WHEN the occupants of “Snowpanda House” in Ahtari zoo, Finland, were first allowed to play in the open air in mid-February, they bounded out and rolled in the white stuff. Xi Jinping, China’s president, had said the furry animals would act as “messengers of friendship” when he promised them to Finland during a visit last year en route to America. On the same trip Mr Xi used a refuelling stop in Alaska to butter up his hosts there, too. The American north was “a mythical, almost mystical place”, a local spokesperson quoted him as saying—a bit “like a Shangri-La”.
今年2月中旬，住在芬兰Ahtari动物园“雪地熊猫屋”的大熊猫被允许在户外玩耍，他们在雪地里撒欢。中国国家主席习近平曾表示，这些毛茸茸的动物可以作为“友谊的使者”，去年他在去美国访问的路上许诺将他们送给芬兰。在这趟行程中，习近平在阿拉斯加利用停留补充燃料的机会夸赞他的东道主，美国北部是一个“神秘的，不可思议的地方”，一位当地的发言人引用他的话说，“有点像香格里拉”。
Mr Xi has been showing a growing interest in Arctic countries. In 2014 he revealed in a speech that China itself wanted to become a “polar great power”. Last year he met leaders from seven of the eight members of the Arctic Council, a group of northern countries that admitted China and four other Asian states as observers in 2013. In January the Chinese government published its first policy document outlining its Arctic strategy. The paper referred to China as “a near-Arctic nation” (never mind that its most northerly settlement is no closer to the Arctic than Berlin is). It also linked China’s Arctic plans with Mr Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, a scheme for building infrastructure abroad to improve links between Asia, Africa and Europe.
习近平对北极圈国家表现出越来越大的兴趣。2014年，他在一次演讲中透露，中国自己想成为“极地强国”。去年，他会见了北极理事会(Arctic Council)八个成员国中的七国领导人。北极理事会成员是一群北方国家，在2013年承认中国和其他四个亚洲国家为观察员国。今年1月，中国政府发布了首份概述其北极战略的政策文件。这篇论文把中国称为“一个近北极的国家”(并不在意它最北端的定居点还没有柏林距北极近)。它还将中国的北极计划与习近平的“一带一路”计划联系起来，“一带一路”旨在在海外建设基础设施，提高亚洲、非洲和欧洲之间的联系。
China’s ambitions are fuelled by a wide range of interests. It wants access to the Arctic for its researchers so they can work out how melting ice affects weather patterns, among other things. Their findings could help China devise responses to its problems with air pollution and water scarcity. China is also keen to tap into the Arctic resources that will become easier to exploit as the ice cap retreats. They include fish, minerals, oil and gas. The region could hold a quarter of the world’s as-yet-undiscovered hydrocarbons, according to the United States Geological Survey. Chinese firms are interested in mining zinc, uranium and rare earths in Greenland.
中国的雄心受到广泛利益的驱动。它想让研究人员进入北极，这样他们就能计算出冰雪融化对天气模式的影响，以及其他事情。他们的发现可以帮助中国解决空气污染和水资源短缺的问题。中国也热衷于开发北极资源，随着冰盖的消融，这些资源将变得更容易利用。它们包括鱼、矿物、石油和天然气。根据美国地质调查局(United States Geological Survey)的数据，该地区可能拥有世界上四分之一尚未发现的碳氢化合物。中国企业对在格陵兰岛上开采锌、铀和稀土很感兴趣。
As the ice melts, it may become more feasible for cargo ships to sail through Arctic waters. China is excited by this possibility (its media speak of an “ice silk road”). In the coming decades such routes could cut several thousand kilometres off journeys between Shanghai and Europe. Sending ships through the Arctic could also help to revive port cities in China’s north-eastern rustbelt, notes Anne-Marie Brady, the author of a recent book, “China as a Polar Great Power”. China is thinking of building ports and other infrastructure in the Arctic to facilitate shipping. State-linked firms in China talk of building an Arctic railway across Finland.
随着冰层融化，货船在北极水域航行可能变得更加可行。中国对这种可能性感到兴奋(它的媒体称之为“冰上丝绸之路”)。在未来的几十年里，这样的路线可以将上海到欧洲的旅程缩短几千公里。最近出版的《中国——极地大国》一书的作者安妮-玛丽•布雷迪(Anne-Marie Brady)指出，让船只通过北极也有助于复兴中国东北地区的港口城市。中国正在考虑在北极建设港口和其他基础设施，以促进航运。中国的国有企业谈到要在建设一条贯穿芬兰的北极铁路。
Chinese analysts believe that using Arctic routes would help China strategically, too. It could reduce the need to ship goods through the Malacca Strait, a choke-point connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans. Much of China’s global shipping passes through the strait. It worries endlessly about the strait’s vulnerability to blockade—for example, should war break out with America.
中国分析人士认为，使用北极航线也有助于中国的战略发展。它可以减少通过马六甲海峡运输货物的需求，马六甲海峡是连接太平洋和印度洋的咽喉要道。中国的大部分全球航运都是从这个海峡通过。它一直担心海峡对封锁表现出的脆弱性——例如，如果与美国开战。
There are no heated territorial disputes in the Arctic, but there are sensitivities, including Canada’s claim to the North-West Passage, a trans-Arctic waterway that America regards as international—ie, belonging to no single state. China does not want to be seen as a clumsy interloper. One point of the policy document was to allay fears that China might muscle its way into the Arctic as it has in the South China Sea. The paper stresses that China will play by international rules and co-operate with the Arctic Council (its members include polar great-powers to reckon with: America and Russia).
北极地区没有激烈的领土争端，但也有一些敏感问题，包括加拿大对西北航道主权的主张，这是一条横跨北极的水道，美国把它看成是国际的，不属于任何一个国家。中国不希望被视为笨拙的闯入者。这份政策文件的一个要点是，减轻人们对中国可能会像在南中国海(South China Sea，中国称南海)一样强势进入北极的担忧。该报告强调，中国将遵守国际规则，并与北极理事会合作(其成员包括需要对付的极地强国:美国和俄罗斯)。
Plenty of non-Arctic countries, including European ones, have similar dreams. But China is “by far the outlier” in terms of the amount of money it has pledged or already poured into the region, says Marc Lanteigne of Massey University in New Zealand. Its biggest investments have been in Russia, including a gas plant that began operating in Siberia in December. Russia was once deeply cynical about China’s intentions. But since the crisis in Ukraine it has had to look east for investment in its Arctic regions.
许多非北极国家，包括欧洲国家，都有类似的梦想。但是，新西兰梅西大学的马克·兰蒂尼(Marc Lanteigne)说，中国在承诺投入或已经投入到该地区的金额上“远远超过了局外人”（该投入的金额）。其最大的投资是在俄罗斯，包括去年12月在西伯利亚开始运营的一家天然气工厂。俄罗斯曾经对中国的意图深感怀疑。但自乌克兰危机以来，它不得不向东方寻求对其北极地区的投资。
The interest shown by Chinese firms could be good news for many Arctic communities. Few other investors have shown themselves willing to stomach the high costs and slow pay-offs involved in developing the far north. But Chinese involvement attracts criticism, too. Greens who would rather see the Arctic kept pristine fear that Chinese money could encourage projects that cause pollution. No one wants to see the kind of problems that have afflicted some Chinese investments in Africa, where the outsiders stand accused of loading locals with debt while disregarding environmental and labour laws. The relative stability of the Arctic will attract Chinese firms looking for places to park their money where conflict is unlikely.
对许多北极社区来说，中国企业的兴趣可能是一个好消息。很少有其他投资者愿意承受投资这个遥远北方的高昂成本和缓慢回报。但中国的参与也招致了批评。那些宁愿看到北极保持原始状态的绿色环保人士担心，中国的资金可能会鼓励那些导致污染的项目。没有人希望看到中国在非洲的一些投资遇到的那种问题，在非洲，这个局外人被指责无视环境和劳动法，加重地人的债务。北极地区的相对稳定将吸引中国企业来发现投资项目，这个地方不太可能发生冲突。
The main concern of Arctic countries is that China’s ambitions will result in a gradual rewiring of the region’s politics in ways that give China more influence in determining how the Arctic is managed. Greenland is a place to watch. Political elites there favour independence from Denmark but resist taking the plunge because the island’s economy is so dependent on Danish support. The prospect of Chinese investment could change that. Should Greenland become independent, China could use its clout there to help further its own interests at meetings of Arctic states, in the same way that it uses its influence over Cambodia and Laos to prevent the Association of South-East Asian Nations from criticising Chinese behaviour in their neighbourhood.
北极国家的主要担忧是，通过中国更多的介入决定如果管理北极，中国的野心将导致该地区政治的逐步重新布局。可以看看格陵兰岛。那里的政治精英们倾向于从丹麦独立出来，但他们拒绝冒险，因为这个岛国的经济非常依赖丹麦的支持。中国投资的前景可能会改变这一状况。如果格陵兰独立，中国就可以利用其影响力在北极国家的会议上扩大自己的利益，就像它利用其对柬埔寨和老挝的影响力，来阻止东南亚国家联盟批评中国在其邻国的行为。
For all the reassuring language of China’s official statements on the Arctic, it is possible that its calculations may change as its Arctic investments grow. China’s diplomats may begin to chafe at their limited say in how the Arctic is run. At present, like other observers, China may not speak or vote at meetings of the Arctic Council, which is by far the most prominent of several regional forums. Aki Tonami at the University of Tsukuba in Japan says China’s policy paper devotes less space to the Arctic Council than might be expected, given the organisation’s importance. In the years to come China may prefer to deal with Arctic issues bilaterally or in settings such as the UN where it feels it has a bigger say, reckons Adam MacDonald of Dalhousie University in Canada. Or China could start pushing for a restructuring of the Arctic Council in ways that give non-Arctic states a more prominent role.
尽管中国官方在北极问题上说了很多让人放心的话，但随着北极投资的增长，它的计算可能会发生变化。中国的外交官们可能会开始对在北极如何运行的问题上，他们有限话语权感到不满。目前，与其他观察成员国一样，中国可能不会在北极理事会会议上发言或投票，北极理事会是迄今为止在几个地区论坛中最突出的一个。日本Tsukuba大学的Aki Tonami说，考虑到该组织的重要性，中国的政策文件在北极理事会的空间比预期的要少。加拿大达尔豪西大学(Dalhousie University)的亚当•麦克唐纳(Adam MacDonald)认为，在未来的几年里，中国可能更倾向于在双边或在联合国这样的环境中处理北极问题，因为在那里，它有更大的话语权。或者，中国可以开始推动北极理事会的重组，以使非北极国家发挥更重要的作用。
But tinkering with the Arctic’s administrative structure would be risky. Many countries believe the existing one has done a good job of promoting good-neighbourliness. That it is taking longer than expected for the economic benefits of a melting Arctic to become readily accessible may also help explain why countries in the region have not been bickering more: there have been few spoils to divvy up.
但是，随意摆弄北极的行政结构将是危险的。许多国家认为，现有的国家在促进睦邻友好方面做得很好。融化的北极的经济效益要比预期的长得多，这也有助于解释为什么该地区的国家没有更多的争吵:几乎没有什么东西可以瓜分。
It might be easier to work out how to accommodate the evolving interests of non-Arctic countries were America—the region’s most powerful country—to show more interest. Andrew Holland of the American Security Project, a think-tank, believes the United States will pay limited attention to Arctic debates while Donald Trump remains president. China’s route to the pole is widening.
或许会更容易的发现，适应非北极国家不断发展利益，需要美国，该地区最强大的国家，显示出更多的兴趣。智库美国安全项目的安德鲁•霍兰德认为，在唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)做美国总统期间，美国对北极争论的关注度将有限。中国通往北极的道路正在拓宽。