But it is impossible for me to think of this stuff as being affected by anything other than
something that is itself stuff. Consequently, since I do – as I must – think of myself as having an effect
on this stuff, I also become for myself stuff; and insofar as I view myself in this way, I call myself a
material body. Viewed as a principle of an efficacy in the world of bodies, I am an articulated body; and
the representation of my body is itself nothing but the representation of myself as a cause in the world of
bodies and is therefore indirectly only a certain way of looking at my own absolute activity.
But now the will is supposed to exercise causality, and indeed, an immediate causality upon my body;
and the body as an instrument, that is, the articulated body [ die Artikulation], extends only as far as this immediate causality of the will extends. (This preliminary survey does not include that aspect of my
body known as organization.)2The will is therefore also different from the body, and it appears as not being the same as the body. This distinction, however, is nothing more than yet another separation of
what is subjective from what is objective, or more specifically, it is a particular aspect of the original
separation. In this relationship the will is what is subjective and the body is what is objective.
9
But what is my actual causality? What is the change that is supposed to ensue thereby in the sensible
world? What is the sensible world that is supposed to be changeable by means of this causality?
2 Concerning the difference between the human body as a mere organism or “organization” and the
human body as an essential tool or instrument of the will, that is, as an “articulated” body, see § 11 of
WLnm( FTP, pp. 250–257 [ GAIV/2: 108–12 and IV/3: 418–422]).
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Insofar as something subjective in me is transformed into something objective, the concept of an end
into a decision of the will, and the latter in turn into a certain modification of my body: to this extent, I
obviously represent myself as changed. But this last item that I attribute to myself, my physical body, is
supposed to be connected with the entire world of bodies; and thus if the former is intuited as changed,
so is the latter necessarily viewed as changed as well [IV, 12].
The thing that can be changed as a result of my efficacy, that is, the specific constitutionor the
propertiesof nature [ Beschaffenheit der Natur], is entirely the same as that which cannot be changed; i.
e., it is mere matter, simply viewed from a different side – just as, above, the causality of the concept
with respect to what is objective appeared, respectively, as will and as body when viewed from different
sides. Viewed subjectively and in connection with me as an active subject or agent, what is changeable
is nature; what is unchangeable is this same nature, viewed entirely and solely objectively, and this is
unchangeable for the reasons indicated above.
The entire manifold contained in the perception of our sensible efficacy has now been derived from the
laws of consciousness, which is what was demanded. We find that the last point we have inferred is the
very same as the point with which we began; our investigation has returned upon itself and is therefore
concluded.
Briefly stated, the result of this investigation is as follows: nothing is absolute but pure activity, and all
consciousness and all being is grounded upon this pure activity. In accordance with the laws of
consciousness, and, more specifically, in accordance with the basic law that an agent [ das Tätige] can be
viewed only as a unified subject and object (as an I), this activity appears as an efficacy exercised uponsomething outside of me. All the things included in this appearance – from, at the one extreme, the end
that is posited absolutely by myself, to, at the other extreme, the raw stuff of the world – are mediating
elements of the same, and are hence themselves only appearances. Nothing is purely true but my self-
sufficiency [IV, 13].3
3 In the original edition there here followed two pages of announcements of Fichte’s other writings that
had appeared with the same publisher and a of The System of Ethics, which has been
incorporated into the at the beginning of the present edition.
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