On the other hand, an evaluative exhibition of education is one that is constituted as an attempt to estimate and make judgments about the way things should be instead of how they are. It should be taken into account from here that we will limit our attention to this second or evaluative exhibition. There is then an implicit interest in education for what is valuable.
One way to try to analyze how education and values are related is to ask the question: what value or values are the most appropriate for education? A subsequent question could be: what value or values are more important?
Theories abound on the way in which these values relate to each other and on what could be superior to all the others.
• Is knowledge and moral virtue, for example, subordinated to happiness?
• Is it possible to affirm that all these values can be considered as ends without having to choose which one to impose on others?
Before saying anything more about education in relation to these values, it would be useful, to avoid possible misunderstandings, to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic values.
In the debates on education the question arises whether it is valuable in itself or only in the degree to which it serves some instrumental purpose beyond what is being done. To put it another way: is education good as an end in itself or only as a means of serving other marginal ends?
Educating is a task of social responsibility, a task that equals us, that binds us and identifies us as human beings capable of thinking, of learning, of creating, of inventing new solutions and, above all, of dreaming.