Second Conversation
A. Do not forget, my reader, the distinction we have drawn between two fundamental determinations of all possible consciousness, but keep in mind that I shall speak only of the former of the two which I have called the fundamental and primary determination of all life. Let us now renew our conversation, without any fear on your part as to how we can return to our argument.
Let us consider the interior of a mechanical work of art; for instance, of a watch. You observe many wheels of various kinds joined together in it, likewise springs, chains, &c. Your observation goes from one object to another in its perception of the manifold of the machinery. Tell me, does it make any difference to you in this, your observation, whether you commence with the upper or lower part of the machinery, with the right or left side of it?
R. Certainly not. I can complete my observation of the parts in all these directions.
A. But perhaps, instead of guiding your observation by the sequence of the parts, you direct it by other characteristics, as, for instance, their external similarity and equality?
R. This also is a matter of indifference to my observation.
A. Nevertheless, just as sure as you have observed the separate parts, you have observed them in a certain order of sequence, let us say from the upper part downward. Why, since there were many sequences possible for your observation, did you then choose this particular sequence and none other?
R. I cannot even say that I did choose it. I did not even consider that many sequences were possible. I immediately hit upon the one I followed. It was by chance, as we say when we can assign no ground.
A. The manifold of the above described fundamental determinations of consciousness in general doubtless observe also an order of sequence in your consciousness?
R. Assuredly. I observe in the world before me at present this, next that, next that, &c, &c.
A. Does it strike you at the first glance, that this sequence of your observation is necessary, or do you hold that the sequence might have been otherwise?
R. I hold that other sequences might have been possible, and, moreover, that I did not choose those observations which did occur in my consciousness with freedom, but that they came into me by chance, like the sequence of my observation of the manifold elements in the watch.
A. At present, let us return to this watch and your observation of its separate parts.
In examining each separate part, this wheel and this spring, each by itself, and finding it altogether determined in a certain manner, of a certain size and a certain form, &c, does it seem impossible to you that it might be otherwise, or can you conceive that it might be otherwise, larger or smaller, in the most manifold manner?
R. I hold that each separate piece, considered in and for itself, might well be infinitely otherwise as such separate piece. But all these pieces are to work together, and to produce a single result in their union; and if I take this view of the subject, all the pieces must, in my judgment, fit together and reciprocally work upon each other. If I take this view, it is certainly possible to make another whole, e. g. another and larger watch, or to make the machinery of the watch serve other purposes besides its proper own; and in this case, the separate wheel which I observed not only could be otherwise, but would necessarily have to be otherwise. But if you ask me to speak only of thisparticular watch before us, then I must say it is absolutely necessary that this wheel should be precisely as it is, and not a hairsbreadth different, for the very reason that the whole is as it is, or rather because all other pieces in the watch are as they are. Again: If I commence my observation with this single piece, I must say: If this piece is once given as a piece of such a mechanism, then it is necessary that all other pieces be precisely as they are, if they are to form a whole with it.
A.