NOTICE: WE ALSO POST OUR SUMMARIES ON: https://eosamsterdam.net/eos-telegram-summaries/
Constitution & Arbitration
User Samupaha says the following: “Lawyers are not on the top. They are not sovereign, they must obey the laws and regulations of the country. ECAF is on the top. If you are not happy with the result, you can complain only to ECAF. You can say that the arbitrator who did the job was bad or something. But if the ECAF thinks that the arbitrator's ruling is OK, then it is.”
User JP replies that he has more faith in the community to come up with innovative solutions to the coordination problem because there is an incentive to get along and we have a great community. JP Continues that the concept he is proposing will have to be implemented per chain rather than on mainnet, but either way, it's going to happen with IBC. User Sun Tzu asks JP if he is going to address the two-forums problem that his proposal raises, which JP confirms.
User Sun Tzu asks JP the following question: “What I'm unclear with is, how can such an idea actually do dispute resolution? If Alice is with Agency A and Bob is with B, how is it possible? Either Bob must sacrifice his principles and submit to Alice's will and go with A, or Arbitrator A and Arbitrator B must do some form of dualism to resolve disputes.”
User JP responds to Sun Tzu that there are real-world examples of this sort of thing happening, for instance with insurance companies. The agencies and community will figure it out better than we can. JP continues that he doesn't have all the answers, but the community, agencies and token holders will come up with much better solutions eventually. That being said, here are a couple of examples of how agencies might decide to handle this problem:
Agency A in your example would agree with Agency B that if they have any disputes between their members that they will hire an outside arbitrator to settle it. They each will have a list of reputable forums and they will pick from the overlap in their list. With a lot of agencies that would become cumbersome to make agreements between every single one. Agency A would blacklist agency C if they refuse to publicly sign on to the standard. But fortunately, Agency B has signed on so they have a process. Depending on the dispute they may have a process like PayPal that requires no arbitration and is fast and nearly free. Blacklisting would be a warning sign to members of agency A that if they choose to do business with members of Agency C then it's at their own risk.
User Sun Tzu replies to user JP and says that he thought that he had made it clear that insurance was a different industry. And insurance policies are based on actuarials and disputes are quite narrow in scope. So borrowing from the insurance industry isn't going to deal with the fullness of the cases. That said, what you have achieved is to make two layers of bureaucracy which have to be paid for - first the agencies and then the multiple competing forums - in both time and cost. Which means that Alice and Bob have to pay the fees to the agencies. Who will then eventually get in contact with each other and share the lists of the forums. Which might narrow down to one.
User Jetse from EOS Amsterdam tells the community the following: “We have decided to remove the choice of law our of our charter. A decision based on the community's views that a choice of law would run contrary to the decentralized character of our blockchain. We understand that. We have decided to allow for a certain level of operational and interpretational insecurity in favor of a decentralized level playing field. Please follow the link for the full text or read just the relevant article hereunder.” You can find the full text here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JPR-gRb2LOijCyU1sV5aNHJq2EifVLIH2pSwYpnp2Jw/edit?usp=sharing
Other
User Syed posts an article on Block.one and voting, you can find it here: https://medium.com/@eoscafeblock/should-block-one-vote-a-case-for-increasing-vote-cap-from-30-to-unlimited-f7583f926ff7
User jem asks Syed if he considered the situation that non-B1 whales might be newly incentivized to concentrate their votes to a very small number of BPs. How might this affect pay distribution and cliffs in a no limit environment? User Yves La Rose seconds the comment of jem. User Haley Thomson says that large non-B1 whales with concentrated votes are a scenario not unlike the status quo. The analysis has B1 not voting for every 5th BP, so you can see what happens to the pay of a top 21 BP who does not receive B1's vote. Even with enough backing to get them into the top 21 currently, these BPs are relegated to stand-by with a B1 vote. User Jem replies and says that we have a distribution in which 80 BPs are being paid, and a very small number of large effective voters, the current situation is precisely not the response scenario described. User Haley Thomson says that the more BPs that B1 votes for, the more total votes are cast. This would reduce the impact of any non-B1 token holder's votes, especially if they are concentrated. User Jem says that he is not sure that Haley Thomson is clear about what the results would lead to. Concentrated, "reduced" impact whales, in a world with B1 votes widely distributed, would easily control the top 21. Perhaps you assume that they would vote for BPs not endorsed by B1. User Haley Thomson says that these same large token holders currently control the top 21. Their ability to do so would be reduced. User Jem says that the overall effect is likely to be the removal of the obvious sock puppets, concentrated votes by the whales for their friends, and some reduction, perhaps by 15-30, of the total number of paid BPs.
EOS 요약 포털 메인 페이지: https://eosamsterdam.net/ko/eos-telegram-summaries/
헌법 및 중재
Samupaha는 다음과 같이 말합니다: "변호사는 위에 있지 않습니다. 그들은 주권이 없으며, 나라의 법과 규정에 준수해야합니다. ECAF가 맨 위에 있습니다. 결과에 만족하지 않으면 ECA에만 불만을 제기 할 수 있습니다. 일을 한 중재인이 나쁘다고 말할 수 있습니다. 그러나 ECA가 중재인의 판결이 옳다고 생각하면 그것은 그렇다 "고 말합니다.
JP는 커뮤니티에 대한 신념을 가지고 있으며, 협조 문제에 대한 혁신적인 해결책을 제시 할 것이라고 응답합니다. JP가 주장하는 개념은 메인넷 대신 각 체인마다 구현되어야하지만, IBC에서는 어떤 방식 으로든 구현 될 것이라고 말합니다. Sun Tzu는 JP가 그의 제안이 제기 한 두 포럼 문제에 대해 얘기할지 JP에게 묻습니다. JP는 그렇다고 합니다.
사용자 Sun Tzu는 JP에게 다음과 같은 질문을합니다: "내가 명확하지 않은 점은 그러한 아이디어가 어떻게 실제로 분쟁을 해결할 수 있는가입니다. Alice가 에이전시 A와 있고 Bob이 에이전시B와 함께 있다면 어떻게 가능 합니까? Bob은 자신의 원칙을 희생하고 Alice의 의지에 복종하거나, 중재인 A와 중재인 B는 분쟁을 해결하기 위해 이원론을해야합니다."
사용자 JP는 보험 회사와 같이 일어나는 실제 사례가 있다고Sun Tzu에게 응답합니다. 에이전시와 커뮤니티는 우리보다 더 잘 이해할 것입니다. JP는 모든 답변을 갖고 있지는 않지만 커뮤니티, 대행사 및 토큰 소유자는 궁극적으로 훨씬 나은 해결책을 제시 할 것이라고 말합니다. 즉, 기관들이 이런 문제를 어떻게 처리할지 결정하는 몇 가지 예가 있습니다:
당신의 예에서 에이전시 A는 에이전시 B와 회원간에 분쟁이있을 경우 외부 중재인을 고용하여 해결할 것이라고 동의합니다. 그들은 각각 명성있는 포럼 목록을 가지며 목록에서 겹치는 중재자를 선택합니다. 이 경우 합의하기 번거로울 수있는 에이전시가 많을 것 입니다. 에이전시 A는 표준에 공개적으로 사인하지 않으면 에이전시 C를 블랙리스트에 올립니다. 그러나 다행스럽게도 에이전시 B가 서명 했으므로 절차가 있습니다. 분쟁에 따라 중재가 빠르며 거의 무료 인 PayPal과 같은 프로세스가있을 수 있습니다. 블랙리스트는 에이전시 A 회원들에게 에이전시 C 회원과 비즈니스를 선택하면 위험에 처한다는 경고 표지 역할을 합니다.
Sun Tzu는 JP에게 보험이 다른 산업이라는 것을 지적합니다. 그리고 보험은 보험 통계에 근거하고 있으며 분쟁은 범위가 매우 좁습니다. 그래서 보험 업계의 예는 사건을 충만하게 다루지 못 할 것입니다. 즉, 당신이 달성 한 것은 시간과 비용이 드는 관료주의의 두 가지 계층을 만드는 것입니다. 즉, Alice와 Bob이 에이전시에게 수수료를 지불해야한다는 뜻 입니다. 그들은 결국에는 서로 연락을 취하고 포럼 목록을 공유하게 될 것입니다.
EOS Amsterdam의 Jetse는 커뮤니티에게 다음과 같이 알려줍니다. "우리는 우리 헌장에 있는 법의 선택을 없애기로 결정했습니다. 이 선택은 우리 블록체인의 분권화성의 반대로 커뮤니티의 견해에 근거한 결정이라고 말합니다. 우리는 분권화성을 선호하며 일정 수준의 운영 및 해석에 대한 불확실성을 허용하기로 결정했습니다. 링크를 클릭하거나 여기에 관련 문서를 읽으십시오. "전체 텍스트는 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JPR-gRb2LOijCyU1sV5aNHJq2EifVLIH2pSwYpnp2Jw/edit?usp=sharing 에서 찾을 수 있습니다.