9
After a party voluntarily discloses attorney-client communications or work-product
information “to an adversary in one proceeding, it cannot withhold the same documents on the
basis of privilege in a subsequent proceeding, even if that subsequent proceeding involves a
different adversary.” Chevron Corp. v. Salazar, 275 F.R.D. 437, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see
also In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d. Cir. 1993) (“The waiver doctrine provides
that voluntary disclosure of work product to an adversary waives the privilege as to other parties
[in a subsequent proceeding].”); Urban Box Office Network, Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P.,
No. 01 Civ. 8854, 2004 WL 2375819, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004) (applying same principle
to waive attorney-client privilege). This, of course, makes sense because “where a party
voluntarily undertakes actions that will predictably lead to the disclosure of [a] document, then
waiver will follow.” Chevron Corp., 275 F.R.D. at 445-46 (internal citations omitted).
“The scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver is determined on a case by case basis
by considering the context of the waiver and the prejudice caused to the other party by permitting
partial disclosure of privileged communications.” McGrath, 204 F.R.D. at 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190 (2d Cir.2000)). “As in the attorney-
client context, fairness and prejudice concerns define the scope of any work product waiver.” Id.
at 192. Factors considered by the Second Circuit to find a broad waiver appropriate include
“(1) whether substantive information has been revealed; (2) prejudice to the opposing party
caused by partial disclosure; (3) whether partial disclosure would be misleading to a court; (4)
fairness; and (5) consistency.” Id.

10
a. Plaintiff’s Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Edwards and Cassell sued Dershowitz for defamation claiming that Dershowitz’s public
statements about their representation of client were false. At the time those claims were filed,
Edwards and Cassell represented Plaintiff in the CVRA Case. She was also represented by
Edwards, Cassell and Boies regarding “potential litigation.” The statements Edwards and
Cassell claimed as false included that “Edwards and Cassell failed to minimally investigate the
allegations advanced on behalf of their client [Virginia Giuffre] and even that they sat down with
her to contrive the allegations.” The allegations Edwards and Cassell failed to minimally
investigate and/or contrived where the allegations made by Plaintiff in the CVRA Joinder
Motion. Dershowitz counterclaimed against Edwards and Cassell suing them for 1) the
publication of the false allegations of Giuffre in the Joinder Motion and 2) defamation for their
extra-judicial false statements concerning Dershowitz and his alleged involvement with Giuffre.
Plaintiff and her counsel McCawley actively participated in the Dershowitz Case and
affirmatively waived any attorney-client privilege over Plaintiff’s communications. Plaintiff
produced documents, sat for a deposition (Menninger Decl., Ex. H) and provided a sworn
declaration (Menninger Decl., Ex. I). Through her participation in the case, Plaintiff specifically
discussed her communications with Edwards and Cassell. In her sworn declaration, she
discussed the following attorney communications:
 Her conversation with Brad Edwards in 2011 when she first told him her story. This was
followed by a telephone conversation with Edwards and his attorney, Scarola, which was
recorded with her knowledge and consent and which has been filed in multiple court
papers and given to the press2
(Menninger Decl., Ex I at ¶ 55-56);

2 Edwards participated in this call as Plaintiff’s attorney. Plaintiff believed that the conversation was covered by
attorney-client privilege. See Menninger Decl., Ex. J, (email between Plaintiff and Sharon Churcher crafting
communication to Edwards regarding publication of privileged communication). Yet, when the conversation was
sent to the press, and used in later court filings, Plaintiff did nothing to stop the publication of this privileged

11
 Her discussions with Edwards and Cassell of her representation in the CVRA Case (id. at
¶ 61);
 Her directions to counsel to pursue criminal charges (id. at ¶ 65);
 In her conversations with her attorneys “no one” has “pressured” her to identify
Dershowitz as a person who allegedly abused her (id. at ¶ 67);
 Her authorization to her attorney to file various affidavits including her stories (id. at
¶ 67);
 Her attorneys’ belief in the truth of her statements (id. at ¶ 68).
Plaintiff’s waiver of her attorney-client privilege was solidified during her deposition in
the Dershowitz Case. At the conclusion of questioning by Dershowitz’s counsel, and after off
the records discussions between and among McCawley, Edwards, Cassell and Jack Scarola
(counsel for Edwards and Cassell), Mr. Scarola then asked Plaintiff a series of questions directly
discussing her communications with her counsel. McCawley made no objection and Plaintiff
responded to each question. Scarola asked if Edwards pressured or encouraged her to lie:
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 202:5-202:12. Scarola asked similar questions concerning Cassell.
Id. at 202-03. The questioning, however, was not limited to Plaintiff’s conversations with
Edwards and Cassell. Scarola’s final question, again answered without objection by McCawley,
was:

communication. This alone is sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege communication as between Edwards
and Plaintiff. See infra, p. 19-20.

12
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 203:18-204:7.
There is no mechanism by which Plaintiff could respond to any of these questions with
the answer “never” unless she is recollecting and relying on the content of each and every
communication she had with Edwards, Cassell and any other person (including each and every
one of her attorneys) about the “topics covered” in the deposition. The topics covered in the
deposition were wide ranging including the full breadth of statements she and her counsel had
made in the CVRA Case, identification of the “high powered” individuals with whom she claims
to have had sexual relations, when and how she allegedly met Epstein, the timing and specifics
of her alleged encounters with Dershowitz, Prince Andrew, Maxwell and others, and her
interviews with and statements to media outlets. In other words, the topics included every story
Plaintiff has ever told concerning the time she claims she was a “sex slave.”
Notably, the Special Master overseeing Plaintiff’s deposition in the Dershowitz Case
immediately recognized the waiver. On re-direct, the following colloquy occurred: