Now we are here thinking the Ego not as merely a knowing power or intelligence, but as a practical power or principle, and hence we proceed further thus: what does it mean when we say, that the manifold utterances or manifestations of the principle are conditioned through each other, those manifestations—as the mere outflow of the freedom of the principle—having in themselves no independent existence whatever which might enable them to have peculiar determinations as the things of external perception have, and thus whatever we assert of them is in truth asserted of the principle from which they flow? It clearly means this: the principle is conditioned in regard to its utterances, its self-development is confined to a determined sequence of series of those manifestations or utterances, a sequence that here continues infinitely. It can arrive at a certain end, y—however clear it may think it and propose it to itself as its end—in actuality only by proceeding in a certain sequence through a, b, c, d, &c.
But whence arises this knowledge of the conditionedness of the Ego? Evidently, since it expresses a limitation of the principle in relation to its power in actuality, from the self-contemplation of its power. And thus the above promised definite description of the conception of conditionedness has become possible. That conception is founded upon the immediate self-contemplation of the faculty of the principle in its state of confinedness to an a prioridetermined sequence of moments in its development in actuality.
This conception will, therefore, make it possible with apodictical certainty to draw a conclusion from a given part of time as to what must have preceded that time—although that preceding has not been experienced in actual life—and thus to restore the past with sure accuracy by means of grounds. Thus it will also be possible in the same manner to draw conclusions from the same given time as to what will follow, and thus to make present the future; of course, under the presupposition that everything will happen properly,—that is, that the principle will use its entire faculty, and limit itself by nothing except the absolute law of its self-development.
I ask you now: is this thus perceived series of moments perfectly ordered, each link having in it its determined position, from which it cannot move, and therefore its firmly determined moment in known time? Doubtless you must answer: Yes. I ask again: at which time in universal time does this whole known time occur? has it also its determined position in that universal time? Doubtless you will have to answer, No; that known time floats in an altogether undetermined position in the infinite time, which is empty at both of its ends.[2]
Appendix concerning the power of Recollection.—We desire to speak of this power in general, and more specially at this place, as it excellently illustrates what we have said about time.
The power of recollection is, first of all, essentially different from the above described power to generate the contents of time absolutely a priorieither of the past or of the future. For whereas the latter power asserts merely, that a certain content of time was necessary in the past, or will be necessary in the future, regardless as to whether such content has been actually experienced in life, and indeed without any reference to actuality whatever, the power of recollection asserts that a certain state or condition in the past has actually been, and been experienced.
Now, upon what is this power of recollection grounded? I answer: just like that former power, upon a relation of conditionedness; but with this difference, that whereas that former power is conditioned by a relation simply of the absolute possibility of the occurrence, the present power is conditioned by the given actuality of the occurrence. In the present given moment I do something within my consciousness; and I observe that I do this by means of a new rejection which rises above the actual doing. Then I ask, under what subjective condition of the occurred development of my faculty could I do so? I find, under this or that condition. Hence this condition must have already been filled by me with some actual deed, whilst it is at the same time represented to be as actual by the immediate causality of imagination. Perhaps this condition is again conditioned in the same factical manner by a necessary previous condition, which is represented to me in the same manner as actual, &c. Thus I am enabled to develop from the one given moment of my life conditions of my past life as having actually occurred; that is, to recollect them.