Copy - paste from Aristotle "POLITICS" page 101-103... I really think so if you will read the next you will understand so "republic" is not "democracy"
"Part XIV
Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion, we will proceed
to speak of the points which follow next in order. We will consider the
subject not only in general but with reference to particular constitu-
tions. All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good
lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for each constitution. When
they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they differ
from one another, constitutions differ. There is (1) one element which
deliberates about public affairs; secondly (2) that concerned with the
magistrates—the question being, what they should be, over what they
should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing to
them; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power.
The deliberative element has authority in matters of war and peace,
in making and unmaking alliances; it passes laws, inflicts death, exile,
confiscation, elects magistrates and audits their accounts. These powers
must be assigned either all to all the citizens or an to some of them (for
example, to one or more magistracies, or different causes to different
magistracies), or some of them to all, and others of them only to some.
That all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy;this is the sort of equality which the people desire. But there are various
ways in which all may share in the government; they may deliberate, not
all in one body, but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian.
There are other constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet
and deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of the
tribes and the very smallest divisions of the state, until every one has
obtained office in his turn. The citizens, on the other hand, are assembled
only for the purposes of legislation, and to consult about the constitu-
tion, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In another variety of
democracy the citizen form one assembly, but meet only to elect magis-
trates, to pass laws, to advise about war and peace, and to make scruti-
nies. Other matters are referred severally to special magistrates, who
are elected by vote or by lot out of all the citizens Or again, the citizens
meet about election to offices and about scrutinies, and deliberate con-
cerning war or alliances while other matters are administered by the
magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote. I am speak-
ing of those magistracies in which special knowledge is required. A
fourth form of democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate
about everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only make the
preliminary inquiries; and that is the way in which the last and worst
form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family
oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present administered. All these modes are
democratical.
On the other hand, that some should deliberate about all is oligar-
chical. This again is a mode which, like the democratical has many
forms. When the deliberative class being elected out of those who have
a moderate qualification are numerous and they respect and obey the
prohibitions of the law without altering it, and any one who has the
required qualification shares in the government, then, just because of
this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only
selected individuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations
of the state, then, although, as in the former case, they observe the law,
the government is a pure oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the
power of deliberation are self-elected, and son succeeds father, and they
and not the laws are supreme—the government is of necessity oligarchi-
cal. Where, again, particular persons have authority in particular mat-
ters—for example, when the whole people decide about peace and war
and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate everything else, and
they are elected by vote—there the government is an aristocracy. And if some questions are decided by magistrates elected by vote, and others
by magistrates elected by lot, either absolutely or out of select candi-
dates, or elected partly by vote, partly by lot—these practices are partly
characteristic of an aristocratical government, and party of a pure con-
stitutional government.
These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they corre-
spond to the various forms of government. And the government of each
state is administered according to one or other of the principles which
have been laid down. Now it is for the interest of democracy, according
to the most prevalent notion of it (I am speaking of that extreme form of
democracy in which the people are supreme even over the laws), with a
view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting
courts of law. For in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges
are compelled to attend under pain of a fine, whereas in deinocracies the
poor are paid to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be adopted
by democracies in their public assemblies, for they will advise better if
they all deliberate together—the people with the notables and the no-
tables with the people. It is also a good plan that those who deliberate
should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of the different
classes; and that if the people greatly exceed in number those who have
political training, pay should not be given to all, but only to as many as
would balance the number of the notables, or that the number in excess
should be eliminated by lot. But in oligarchies either certain persons
should be co-opted from the mass, or a class of officers should be ap-
pointed such as exist in some states who are termed probuli and guard-
ians of the law; and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively
with matters on which these have previously deliberated; for so the people
will have a share in the deliberations of the state, but will not be able to
disturb the principles of the constitution. Again, in oligarchies either the
people ought to accept the measures of the government, or not to pass
anything contrary to them; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the
decision should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is done
in constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies; the veto
of the majority should be final, their assent not final, but the proposal
should be referred back to the magistrates. Whereas in constitutional
governments they take the contrary course; the few have the negative,
not the affirmative power; the affirmation of everything rests with the
multitude.
These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative, that is, the supreme element in states."