Since it looks like China is pressing it's advantage with a bought-off and senile corruptocrat in the White house, I'll share the last paper
I completed in grad school

CCP JUSTIFICATION OF DECEPTION OPS TARGETING THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF CONFUCIAN ETHICS FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF CHINESE POLICY

Military strategy must be kept secret and not promiscuously transmitted
Tai-pai Yin-ching

Introduction

China has developed it’s military strategy over the course of its historical experience. From an origination of highly formulaic, almost ritualized (Metcalf, 2017) warfare, Chinese strategy has adapted into a grand strategy along the full spectrum of war, including influence warfare. Part of this adaption has been as a result of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) experience, but a foundational role in the development can be seen in the ethical views of warfare originating in Confucian philosophy.

The modern manifestation of this evolution can be seen in the example of CCP deception operations directed at the United States. The use of this mode of warfare reflects the grand strategy of the CCP as it has evolved under the influence of Confucius.

The purpose of this literature review is to illustrate how these ethics led to the use of the deception tactic, and how this is justified bt the CCP under the conditions of the ethic. The first step in the process is to demonstrate the deception tactic in practice. The next step is to examine the role of the mode in overall CCP strategy. From there an exploration of the evolution of Chinese strategy in historical terms provides the framework for this modern strategy. An overview of Confucian ethics illustrates how the Chinese view strategy from the eyes of morality. Finally, putting these elements together demonstrates how the CCP can justify deception operations against the United States within its own ethical standards.

CCP Deception Operations Against The United States

Perhaps the easiest type of deception operation to understand is its application under purely military terms. Jensen (2020) describes the use of decoys (or dummies) by Chinese troops conducting field exercises to hide capabilities from American satellite surveillance. However, deception ops are not limited to use in conventional war. Ha and Cho (2020) assert that the United States note the disinformation campaign in which the CCP blamed America for bringing COVID-19 to China. A DHS report, “Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020.”, notes that this effort may be linked to a 10000+ member Twitter network. Peterson (2020) asserts that the “Confucius Institute” system (the Hanban, a system of educational partners with American universities) made cosmetic changes to avoid association with its use of other soft power moves against America, including influence peddling and espionage) with the purpose of continuing those operations. In a similar fashion, Iasiello (2016) notes the use of deception to blunt repercussions for other CCP espionage activities targeting America.

Deception operations should be viewed as a subset of information war operations, even outside (indeed, in particular, outside) the parameters of conventional war.

Deception Operations, Information War, And CCP Strategy

deLisle (2020) states that, “Since the early 2000s, the PLA has held as one of its principal doctrines “the three warfares” (୕ㇿ): psychological warfare (ᚰ⌮ㇿ), public opinion warfare (凭审ㇿ), and legal warfare (ἲᚊㇿ)”; The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is the CCP’s military arm, beyond it’s role as China’s amy(Cheng, 2013). Keeping in mind two things, first, that the term “information war” has different meanings to different entities, and second, that information war often takes place as a supporting mode of hybrid war, the concepts of psychological war and public opinion warfare noted by deLisle are considered to be under the umbrella term “information war” for this review’s purpose. A common understanding of the term is the control of information to provide advantage during conflict.

Accoding to Mulvenon (1999), the CCP seeks information dominance (zhixinxiquan), defined as “the ability to defend one’s own information while exploiting and assaulting an opponent’s information infrastructure. This information superiority has both technological and strategic components.” Note the use of “systems” as targets in conflict, rather than “opposing armies” (Engstrom, 2018)

he use of deception in information war as part of CCP strategy is doctrinal; Anderson and Engstrom (2009, p.10) note that “strategic deception is an ongoing process and covers ‘all types of measures and activities’ designed to confuse an opponent in peacetime or wartime, emphasizing the latter.”

However, it should also be noted that information war is only one component of the CCP approach, which requires what Nick Eftimiades, the author of Chinese Intelligence Operations, calls a “whole of society” integration of effort (Ventura, 2020). deLisle (2020) discusses the range of CCP power options, including information war. As an example of this unified strategy, Green (2016) discusses the convergence of information war, economy, and cyberspace by the CCP.

The use of deception ops/information is not a modern, or CCP, development; it’s use has been a staple of Chinese strategic philosophy.

A Brief History Of Chinese Strategy

• Pre-CCP Strategic Thought

Metcalf (2017) notes that “Ren Li, editor of* Lectures on Sun Tzu’s Art of War*, argues that ‘warfare is a way of deception’ is the most shocking concept in the Sun Tzu because it favors an unchoreographed, asymmetric approach to fighting while rejecting any notion of constancy in warfare”. While Sun Tzu is perhaps the best known of Chinese strategists, Muñoz, in his 2018 review of Sawyer’s study, provides an example maxims of deception from an array of other Chinese strategists following Sun Tzu’s work. Bruzdzinski (2013) explains how the concept of Shashoujian (“a synonym for a secret weapon as originally used in traditional Chinese storytelling to describe an ancient weapon of surprising power”, and the use of the word “surprise” should be noted here) has had a place in their culture since “antiquity”. However, Holmes (2000) explains the prevalence of themes from Sun Tzu’s work in Chinese views on regional and global balances of power.

• CCP Strategic Thought

he CCP, at its inception, worked under the strategic leadership of Mao and his China/CCP focused study of war; the base concept was “people’s War”. Yet, deception still played a role in this line of strategic thought. FM 90-2 notes Mao’s thoughts on “Distracted War”: “To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.”

ruzdzinski (2013) argues that the CCP as an entity begins shifting back to more of an emphasis towards the thought of Sun Tzu in the 1990s, using the springboard of American success in the Gulf War as impetus. Bruzdzinski does warn of pitfalls while studying modern CCP doctrine:“very little useful official information is publicly available or accessible to foreigners. Moreover, the national defense information that is made available by the PRC must be scrutinized carefully by researchers as it is commonly propagandist in nature and may be deliberately inaccurate for the purposes of perception management.” So it is interesting to see the deceptive mode so firmly entrenched in PLA practice as well as in theory.

Confucianism and Just War

ust as Sun Tzu plays the primal, but not solitary, role in Chinese (currently CCP) military thought, Confucius plays a central, although not exclusive role in Chinese ethics (Low, 2003). And echoing the return to Sun Tzu after Mao, Saha (2010) notes an official CCP reinvestment in Confucian thought following Mao’s rejection of that ideal. Bondes and Heep (2012) reinforce this idea, further noting the concept of a “harmonious society”. This “moral revival” definitely includes Chinese concepts of Just War.

• The Place Of Relationships In Confucian Ethics

There are two concepts of note: the “mandate of heaven” and the “five relationships”. Godehardt (2008) notes that Confucianism is mainly an ethical system for good governance; the emperor (in our terms, the sovereign...for the CCP, themselves) is at the apex of the relationship structure, but only as long as he has the “mandate of heaven”. Godehardt further notes that at that apex position, the emperor holds the mandate as long as he remains a bastion of virtue. The pyramid of authority under the “five relationships” is essentially a hierarchic model in which a citizen’s virtue is derived by how he fulfills the role he has in the structure.

• The Quasi-Paradox Of Just War

ust as CCP doctrine can be hard to study, the Chinese concept of Just War has not been studied very much (Godehardt, 2008). Perhaps this is due to a possible paradox. The emperor must be of supreme virtue, and waging war disrupts harmony (Godehardt, 2008). Yet, at the same time, “From a Confucian perspective, war—if waged by the emperor—is justified per se” (Godehardt, 2008). How can this paradox be resolved?

The CCP Justification For A War Of Deception Against America

An examination of the CCP policy of deception demonstrates that the maintenance of harmony and mandate is key to resolving the paradox. Godehardt (2008):

he concept of a harmonious society (hexie shehui) further highlights the constant significance of economic success and the general political direction in China. A harmonious Chinese society can only be accomplished in agreement with a peaceful and stable international environment—a harmonious world (hexie shijie). Domestic stability, therefore, describes the foundation of
China’s new “going out” mentality...

Nick Eftimiades (Ventura, 2020) explains why this “harmony” rests on an unequal relationship with other nations:
?he problem is China’s objectives, and this leads back to Confucian culture, which is still very pervasive in China and doesn’t really recognize equality. Culturally, they recognize you being below them, or you being above them, but there are no equals — and this pervades every aspect of their relationships from interpersonal all the way up to the international level.

And Eftimiades (Ventura, 2020) continues:

So China’s striving greatly, and I’ll quote Xi Jinping on this point, ‘to take its rightful place at the top of the world.’ China sees itself as having been superior and having suffered a century of humiliation at the hands of the West — and now that they have money, they intend to change the international order to something more suitable to the Chinese governance model

Mulvenon (1999) notes that the CCP understands their relative weakness to the United States in conventional and technological capabilities. However, this is not exactly a problem for the CCP due to the integral part of deception in their strategy. Bruzdzinski (2013) states that they believe they “can prevail in an asymmetric conflict against a superior military under the right conditions, despite the shortcomings of Chinese military hardware”

Conclusion

Muñoz (2018) ties everything together aptly: ““The highly developed Chinese body of doctrine on deception is particularly relevant today because of China’s long-term strategy to expand its influence worldwide through a well-integrated mix of diplomacy, propaganda, intelligence, technology acquisition and innovation, and commercial trade.” The themes of societal harmony, moral virtue, and deception culminate from China’s history of war strategy and philosophy of virtue based on good governance. This culmination results in a deception war against the United States as the CCP attempts to establish the world dominance they believe they ethically require in order to promote harmony within their own society.

References

Anderson, Eric C., and Jeffrey Engstrom. 2009. “China’s Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSAICStrategicDeceptionPaperRevis edDraft06Nov2009.pdf.

Bondes, Maria, and Sandra Heep. 2012. “Frames We Can Believe In: Official Framing and Ideology in the CCP’s Quest for Legitimacy.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2011686.

Bruzdzinski, Jason. 2013. “Demystifying Shashoujian: China’s ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Concept.” September 12, 2013. https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/demystifying-shashoujian- chinas-assassins-mace-concept.

Cheng, Dean. 2003. “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge.” The Heritage Foundation. Accessed November 28, 2020. https://www.heritage.org/global- politics/report/winning-without-fighting-the-chinese-psychological-warfare-challenge.

deLisle, Jacques. 2020. “Foreign Policy through Other Means: Hard Power, Soft Power, and China’s Turn to Political Warfare to Influence the United States.” Orbis 64 (2): 174–206. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.004.

Engstrom, Jeffrey. 2018. Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare. RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1708.

“FM 90-2 Chapter 5 Deception Means.” n.d. Accessed November 29, 2020. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm90-2/90-2ch5.htm#:~:text=-%20Mao%20Tse-Tung%2C %201893-1976%20on%20Distracted%20War%20Deception,Deception%20requires %20providing%20false%20indicators%20to%20the%20enemy.

Godehardt, Nadine. 2008. “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287161.

Ha, Matthew, and Alice Cho. 2020. “China’s Coronavirus Disinformation Campaigns Are Integral to Its Global Information Warfare Strategy.” The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (. April 30, 2020. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/04/30/chinas-coronavirus-disinformation-campaigns- are-integral-to-its-global-information-warfare-strategy/.

Holmes, Colleen K. 2000. “What the Chinese Learned from Sun-Tzu.” Carlisle Barracks, PA,17013: USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ ADA391266.pdf.

“Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020.” 2020. Washington, D.C: Department of Homeland Security. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat- assessment.pdf.

Iasiello, Emilio. 2016. “China’s Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities.” Journal of Strategic Security; San Jose 9 (2): n/a. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1489.

Jensen, Aaron. 2020. “Deception Is Key to Chinese Military Strategies.” The Diplomat. August 8, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/deception-is-key-to-chinese-military-strategies/.

Low, Sui Pheng. 2003. “Understanding the Mind of the Chinese: A Historical Perspective.” In Corruption and Governance in Asia, edited by John Kidd and Frank-Jürgen Richter. Houndmills, Balsingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Metcalf, Mark. 2017. “Deception Is the Chinese Way of War.” U.S. Naval Institute. February 1, 2017. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/deception-chinese-way-war.

Mulvenon, James C., and Richard H. Yang. 1999. “The PLA and Information Warfare.” In The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age. Santa Monica, CA.: RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145.html.

Muñoz, Arturo. 2018. “Review: Lever of Power: Military Deception in China and the West.” Studies in Intelligence 62 (3). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi- publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-62-no-3/lever-of-power.html.

Peterson, Rachelle. 2020. “China Is Rebranding Its Confucius Institutes | RealClearEducation.” Accessed November 26, 2020. https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2020/07/22/china_is_rebranding_its_confucius_institutes_ 110445.html.

Saha, Subrata. 2010. “China’s Grand Strategy: From Confucius to Contemporary:” Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA518303.

Ventura, Tim. 2020. “Chinese Espionage in the 21st Century: An Expert Opinion.” Medium. March 13, 2020. https://medium.com/predict/chinese-espionage-in-the-21st-century-an-expert-opinion- 5a98dcff646e.