Sorry for completely forgetting this section!
The second argument against the NATO intervention is based on the fact that not all non-military alternatives such as regional diplomatic measures and soft power initiatives had been exhausted. According to proponents of this argument, such as German Foreign Minister Westerwelle, no military intervention comes without civilian casualties and should be avoided (Lopez, 2015). The AU, an important regional actor, argued against all military intervention because most of its members believed that non-military alternatives towards a solution were not adequately explored and instead proposed a diplomatic “road map” (de Waal, 2012). This “road map” encompassed suggestions such as a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance for all civilians in Libya, including the marginalized African laborers, as well as a peace agreement including a path towards a democratic transition (de Waal, 2012).
The AU was also skeptical of western military intervention based on the anti-imperialist arguments pointed out in the above section as it had dedicated itself to an interpretation of an “anticolonial version of human rights” with an explicit focus on self-determination (Alberts, 2011). In addition to the AU’s stance, Tisdall (2011) highlighted that soft power alternatives that include coordinated diplomatic initiatives would allow for humanitarian missions to take place and would add to the establishment of methods for a democratic transition. Zunes (2011) argued that any military intervention would reduce the chances of a “successful transition to democracy” and undermine local movements. Others such as the editors at The Nation (2011), argued that military solutions were easy and persuasive in theory, however in practice they usually lead to more problems than they solved. There was a substantiated fear that “enforcement operations” would result in the disregard of civilian protection (Bellamy and Williams, 2011).
The NATO powers had purposely sidelined and marginalized the AU’s diplomatic initiatives and instead decided to derive regional legitimacy from cooperating with the Arab League who supported and encouraged the no-fly zone (Kasaija, 2013). On March the 18th, the AU Ad Hoc Committee on Peace and Security met and decided to send a diplomatic mission to Tripoli the following day but the mission was undermined by the no fly-zone which came into effect the 19th of March (de Waal, 2012). Additionally, the AU had tried to set up many diplomatic negotiations, most of which were supported by Gaddafi but were denied by the Western-backed rebels (Wedgewood and Dorn, 2015: 33)
Although, according to de Waal (2012), the diplomatic initiatives of the AU were relatively weak and its members had polarized opinions, if the AU’s knowledge and ability to negotiate with Gaddafi and NATO’s non-military international pressure were combined then maybe the alternative diplomatic route would have been an option in Libya. While it is always easier to adopt the hypothetical in retrospect, Kuperman (2013: 132) estimated that the military intervention amplified the length of Libya’s war by six times, and the number of casualties by around ten times.
Essentially, based on this comparison, diplomatic and non-military means, as well as greater AU involvement, should have been explored before militarily intervening because this could have spared lives and paved a way to a less hurdled course to a peace and democracy.