the forces of nature.
There are few important things to note in Bacon’s scientific enquiry. He believes that man ought to have dominion over nature. Thus, the ultimate goal of scientific enquiry is power over nature; the knowledge of the form is only a proximate goal. His practical application of scientific knowledge contrasts him from Aristotle whose scientific investigation has a teleological end. Again, Bacon’s view of science demarcates science from teleology and natural theology. He claims that the search for final causes of observable phenomena inhibits scientific progress. He holds this position because he believes that every scientist ought to become a child before nature.
Newton on the Method of Analysis and Synthesis
Newton refers to Aristotle’s theory of scientific procedure as the “Method of Analysis and Synthesis" What distinguishes the new Baconian view of science from that of Aristotle is, indeed, his clear commitment to the role of observation and experiment as a prerequisite for the construction of scientific theory. Newton notes some basic similarities between the scientific procedures of Aristotle and Bacon. Both Aristotle and Bacon collect facts, realise the value of hypothesis, and as well experimented. Again, both Aristotle and Bacon favoured the popular belief that the earth was the centre of the universe. The former, rejects in his time the view of Pythagoras while the latter rejects the view of Copernicus. Aristotle and Bacon both rely largely on second-hand information. But to Bacon's advantage, and despite discrepancies between theory and practice, it seems clear that he had a much more vivid appreciation than Aristotle of the absolute necessity in discovery of paying strict attention to the objective facts of experience.
Newton’s discussion of the inductive–deductive procedure was superior to that of his predecessors in two respects. He consistently stressed the need of experimental confirmation of the consequences deduced by Synthesis, and he emphasized the value of deducing consequences that go beyond the original inductive evidence. In Newton's view, the synthetic or deductive method can itself have no legitimate starting point that is not supplied by analysis and induction. He insists upon the priority, for all natural science, of the latter process; and protests strongly against the rejection of its legitimate results merely because they conflict with dogmatic hypotheses. The conclusion of Newton's critique of hypotheses is, therefore, in sum, that they are incapable of supplying adequate grounds either for the acceptance or for the rejection of any scientific theory, and that whosoever employs them for this purpose is guilty of an abuse. Scientific theories can be legitimately established by experimental evidence only, and they can be overthrown only (i.) by showing the insufficiency of the evidence adduced in their favour, or (ii.) by producing adverse experimental evidence.
Critique of Bacon's Scientific Method
Bacon’s role in science has been criticised by some twentieth century philosophers, especially Alexandre Koyré and E. J. Dijksterhuis. They argue that Bacon’s critiques of Aristotle are not incisive and do not originate from him. They also claim that Bacon as a person did not enrich science through his theory of scientific method. Many philosophers have argued that Bacon's scientific project and its influence on modern science claims too much on the basis of hasty generalization to be considered as a reliable source of knowledge.
Induction as employed by Bacon in modern scientific process makes consequences of both positive and negative value inevitable. Modern science which is basically built around induction has shown positive progress over the last four centuries. Scientific theories are to provide fertile ground for new discoveries through research simply because it follows the inductive process. In so far as scientific methods are based on observation of facts, they alone provide sure and certain knowledge. Again inasmuch as science is a body of certain knowledge, the growth of Science consists in the endless addition of new certainties to the already existing ones. Inductivists even though with a lot of criticisms, have argued that scientific knowledge gained by induction could be considered reliable, given the condition that it has always been found to hold true in the past. In addition, if we follow the sceptical position of some philosophers like Hume, then nature cannot be known.
The negative implications of modern science stem basically from the point that the method of induction through which it majorly proceeds ordinarily holds no ground for justification. Thus, many philosophers highlight the problem of induction. David Hume, in his work, "An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding," argues that there is a philosophical problem with inductive reasoning. He notes that there is no causal connection between past events and future events. The fact that something happened in the past does not necessary mean that it will happen in the same way in the future. Similarly, Aigbodioh highlights the problem of induction by asking: "if the premises of an inductive argument, even if they are all true, provide any logical guarantee for the truth of the conclusion or do the observations of past uniformities, constitute any evidence that the future will resemble the past? This problem is about the epistemological status of inferences from particular experiences, observations and experiments as in the empirical sciences.
Furthermore, Baconian scientific process implies that science is essentially unimaginative since it goes through observations and presuppositionless inferences. Nonetheless, many of the most admired scientific theories were not produced in this sort of way. For instance, in considering Kepler's Laws of Planetary motion, following mathematical correlations with observable data, he had a lot of conflicts regarding results from the observed planetary activity. Kepler produced bold and potentially highly testable theories, one set of which had the additional virtue of being close to the truth and recognised as such by Newton. This he achieved by actually going far beyond facts known to him. It becomes obvious that Baconian model of cautiously working upward from observational data fails.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, we have seen that Aristotle's inductive-deductive method of science is the foundation of the scientific theories of modern philosophy of science. In this paper, we described Aristotelian scientific method as a method that progresses from observations to general principles and then back to observations. However, Many philosophers of the 17th century made a critique of this method. Francis Bacon and many other philosophers insist that if we want to understand nature we must consult nature and not the writings of Aristotle. Bacon proposes a new method which consists of true induction and the method of exclusion.
Furthermore, this paper highlighted some similarities between Aristotelian and Baconian scientific procedures. Both Aristotle and Bacon collect facts, realise the value of hypothesis, and as well experimented. Their scientific methods place emphasis on induction, although the methods of their induction differ. More so, the major difference between the two methods is that Aristotelian method has a teleological end while Baconian method separates science from teleology.
Finally, this paper identified some of the critiques levelled against Baconian scientific method. Many philosophers of modern science argue that Bacon's method of science is based on hasty generalisation and should not be considered as a reliable source of knowledge. also, his inductive method was critiqued by Hume who holds that inductive reasoning has no empirical justification. However, despite the criticism levelled Bacon, many philosophers of modern science have described him as the champion of the new inductive–experimental method. His contribution to the modern philosophy of science cannot be overestimated.