Notwithstanding the personal legislative power conferred upon Congress at Art. I, § 8, cl. 6 of the Constitution, it appears that the Act would make ownership of property a criminal offense. This monograph provides a remedy for those Americans who are not subject to this legislation.
Note: All case citations in this monograph are from the Supreme Court of the United States.
* * * *
There are three and only three kinds of legislative power and executive and judicial jurisdiction: (1) territorial, (2) personal, and (3) subject-matter.
Legislative Power
What distinguishes the U.S. Constitution from all other instruments of creation in the community of nations is that it has no provision that confers upon the national legislature (Congress), power of territorial legislation over Americans residing or property located outside the territory that is the seat of the national government; rather, this power is the exclusive domain of each respective member of the Union; to wit:
“[W]ithin any state of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and property are the functions of the state government. . . . The laws of congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national goverment [sic].” Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211, 215 (1894).
“The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the right [sic] and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
[95 U.S. 714, 723] “[T]he exercise of this jurisdiction [over those domiciled within its limits] in no manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State within which it is situated. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.”
The Constitution confers upon Congress power of (a) personal legislation over Americans residing within the Union, but only in respect of the criminal offenses enumerated at Art. I, § 8, cl. 6 and 10 thereof, and (b) subject-matter legislation over those things enumerated at Art. I, § 8, cl. 1-5, 7-9, and 11-16.
The Constitution does confer upon Congress power of territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation (called exclusive legislation), but only in (what will be) the District of Columbia and “all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings” (Art. I, § 8, cl. 17), and “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
The Supreme Court confirms the foregoing facts:
“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .” Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).
Executive and Judicial Jurisdiction
Executive and judicial power is co-extensive with the legislative power of Congress; i.e., officers of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have legislative power in a particular geographic area; to wit:
“It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the General Government . . .” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435 (1793).
“[I]t is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . .” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 808 (1824).
This means that officers of the executive and judicial branches of the general government have (a) exclusive / general jurisdiction (territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction) in the District of Columbia and “all Places purchased . . . for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings” (Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 17) and “Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” (Id. at Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2), and (b) limited jurisdiction (personal and subject-matter jurisdiction only) in the Union (Id. at Art. I, § 8, cl. 1-5, 7-9, and 11-16).
As mentioned above, the Constitution confers upon Congress power of personal legislation over Americans residing throughout the Union to (a) “provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States” (Art. I, § 8, cl. 6), and (b) “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations” (Art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
Notwithstanding the personal legislative power conferred upon Congress at Art. I, § 8, cl. 6 of the Constitution, it appears that the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” would make ownership of property a criminal offense.
If an act of Congress is not authorized by the Constitution, no executive or judicial jurisdiction is created; to wit:
“As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. . . . It can be brought into activity in no other way. . . .” The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867).
The right to ownership of property is equivalent to the unalienable right to “the pursuit of Happiness,” as guaranteed in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776; to wit: “Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .” (Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872))—and Congress have no authority to enact legislation that makes ownership of property within the Union a crime or deprives any resident of any member of the Union of the unalienable right to liberty or property without due process of law, i.e., process according to the law of the land, the Constitution; to wit:
“Due process of law is process according to the law of the land. . . .” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533 (1884).
[110 U.S. 516, 535] “Due process of law in the latter [Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution] refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the legislative powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution of the United States, exercised within the limits therein prescribed . . .”
The “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017,” as proposed, appears to violate certain basic principles memorialized in the foundational instruments upon which the Republic was established, the: (a) unalienable right to liberty and property, as guaranteed in the Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, (b) right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution, and (c) right to enjoyment of liberty and property unless by due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Article of Amendment thereto.
How can this be?
Rules of Statutory Construction
It is not possible to understand the meaning of the provisions of the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” or any other statute without knowledge of the rules with which it was composed: the semi-secret but simple rules of statutory construction.
The root of this particular use of the word “construction” is “construe,” not “construct”—and to construe means to analyze and interpret or explain the connection of words. The rules of statutory construction allow for statutes to be written in as few words as possible yet comprehend everything that is intended. The basic rules of statutory construction are the key to understanding statutes and dealing with government officers.
The principal and universal rules of statutory construction, though presented piecemeal in American law dictionaries, appear in tandem in the Oxford Dictionary of Law; to wit, in pertinent part:
The principal rules of statutory interpretation are as follows:
(1) An Act must be construed as a whole, so that internal inconsistencies are avoided.
(2) Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule.
(3) Ordinary words must be given their ordinary meanings and technical words their technical meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is the golden rule.
(4) When an Act aims at curing a defect in the law any ambiguity is to be resolved in such a way as to favour that aim (the mischief rule).
(5) The rule ejusdem generis (of the same kind): when a list of specific items belonging to the same class is followed by general words (as in “cats, dogs, and other animals”), the general words are to be treated as confined to other items of the same class (in this example, to other domestic animals).
(6) The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other): when a list of specific items is not followed by general words it is to be taken as exhaustive. For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
(7) The rule in in pari materia (on the like matter): when a prior Act is found to be “on the like matter” it can be used as an aid in construing the statute in question . . .
(8) The rule noscitur a sociis (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . .
. . . Penal and taxing statutes are subject to strict construction . . . A Dictionary of Law, Seventh Edition, Jonathan Law and Elizabeth Martin, Editors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) (hereinafter the “Oxford Dictionary of Law”), p. 295.
It will be found that nearly every statute enacted by Congress can be construed accurately using only Rule 5, 6, or 8 of the above rules.
Congress create a different kind of “State” and “United States” than those found in the Constitution
At the time of the Constitution, “State” and “United States” are, respectively, a common noun and proper noun—the meaning of the former everyone knows to be one of the commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union, and the latter the collective of all of the former.
Beginning June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 306 (see Sec. 182), and continuing to the present today, however, using the rules of statutory construction to craft the legislation, Congress have changed the meaning of (a) “State” to comprehend only the territories and District of Columbia (and sometimes political subdivisions thereof or Indian tribes) and exclude the body politic of every member of the Union, and (b) the geographic “United States” to mean only the District of Columbia or the collective of the District of Columbia and the territories and exclude all members of the Union—and the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” is no exception.
Since June 30, 1864, there is no legislative act of Congress—amendments to the Constitution notwithstanding—that comprehends any member of the Union in the meaning of the statutory definition of “State” or “United States”; and today there are no less than 75 different definitions of “United States” scattered throughout the so-called United States Code.
Congress have unilaterally effectively altered the Constitution by ordinary act and self-authorized themselves and executive and judicial officers to oppress anyone and everyone who is unaware (by reason of ignorance of the rules of statutory construction) that he or she is not a resident of one of the statutory “States” or “United States,” as “State” and “United States” are defined in the so-called United States Code, rendering all such legislation—in respect of the geographic area comprising the Union—void; to wit:
“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
“Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
“If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-177 (1803).
[5 U.S. 137, 178] “If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he [sic] constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”
Meaning of “United States” in the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017”
The proposed “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” consists exclusively of certain amendments to certain sections of Titles 18 Crime and Criminal Procedure and 31 Money and Finance of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”).
• Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum. It is a miserable slavery where the law is vague or uncertain. John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the Eighth Edition) (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s Law Dictionary”), p. 2145.
• Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum. Where the law is uncertain, there is no law. Id. at 2165.
• Est autem vis legem simulans. Violence may also put on the mask of law. Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1891), p. 433.
The “United States” of Title 18 U.S.C. Crimes and Criminal Procedure
The controlling definition of the geographic “United States” in Title 18 U.S.C. provides:
§5. United States defined
The term “United States”, as used in this title in a territorial sense, includes all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.
Firstly, inclusion of the phrase “except the Canal Zone” is superfluous and misleading because (a) as of October 1, 1979, the United States returns to Panama approximately 60 percent of what is known as the “Canal Zone,” the Canal Zone ceases to exist in name, and the remaining 40 percent is dubbed the “Canal Area,” and (b) as of 12:00 Noon December 31, 1999, the United States returns to Panamanian rule all interest in the Panama Canal and Canal Area.
Secondly, we cannot identify the places and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States before we establish the meaning of “United States.” The above definition of “United States” is impossible to construe / interpret in a lawful manner because it is circular, depending exclusively on an unknowable meaning of “United States” before we can determine the meaning of the official definition of the same statutory term, “United States.”
Notwithstanding the above fatal defect in the controlling definition of “United States” in Title 18 U.S.C.: As mentioned at the top of this monograph in Chisholm and Osborn, there is no provision of the Constitution that confers upon Congress power of territorial legislation over persons or property anywhere in the Union, only power of personal legislation (in certain criminal matters) and subject-matter legislation (over certain subjects).
Whereas, no part of the Union is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the general government of the Republic, it is a certainty that the unqualified phrase “jurisdiction of the United States” in the definition at 18 U.S.C. § 5, does not comprehend any part of the Union; only geographic areas over which the Constitution confers upon Congress power of all three types of legislation—territorial, personal, and subject-matter legislation (called exclusive legislation)—as provided at Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 and Art. IV, § 3, 2.
This means that none of the 50 commonwealths united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union are part of the Title 18 U.S.C. § 5 geographic “United States.”
Irrespective of the above interpretational courtesy, the definition of “United States” at 18 U.S.C. § 5 is void for vagueness (“Where the law is uncertain, there is no law,” supra), and no mention of “United States” in Title 18 U.S.C. obtains lawfully anywhere in the Union (this statement, however sweeping, is 100 percent accurate).
The “United States” of Title 31 U.S.C. Money and Finance
The controlling definition of the geographic “United States” in Title 31 U.S.C. provides:
§ 103. United States
In this title, “United States”, when used in a geographic sense, means the States of the United States and the District of Columbia.
Since we cannot know what “the States of the United States” are until we determine the meaning of “United States,” the phrase “the States of the United States” is of uncertain meaning and we must resort to the rules of statutory construction to construe the definition properly.
The rule of statutory construction that applies is noscitur a sociis; to wit:
The rule noscitur a sociis (known by its associates): when a word or phrase is of uncertain meaning, it should be construed in the light of the surrounding words . . . Oxford Dictionary of Law, p. 295.
The words surrounding the subject phrase of uncertain meaning are “‘United States’, when used in a geographic sense, means . . . the District of Columbia.”
Application of the rule of statutory construction noscitur a sociis reveals that every appearance of “United States” in every section of Title 31 U.S.C. amended by the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” means the District of Columbia and no other thing.
The above interpretation of the meaning of the statutory term “United States” is consistent throughout the so-called United States Code and all other congressional legislation. A blatant corroborating example thereof may be found in the Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC (adopted by every member of the Union), in which “United States” is a singular proper noun; to wit: “The United States is located in the District of Columbia.” UCC § 9-307(h).
The “States” of Title 31 U.S.C. Money and Finance
Whereas, there is no definition of “State” in Title 18 U.S.C. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Title 31 U.S.C. Money and Finance has 10 different definitions of this term the meaning of nine of which resolves upon application of the same rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis.
Here are some of the definitions of “State” in Title 31 U.S.C. (Bold emphasis added in all citations.):
Subchapter IV - PROHIBITION ON FUNDING OF UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING
. . . § 5362. Definitions
In this subchapter:
. . . (9) State.—The term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or other possession of the United States.
Chapter 62 - CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT
§ 6201. Definitions
As used in this chapter, the term—
. . . (2) “State” means any State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands[*]; . . .
- The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands comprised three major island groups, the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls (except for the southernmost of the Marianas, Guam). In 1986 the U.S. government declared the Trust Territory agreements no longer in effect.
Chapter 67 - FEDERAL PAYMENTS
. . . § 6720. Definitions, application, and administration
(a) Definitions.—In this chapter—
. . . (4) ‘‘State’’ means any of the several States and the District of Columbia;
Note: Whereas, 31 U.S.C. § 103 expressly defines “United States” in a geographic sense, but omits such language in any of its definitions of “State,” it is reasonable to conclude that the definitions of “State” are not intended in a geographical but political sense.
Because no word defines itself, and all of the above Title 31 U.S.C. definitions use “State” to define “State” and have a phrase of uncertain meaning within their provisions, i.e., “any State of the United States,” “any State,” and “any of the several States,” respectively, we must look to the rules of statutory construction for resolution.
Application of noscitur a sociis to:
• 31 U.S.C. § 5362(9) reveals that “State” means the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or other possession of the “United States” (i.e., of the District of Columbia; see 31 U.S.C. § 103 United States, supra) and no other thing;
• 31 U.S.C. § 6201(2) reveals that “State” means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands and no other thing; and
• 31 U.S.C. § 6720(a)(4) reveals that “State” means the District of Columbia and no other thing.
One of the definitions of “State” in Title 31 U.S.C. requires application of a rule of statutory construction other than noscitur a sociis; to wit:
Chapter 73 - ADMINISTERING BLOCK GRANTS
. . . § 7302. Definitions
In this chapter—
. . . (2) “State” includes the District of Columbia and territories and possessions of the United States.
Rule 6 of the above rules of statutory construction provides:
The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the other): when a list of specific items is not followed by general words it is to be taken as exhaustive. For example, “weekends and public holidays” excludes ordinary weekdays.
In the 31 U.S.C. definition of “State,” the list of specific items included in the definition, i.e., “the District of Columbia and territories and possessions of the United States,” is not followed by general words. This signifies that the list is exhaustive as given and excludes all other things.
Wherefore, (a) neither definition of “United States” in Title 18 or 31 of the so-called United States Code comprehends the geographic area occupied by the body politic of any member of the Union, and (b) no definition of “State” in Title 31 U.S.C. embraces the body politic of any member of the Union—meaning: The provisions of the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” and Title 31 U.S.C. are of no force or effect anywhere in the Union, only the District of Columbia and other federal territory as enumerated in each respective definition.
No authority to alter the meaning of words used in the Constitution
• Words that are reasonably capable of only one meaning must be given that meaning whatever the result. This is called the literal rule. Oxford Dictionary of Law, p. 295.
• Proprietates verborum observandæ sunt. The proprieties of words (i. e. proper meanings of words) are to be observed. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 2155.
• Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressa fienda est. When there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary to the words is to be made. Id. at 2160.
• Quando verba et mens congruunt, non est interpretationi locus. When the words and the mind agree, there is no place for interpretation. Id. at 2156.
• Quæ ad unum finem locuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri. Words spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another. Id. at 2155.
• Verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Words are to be so understood that the subject-matter may be preserved rather than destroyed. Id. at 2167.
Congress have no authority to change the meaning of “State” or “United States” as those words are used in the Constitution; to wit:
“A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. . . .” Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-449 (1934) (Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting).
[290 U.S. 398, 450] “Chief Justice Taney, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, said that, while the Constitution remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption; that it is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.
“And in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-449, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, this court quoted these words with approval, and said:
“‘The Constitution is a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it met when adopted, it means now. . . . Those things which are within its grants of power, as those grants were understood when made, are still within them, and those things not within them remain still excluded.’”
Treason to the Constitution
Every single act of Congress and action of executive and judicial officers requires constitutional authority (see The Mayor, supra).
Pretending that “State” and “United States” mean something other than what they mean in and at the time of the Constitution by legislating “official” definitions with absurd, constitutionally opposite meanings in the so-called United States Code does not legitimize the legislation, the contrived definitions, or the meaning of those definitions—because there is no constitutional authority for any such legislative act.
Congress are usurping exercise of territorial legislative power over those residing and property located in the geographic area of the Union, and executive and judicial officers are extending their territorial jurisdiction beyond the limits fixed by the Constitution to the District of Columbia and other federal territory, and usurping exercise of territorial jurisdiction over said Americans and property—each instance of which is an act of treason to the Constitution; to wit:
“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821).
How Congress and executive and judicial officers justify the fraud and treason
There are two sovereign authorities in the American Republic, each with its own respective geographic area: (1) Congress, who have power of exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia and other federal territory, and (2) the American People, also known as “joint tenants in the sovereignty,”[1] who are the supreme political authority in the Union.
Knowing that the Constitution makes no provision for them to exercise territorial legislation over Americans or their property anywhere in the Union, Congress came up with a scheme that would allow them and executive and judicial officers to pretend that the legal residence of almost every American is a geographic area over which Congress enjoy territorial legislative power, and executive and judicial officers territorial jurisdiction, over persons and property, so as to be able to justify application of deadly force against ordinary Americans residing, and seizure of property located, within the Union.
A brief but sufficient treatment of the subjects of residence, domicile, and legal residence is as follows:
residence. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. . . . Residence usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time, but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. Cf. Domicile. . . . Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1999), p. 1310.
domicile (dom-ə-sil), n., 1. The place at which a person is physically present and that the person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere. . . . 2. The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. Also termed (in sense 2) legal residence. . . . Id. at 501
The vehicle devised to effectuate the con: the Social Security retirement program.
It is significant to note that upon application of: (a) expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the definition of “State” in Section 1101(a)(1) of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, the only “States” of Social Security are the bodies politic of the District of Columbia and territories of Alaska and Hawaii (each of which will be admitted into the Union 24 years later, in 1959), and (b) noscitur a sociis to the definition of “United States” in Section 1101(a)(2) of the Act, the geographic United States comprises the District of Columbia and territories of Alaska and Hawaii and no other thing.
This means that on August 14, 1935, the only “State” residents eligible to apply for admission into the Social Security retirement program are residents of the District of Columbia and territories of Alaska and Hawaii; no one else is eligible. To this date, no member of the Union is embraced by any definition of “State” or “United States” in any Social Security legislation.
“Unumquodque est id quod est principalius in ipso. That which is the principal part of a thing is the thing itself,” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 2166, and upon inspection it is discovered that despite its advertised purpose as a retirement program, the principal part of the organic Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, is income tax.
The Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, is income-tax legislation—and the material / physical fact of one’s residence for the general purposes of life and major life-interests, in geographic area occupied by the body politic of one of the members of the Union—his or her “preeminent headquarters”—bars peremptorily any claim that for the purpose of taxation he or she resides or is domiciled in the District of Columbia; to wit:
“When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in one place in point of interest and attachment and for the general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has no residence, for the purpose of taxation. P. 426. 14. Physical facts of residence, united with major life interests may fix domicile — one’s “preeminent headquarters.” Id. 15. The burden of proof is on one who claims that an earlier domicile was abandoned for a later one. P. 427.” Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
Today, anyone who is entitled to receive (but not realize) Social Security retirement or survivor benefits—which includes virtually every American—is deemed by Congress and every executive and judicial officer of the United States to be a United States Government employee and member of the class defined as “Federal personnel”; to wit (Bold emphasis added):
UNITED STATES CODE
. . . Title 5 - GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
. . . § 552a. Records maintained on individuals
(a) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
. . . (13) the term “Federal personnel” means officers and employees of the Government of the United States, members of the uniformed services (including members of the Reserve Components), individuals entitled to receive immediate or deferred retirement benefits under any retirement program of the Government of the United States (including survivor benefits).
The above section of Title 5 U.S.C. controls all United States Government records maintained on individuals.
All true government employees and Federal personnel, of course, are either actual residents of the District of Columbia or legal residents thereof because of the jurisdiction from whence their respective paycheck issues: the District of Columbia.
The above statute from Title 5 U.S.C. Government Organization and Employees is why ordinary Americans (Social Security account holders) are alleged to be liable for income tax wherever in the world they may live, work, or travel: They are declared by statute to be United States Government employees / Federal personnel and therefore residents, for legal purposes, of the District of Columbia.
Conclusion
No executive or judicial officer of the United States is authorized to perform any act without constitutional authority (see The Mayor, supra). An executive or judicial officer attempting to impose a federal statute against someone or his / her property requires territorial jurisdiction—and no executive or judicial officer of the United States can cite any provision of the Constitution that gives such officer the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction anywhere in the Union (see Caha, Pennoyer, supra), only the District of Columbia or other federal territory.
Like other such legislation, the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” is predicated on the presumption that all targets of the Act (Social Security account holders) are residents, actual or legal, of the District of Columbia, territory over which Congress are sovereign and can make any law they want respecting the residents thereof and property located there.
If the Act becomes law, some might think that upon challenge a government officer could say that the constitutional authority that gives him the capacity to take personal jurisdiction and enforce criminal counterfeiting statutes in the Union is Art. I, § 8, cl. 6, which provides that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States.”
Inclusion of laws that provide for the punishment of counterfeiting in the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” confers neither legitimacy / constitutionality on the remainder of its provisions nor authority, under the guise of enforcing counterfeiting or other criminal statutes, to deprive a Union-member resident of the unalienable right to liberty or property without due process of law (Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution) or conduct peremptory and unreasonable searches and seizures of any kind anywhere in the Union except “upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (Fourth Article of Amendment to the Constitution).
That the provisions of the Act (as well as Titles 18 and 31 of the United States Code) violate the Fourth and Fifth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution and Preamble to The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, is conclusive proof that Congress are not relying on Art. I, § 8, cl. 6 of the Constitution as authority for the Act.
In actuality, the authority for the proposed Act is Art. I, § 8, cl. 17—which gives Congress territorial legislative power (one aspect of exclusive legislative power) over the District of Columbia, and, therefore, executive and judicial officers capacity to take territorial jurisdiction (one aspect of general jurisdiction) and enforce provisions of the Act against residents of and property located in the District of Columbia.
• Rerum ordo confunditur, si unicuique jurisdictio non servatur. The order of things is confounded if every one preserves not his jurisdiction. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 2161.
• Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur impune. One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory cannot be obeyed with impunity. Id. at 2134.
The order of things is confounded because every Member of Congress and executive and judicial officer of the United States has been, among other things, extending his territorial jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, into the geographic area of the Union for some time now.[2]
Whereas, it is a certainty that no executive or judicial officer of the United States would, upon demand, cite any provision of the Constitution as authority to enforce the proposed “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017” or any other such legislation: Demand (whether verbally or in writing or both) for the constitutional authority that gives an executive or judicial officer the capacity to take territorial jurisdiction or enforce a federal statute against person or property in a particular county, borough, or parish, is a remedy—because every officer has a duty to present it, whether in the moment or afterwards, and there is no such constitutional authority. Should a confrontation escalate, the officer would know that he is going to have to come up with constitutional authority at some point or risk criminal charges or a civil lawsuit (and personal liability) or both. A stalemate is better than defeat.
In keeping with the title and contents of this monograph, the only persons who would be subject to the provisions of the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017,” as proposed, are those who (a) take up housekeeping (actual residence), or (b) realize earnings directly from a source (whether governmental or private) or own real property or a business that is located within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia (legal residence).[3] Such individuals represent less than one percent of the American population.
~ Lockesmith.
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1 “The same feudal ideas [that in European countries, particularly in England, the Prince is the sovereign and the people his subjects] run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793).
2 The scope of this situation is too extensive to be included in this monograph.
3 Even though legal residents of the District of Columbia are subject to the provisions of the “Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017,” no executive or judicial officer of the United States is authorized to enforce those provisions against such legal residents anywhere in the Union in the absence of due process of law, i.e., process according to the law of the land, the Constitution. The same is not true, however, in the District of Columbia.