How significant was Donald Trump’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un?
The meeting was accurately described as historic, because it was the first time that leaders from the two countries had ever met face-to-face. Since North Korea and the US have essentially been in a state of suspended armed conflict for almost 70 years, the symbolism and pictures coming out of a summit between the two leaders is probably the most important result of the meeting. It could change the atmosphere in relations between the two countries, and it could potentially move North Korea towards greater openness and engagement with the outside world. It could also reduce the likelihood of an armed conflict in Asia.
On the other hand, the meeting did not yield many specific details on what each side has committed to, and subsequent negotiations are expected to iron out these details. So it is too early to say whether the meeting will have a lasting historical impact.
What do you make of the joint document inked at the end of the summit?
The joint document at the end of the summit was phrased in highly general language that both sides could agree to, but which are so general that it is still unclear if the differences between the two sides have actually been resolved. For instance, North Korea committed to “work towards complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”. The US has said in many statements that it is seeking “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation” of North Korea. It is far from clear that North Korea’s understanding of “complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula” means the same thing as what the US is seeking.
Nothing in the language of the joint document helps to resolve this issue. If those understandings between the two sides remain very different, then the possibility of an actual final agreement that both sides will accept is very low. Another way to look at this is that the two sides have agreed to negotiate about denuclearisation, but they have not actually agreed on much else. That is what the joint document tells us.
The joint document’s language on denuclearisation is also far weaker and less specific than prior agreements between the two countries. For instance, in 2005 North Korea pledged in a similar document to “abandon” its nuclear weapons and rejoin the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. No such commitment is clear from the joint document.
Did Trump make the right call in suspending war games with South Korea?
I do not know if President Trump’s decision was correct. It depends on whether North Korea has indicated in private conversations (outside of the joint document) that it is quite serious and willing to take the steps towards complete and irreversible denuclearisation sought by the US. In general, I think it is a bad idea to suspend the exercises because doing so concedes to the North Koreans that the exercises are somehow offensive and provocative, rather than defensive.
Having pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, can Trump be trusted by Pyongyang to deliver on a Korean accord?
I actually think Trump’s personal meeting with Kim and his personal investment in this process makes it more likely he would honour any agreement with North Korea he signed. For Trump, many issues are personal and this type of personal relationship with the North Korean leader makes him more committed and interested in the process.
However, it is certainly true that the US as a whole has a more complex and ambivalent relationship with international agreements than it had before Trump took office. One way to reassure North Korea would be to seek senatorial approval for an agreement with North Korea as an official treaty. This requires two-thirds of the US Senate to approve the treaty, and would signify a stronger US commitment.
The US and North Korea have couched the conclusion of the summit differently. What has each country gained or lost?
The US has lost a little of its moral high ground over North Korea because the photos coming out of Singapore “normalised” North Korea’s government. Prior to Singapore, the US often treated North Korea (rightly in most cases) as a rogue state that supported terrorism, spread nuclear and chemical weapons, and committed human rights atrocities at home. The danger of normalising North Korea’s government is why prior US presidents had been hesitant to accept a face-to-face meeting with the North Korean leaders.
North Korea has therefore gained the most out of the summit, and the US has had almost no tangible victories. Of course, if North Korea eventually denuclearises completely, this assessment would change.