The two-pronged arbitration process between the unelected EOS Core Arbitration Forum (ECAF) and the Block Producers (BPs) has proven to be a disaster in two short weeks following the mainnet launch. So far, we’ve had:
- Non-transparent freezing of accounts made under arbitrary and fallible decision-making processes
- Byzantine fault tolerance fail. A failure on the part of BPs to follow through with rulings - not intentionally - but due to human error
- Collateral damage from arbitrary rulings seen in the form of conforming members having their funds frozen
- Cult-like behavior of cronyism, censorship and favoritism ruling the governance process in the determination and execution of rulings through an informal decision making process
- A myriad of social engineering attack vectors that have been revealed and will inevitably be exploited
All the issues outlined above stem from the fact that when it comes to blockchain governance, anything that can be exploited will be exploited. Any constitution and governing body whose rulings are contingent on human input instead of code alone does not work in an adversarial environment with a diversity of stakeholders each with incentives that are often not aligned.
The Block.one reformulation with v2.0 is a step in the right direction, but still fundamentally misses the mark.
Blockchain based systems are inherently adversarial in nature. As a design principle, one must assume the worst and design the incentives that way. If there is a possibility to exploit a blockchain design, then in a long enough timeline, it’s mathematically guaranteed that the exploit will happen. Version 2.0, while an improvement, is a far shot from an ideal blockchain-based system.
ChainRiftxxx’s reformulation of EOS Governance intends to remove arbitrary human input from the equation, and with it removing the fallibility, cronyism and lack of transparency that comes along with it. In order to do so, we replace the flawed EOS governance model with a system whose design principles are modeled with incentive structures built around an entirely adversarial environment.
The manifesto outlined below is the stance ChainRiftxxx has held pre-mainnet launch and continues to hold today.
ChainRiftxxx manifesto
I. No constitution
Any constitution and rulings that stem from it are unenforceable in practice, and is therefore redundant and doesn't add value to EOS investors.
II. No ECAF
The ECAF, or any elected governing body, is doubly guilty of the points made against any form of a human-ratified document as detailed in point I:
- It's not enforceable.
- It's even further susceptible to exploitation due to the centralization of authority without an appropriate system of checks and balances (of which any attempted system would still be fallible due to the human element).
III. Investors first
BPs will be incentivized to act in the best interest of EOS investors. If they don't, they will be voted out by empowered EOS investors who arguably care about their investment. In practical terms, this means that the BPs will focus on providing a secure and scalable infrastructure, and contribute to protocol and DApp development.
IV. Users hold liability
EOS investors hold full liability for their actions. Users who have lost private keys in phishing scams, or through individual failings cannot be compensated by a fallible ruling body. Until a decentralized opt-in arbitration process is in place, stakeholder liability is an essential tenet of a human error proof blockchain.
V. Opt-in smart contract based arbitration
Despite the claims made by many members of community, the reality is that there is no enforceable arbitration process that exists in EOS at the moment. If, and when a decentralized arbitration system is developed, the parties should be able to opt-in, with no involvement required by BPs.
VI. Block.one funds blacklisted
The recent announcement from Block.one doubling down on their unelected and unrepresented role in the EOS community as an "active voting member" should come as a major red flag.
We, as BP candidates, propose a move against Block.one in the opposite direction. The 10% of EOS supply delegated to Block.one with no prior representation should be blacklisted. Block.one has raised $5B+ in fundings over a year long ICO, which is sufficient for any startup in real world to continue to build products and services. This also removes undue influence by one entity in future directions of EOS, as is required for EOS to become more decentralized.