handing out money is destructive to the VITAL price discovery system of which any resource based economy is based off of.

To the contrary, there is no price discovery possible if people don't have money to signal demand for goods and services.

I suggest reading this to get a bit deeper into just how badly markets can be distorted when a large group of participants have no means of participating in the price discovery calculation mechanism.

The price system may run into trouble on the low end of the economic spectrum: How can someone send a price signal when they don’t have any money at all? How can the comparatively feeble price signals of the very poor compete with the price signals of the middle class, which are strong and (happily) getting stronger?

It’s possible, and tempting, to make gross simplifications of this situation. But the impaired ability of the poor to signal via the price mechanism has some predictable effects, and they aren’t especially good. We might say, for example, that inexpensive, high-quality basic consumption goods will be underprovided, in favor of conspicuously non-basic goods. The latter signal at great cost that the consumer belongs to a higher social class. That’s a big problem if you’re poor. (Revealing, too, is that the word “basic” itself has acquired such a negative connotation in recent years.)

We might further hypothesize that when charity is left to the upper classes, a good deal of supposed charitable expenditure will be devoted instead to virtue signaling. Charity will tend to be demonstrative rather than helpful, a subject I’ve discussed before. Charity in the form of simple cash transfers to the indigent will almost certainly be more efficient, and Hayek’s theory of price signals explains why this is so, and this would apply as well to state-provided charity as private.

In short, it seems that an unconditional basic income might do three important things in light of the Hayekian price system:

1. A UBI would allow the indigent to communicate their needs by means of efficient price signals, rather than relying on inefficient charities to do the exact same thing. The needs of the indigent would therefore be met more effectively, as the economy re-ordered itself to match them.

1. A UBI would allow the price signals of the indigent to compete somewhat better with the signals being sent by the still-rising middle class. May our middle class rise forever, but long as they do, the gap between them and the utterly indigent is going to grow. That’s a real problem as regards the communication of local knowledge in the economy, but it’s also a problem that a UBI could address.

1. The unconditional nature of a UBI would prevent the market distortions inherent in conditional grants, which always incentivize or disincentivize particular behaviors. The incentives that are set up by means of conditional grants are the product of politics, and to the extent that politics intrudes on the economic process, it crowds out the price signals that communicate consumers’ actual needs. Hayek argues that such intrusions should be resisted with great force, and a UBI might be one means of doing so.

By the way, you're welcome to read the actual interview with Milton Friedman instead of continuing to pretend you know what he was thinking.