Paving the Pathway to the Great Sioux War

The Great Sioux War was the last war of the Indian Wars, involving infamous battles over the Black Hills with leaders such as General Custer and Sitting Bull. The buildup of the war began with the Treaty of Fort Laramie to the declaration of war by the United States on the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in 1875. Seven years prior to the official start of the Great Sioux War, the Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868) was signed by some bands of Lakota and Cheyenne tribes of the Black Hills, which established a reservation within the region for these bands to reside. This agreement instantly became controversial because of ambiguous boundaries, contradictions in the language, and uncooperative Indians who did not sign the treaty and refused to acknowledge the reservation at all. The government took measures to keep miners and settlers out of the region, but the United States was pressured from the Civil War debt and by the attitude of the average American citizen, which they felt as a sovereign citizen they had a right to the land as much as any Indian. Soon, pressured by the American citizens in search for a solution, the United States government opted to explore the Black Hills, disregarding the spirit of the treaty which established the reservation. The effects of the economic burden of the civil war and the Panic of 1873 caused the United States to have a financial motivation in the Black Hills which spiked their interest to explore the region. Under the mask of a survey, they explored the mountain finding a vast amount of resources such as gold which caused them to engage in failed negotiations to purchase the land which ultimately left the Indians to defend the most sacred land in their culture.

To understand the causes behind the Great Sioux War, it is important to analyze all aspects of the tensions, including placing political decisions within their cultural context. This research is an attempt to establish a brief overview from the Treaty of Fort Laramie to 1875, while examining the perceptions of individuals and leaders within their respective communities, and synthesizing these tensions with their perceptions and intentions. The miscommunication within the negotiations of the Treaty of Fort Laramie and the exploration of the Black Hills set the foundation for the Great Sioux War. The United States, while arguing the legality of exploring the Black Hills extensively, violated the spirit of the Treaty of Fort Laramie by invading their most sacred land which gave the Indians no other choice than to fight.

The Black Hills are the only mountain range in the Dakotas extending to Wyoming, “approached from the barren, desert wastes of the Plains, they loom up in the distance as a dark range, black from the heavy growth of timber they support.” The Great Sioux War is the last Indian war fought in the Great Plains region. The Black Hills have a long history of indigenous population, but the two tribes affected by this conflict were the Lakota and Cheyenne.

At the start of the 18th century, the Lakota were settled in present day South Dakota, east of the Missouri river. For the next 140 years, they gradually migrated west due to conflict from other tribes as well as their own aspirations such as hunting and trading. The Lakota had an interest in the fur trade as many tribes did at the time. Part of this migration was due to the allure of the superior weapons and utilities which they obtained primarily by hunting buffalo. Conveniently, the buffalo were migrating westward as well, which helped facilitate their trade desires and further justify migration. This migration brought on big cultural changes within the Lakota. For example, it was during this period that the Lakota first obtained horses, which becomes a center of their culture. Because of the forced migration they were subsequently introduced to many new ideas through interaction with other tribes, such as establishing the hunting economy as a way of life.(2)

The Cheyenne migrated to the region similarly, but their origin started in northern Minnesota. They were forced to migrate by other tribes in the region, specifically the Chippewas and Assiniboine, who traded with the French to obtain superior weapons. They slowly drifted into the northern plains, and by the end of the 1700’s had occupied the Black Hills. The Black Hills became a spiritually connected place for the Cheyenne. They fully adopted the buffalo-hunting culture as a profitable source to survive early in the century after the migration started. The Cheyenne obtained horses before the Lakota, but likewise their lives revolved around the animals. They also became involved in horse raids where they would steal horses from wealthier tribes for trade.

In the beginning of the 1830’s, as the Lakota migrated west into the Black Hills, they allied with the Northern Cheyenne to expel other tribes who inhabited the region such as Crows and Kiowas. The geographical and cultural bridges between the two tribes helped establish a firm foundation for this endeavor. The Siouan speaking Lakota and the Algonkian speaking Cheyenne, “while linguistically unrelated, nonetheless possessed cultural similarities that had influenced their parallel courses by the mid-1870s”. Even through this language barrier, both tribes were able to find cultural similarities such as being driven from their original home, embracing the buffalo hunting economy, and horses being a center of their culture. These similarities allowed both tribes to fight relatively little between each other and share common goals. (3)

The United States, was a relatively new country in the 19th century when these two tribes first started their migration to this region. Cautious of violence in the region, the United States first started signing treaties in 1815 with the foresight of possible danger and for the guarantee of peace. Early white relations with these Indians were relatively well-perceived by the tribes. In the 1800’s, white fur traders and explorers had very little negative impact on the tribes. In fact, in many cases the meeting led to gift giving, declarations of friendship and peace, and usually led to trading items for beaver or buffalo skins. It is unknown if the language barrier allowed the Indians to understand the full extent of these treaties, but the items received by these treaties typically were appreciated and worth the effort for the natives.

These types of treaties ensured peace for the region until mid-way into the century. In 1851, the U.S. government negotiated the first treaty of Fort Laramie. At Fort Laramie, over 10,000 plains Indians gathered to hear the United States try to establish lasting peace, not only between the United States, but themselves as well. The treaty states the parties have assembled “for the purpose of establishing and confirming peaceful relations amongst themselves…hereby covenant and agree to abstain in future…all hostilities”. This treaty was ratified by Congress May 24, 1852. Though good intentions, this treaty was not very effective at maintaining peace. The boundaries within the treaty are ambiguous and not well defined, as well as there being a clause that states, “Indian nations do not hereby abandon or prejudice any rights or claims they may have to other lands; and further do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore described.”(4) With so many different bands of Indians, seven just within the Teton-Sioux themselves, these boundaries did not define all bands of Teton-Sioux land, such as the Hunkpapa tribe, which ultimately led to disputes.

This treaty led to much bloodshed over the course of the next 20 years. Each conflict inevitably led to more and more disdain from both parties. The collection of events throughout this period could be defined as very aggressive for both sides. These conflicts mostly occurred on Sioux lands, involving Sioux attacks on miners in search for gold and troops who invaded the area.(5) Certain encounters throughout this area were devastating to both sides, and continually heightened responses to the events.

In 1868 after years of fighting and negotiations, the second treaty of Fort Laramie was signed with many bands of Lakota which concluded the first Sioux wars and established the Great Sioux Reservation. Sitting Bull, the leader of the Hunkpapa tribe, refused to sign unless Forts Buford and Stevenson were abandoned. Throughout this period, Congress insisted on playing a larger role in Indian policy, specifically within the Indian Affairs department after multiple destructions of army regiments, and disastrous policy making from the executive branch.(6) Previously, officials had a “take it or leave it” negotiation policy, along with corruption using “force, bribery, deception, and threats, among other things, to convince Indian leaders to sign land cession treaties”. This policy was possible because the physical power the United States had over the tribes and the monopoly the United States government had on buying Indian lands.(7) The new strategy of the legislative branch was to strip the executive branch of the power of dealing with Indians directly and make it a legislative process. This was due to a search for solutions to resolve the issues causing warfare and distrust in the Northern Plains.

Instead of removing Indians to place settlements, the new policy was also securing a positive future for the tribes including establishing reservations. This policy included some helpful benefits such as supplying livestock, clothing, schooling as well as the Christianization of these Indians. The treaties with the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Crow were all similar as they had the same objective to assimilate these tribes into white society. While some tribes accepted this life style, a large number of Lakota and Cheyenne opted to hunt in the North and had had a difficult time abandoning their nomadic ways.(8) Some Indians who initially opted to stay in the Great Sioux Reservation chose to stay within their traditional lifestyle. Many Lakota and Cheyenne were not interested in the agencies at all, while others found the agencies useful when it suited their needs. Others fully embraced the agencies and the lifestyle. (9) These treaties, which were written with good intentions of the United States, overpromised what both parties intended to do, which ultimately laid the foundation for the Great Sioux War.

In 1870, Red Cloud, an Oglala Lakota leader, traveled to Washington D.C. to resolve disputed lands which were a result of apparent miscommunication between the Oglala who insisted that the original terms agreed upon allowed them to reside where they please. Red cloud effectively pressured the government by appealing to humanitarians who influenced the secretary of interior to allow a suitable location for both parties. The secretary of interior compromised even though the treaty explicitly states in Article 11, “tribes who are parties to this agreement hereby stipulate that they will relinquish all right to occupy permanently the territory outside their reservation as herein defined”. (10)

The second Treaty of Fort Laramie was supposed to stop all bloodshed between the United States and the Indians, but alas there were plenty of small clashes between soldiers, settlers, and Indians. Not only that, many bands of Sioux, specifically the northern Sioux, had not signed the treaty anyways. To them these people were invading their land and threatening their traditional way of life.

In 1871, Northern Pacific Railroad starting surveying in Yellowstone Valley which caused uproar between the Sioux and northern Cheyenne who did not allow them to complete their survey. The Treaty of Fort Laramie specifically allows this in Article 11 stating, “Indians, further expressly agree: 1st. That they will withdraw all opposition to the construction of any railroad as herein defined”(11) but this technicality did not matter to tribes who did not sign the treaty in the first place. The Northern Pacific Railroad attempted again in 1872, but was attacked in the middle of the night by hundreds of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors while camped on the banks of the Yellowstone River. Finally, the last attempt in 1873 was successful, only after its escort had been increased to 1900 men, which even then the natives caused them much trouble. The United States considered these troubles to prove the failure of the Treaty of Fort Laramie just a few years prior.(12)

As the Panic of 1873 set in, the United States came to one of its most challenging financial crises since its creation. Though other fronts of gold were previously able to satisfy the United States search for wealth, they could no longer ignore the potential of the Black Hills. Along with the potential of gold, invading the area and taking control of it could cease the conflict and stabilize the region. Lieutenant General Sheridan spoke about the army’s interest in the Black Hills, believing in “the erection of a large military post near the base of the Black hills”, and viewing deployment on the perimeter of Sioux Country as a weakness. This way the army could “secure a strong foothold in the heart of the Sioux country”. By doing this they would be able exert dominance in the region and “exercise a controlling influence over these warlike people”.(13)

Heading the advice of General Sheridan, in 1874 the Grant administration sent in General George A. Custer with the goal of conducting a survey for military purposes, such as finding a location to establish a fort.(14) The expedition, after some short delays, officially began on July 2, 1874. The regiment included geologists to help conclude the possibility of gold.(15) For General Custer, this was a typical operation, but unknowingly he lays the foundation for the beginning of a war which will ultimately be his demise. Though this expedition may have been routine for General Custer, it was by no means an easy task. Despite this, General Custer was relatively confident in his ability, and his experience allowed him to possess the knowledge to overcome the obstacles that laid before him.(16)

The Sioux specifically warned against going into the Black Hills as it would likely cause war, but the United States government was persistent on two things: the government was specifically there to survey and this was not a violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty. This specific expedition was arguably allowed in the Terms of the Treaty of Fort Laramie. In a letter from General Terry to General Sheridan he says, “I am unable to see that any just offense is given to the Indians by the expedition to the Black Hills…From the earliest times the government has exercised the right of sending exploring parties of a military character into unceded territory, and this expedition is nothing more.”(17) These two men were previously commissioners to the Treaty of Fort Laramie.(18) The United States legal defense for being able to perform this expedition was based on Article 6, which states, “The President may, at any time, order a survey of the reservation.”(19) General Terry doubted the Indians understood the full extent of the clause, and was dumfounded that they thought it possible to set such a large tract of land aside without the government exercising their power such as sending troops where needed. (20)

To the Indians, this seemed as an invasion of their land rightfully given to them by the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Even though they did not live in the Black Hills, to them the Black Hills were the center of their culture. It was the most sacred place in all of the reservation. The Sioux also expressed concerns that if the United States explored the Black Hills, whether they found gold or not, they would want the land for the abundance of positive features. The fear of the white man going into the mountains, realizing its potential, and never leaving the mountain was a real fear for the Sioux.(21) They firmly believed soldiers should never belong in the Black Hills. This is why the Sioux were so adamantly against exploration of the territory. If it had been some other area of the reservation, they possibly would not have cared quite as much.

This expedition caused resistance not only from the Indians but also on the home front. Bishop William H. Hare, a missionary, was vocally opposed to this expedition. In fact, he met with the President personally to express his concerns.(22) His opposition was rooted in Article 16, which states, “that no white person or person shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same, or, without consent of the Indians first had and obtained, to pass through the same;”(23) Out of the thousand people Custer brought into the Black hills, there were more than just soldiers. His battalion was made up of soldiers, scientists, reporters and miners.(24) The United States Government insisted that they were not there to search for gold, but brought professional miners, and geologist along on the expedition. The Sioux chiefs near the area warned Custer himself about the possible consequences of the war, and in some ways, he was sympathetic to their love of their country. He writes, “Love of country is almost a religion with them. It is not the value, of the land... but their strong local attachment that the white man does not feel”.

The United States government concluded that since there had been 3 forts established on the reservation after the ratification of the treaty and no Indians of the territory previously complained, along with their legal reasoning, was enough justification for the expedition.(25) Of course, it is easy to see the contradictions of the treaty and the reason there were disputes over the true nature of the document. If the culture of the Indians dealt with precise language such as lawyers perhaps they would have been better equipped to understand truly what they were agreeing to. Nonetheless, these misunderstandings throughout the creation of the Treaty of Fort Laramie paved the way for the legal argument that led to the Great Sioux War.

During the training period for the expedition, over 200 Sioux from the Grand River Agency arrived to protest the expedition. Small delegations continued over the course of May in 1874. At the arrival of each delegation, General Custer would explain the peaceful intentions of the expedition, but the reaction of the Sioux made him suspicious of a negative response.(26) Private Theodore Ewert, a soldier who had ventured to the area previously in the command of General Custer, accused Custer of “devising a plausible excuse to enable him to visit the Black Hills…Since the return of the “Yellowstone Expedition”.(27) The truth of these allegations are unknown, but Custer was an extreme advocate of the expedition. He claimed that it would be cheaper to maintain the army on the expedition than keeping them in the garrison. To achieve this, he knowingly under predicted the cost of the expedition to help his case. In fact, he claimed 4 pounds per animal each day was realistic when previously he claimed that amount to be triple that.(28) Someone as experienced as Custer would be unlikely to make this miscalculation by mistake.

The expedition for the United States was successful in the search for valuables, as gold was discovered during Custer’s expedition. Custer wrote two reports on the discovery of gold, mentioning that there was gold to be found in paying quantities in every panful of earth.(29) Coincidentally and to no surprise, the allure of gold within the Black Hills caused a flood of miners to unseen proportions. Just within a few months after the discovery, a prospecting party was living along the banks of French Creek, near where the gold was first discovered.(30)

Emigration into the area was steadily picking up, especially as public interest grew. Building public interest was due to the newspapers, which had covered considerations of the expedition and excited prospectors who eagerly awaited confirmation of gold.(31) In fact, most of the country was beginning to watch; some waiting for confirmation of gold and others criticizing Grant for his willingness to agree to promises in the treaty which were unattainable.(32) Despite critics, the administration to some extent did take action against miners and white settlers of the region. The miners, who set up unlawfully near the French River were expelled in March 1875.(33) But by the time this occurred, the government had already taken an interest not only the value of the gold, but the value of the countryside with the ultimate goal of settlement of the Black Hills.

The Black Hills impressed Custer with how moderately delightful and rich they were. The appearance of the country was quite outstanding; vibrant flowers, lush forests, and an immense amount of minerals such as quartz, gold, and silver along with moderate weather conditions.(34) The land had an ample amount of game: deer, elk, bear, antelope, beaver, and more. So abundant in fact, Mr. Grinnell, who was present on the expedition, noted they had killed 100 deer in a single day. Custer writes, “Men going to the Black Hills to engage in agriculture or stock raising pursuits need not fear disappointment.”(35) The Sioux’s fear had become a reality.

After the expedition, the interest in the Black Hills for the United States increased immediately. It did not help that headlines in the paper, such as the Bismarck Tribune, wrote, “The most beautiful valleys the eye has ever rested upon. Gold and silver in immense quantities. No fighting with the Sioux.”(36) Soon after, there were already calls for a second expedition to verify the integrity of the findings and to assess the value of the Black Hills. By March 1875, the government published statements in the paper deterring persons from exploring the Black Hills in the search for minerals until a negotiation could be met. Measures were taken to remove any people unlawfully there, but to no avail thousands of prospectors were able to avoid being detected by the army and found their way to gold. By the end of July, it was estimated that over 1,500 miners were secretly panning for gold in the Black Hills.(37) This was quite upsetting to the United States government, who were afraid the unauthorized miners would jeopardize the integrity of the negotiations. They sent in Brigadier General Crook to help control the area from unwanted miners, which resulted in him civilly removing them. In fact, as early as September 1874, soldiers had the directive to remove any miners, which included, burning their wagons, destroying their outfits, and arresting their leaders.

Negotiations started almost immediately after the expedition came to a closing in the fall of 1874. In September of that year, many tribes from the South and North met with the United States at the Red Cloud Agency. Both sides were engaged in a heated debate, arguing their positions which ranged from no sale possible to leasing mineral rights, or outright buying the Black Hills. Some were inclined to sell, but for huge sums of money, such as 50 million, which the United States government found unreasonably high. Eight days into the negotiations and almost many altercations later, both parties dispersed unable to come to an agreement.(38)

These failed negotiations started to look bad on the Grant administration. A permanent solution to bring peace to the region was needed, and this is what the Treaty of Fort Laramie intended to do several years prior. Grant addresses speaks of this issue in his yearly address to congress in 1875. He says, “The discovery of gold in the Black Hills, a portion of the Sioux Reservation, has had the effect to induce a large emigration of miners to that point. Thus far the effort to protect the treaty rights of the Indians to that section has been successful, but the next year will certainly witness a large increase of such emigration. The negotiations for the relinquishment of the gold fields having failed, it will be necessary for Congress to adopt some measures to relieve the embarrassment growing out of the causes named.”(39) The Northern Plains were being flooded with unwanted visitors and tensions were rising to a boiling point. These tensions burst later that year after the United States ordered all bands of Sioux within the boundaries of the reservation, and military action would be taken if they did not. To the Indians this was the last straw which attacked their traditional way of life. The Indians were to report to an agency, and out of all targeted bands of Indians, none headed their instructions.(40) After the failed assimilation, Christianization, and relocation of these Indians, the United States would launch a campaign against them beginning the Great Sioux War.

One main factor which set the stage for the great Sioux war which could have possibly diverted it was the Expedition of 1874 into the Black Hills. If you’re not one to believe in backroom deals, and the conspiracy theory to displace the Indians and obtain the Black Hills, then you would believe the public records available from the United States government. The United States, in this case, would have appeared to have actively taken action to prevent disputes within the region such as dispelling miners and debating the legality of the expedition, at least until a negotiation could be met. Of course, another factor is the government did not quite account for the citizens, who were starry-eyed about any possibility of gold. Not only that, the citizens believed that as sovereign citizens of the United States they had the right to the land as much as the Indians, a feeling expressed in the New York Times, “The universal impression here is that a handful of Indians have no right to retard the progress of civilization, and that now, as in the past history of the world, the weaker nation must go.”(41) The media, as always interested in selling newspapers, spiked immediate public pressure on the issue for both sides.

Of course, the Sioux were not completely innocent in breaking the treaty. Some treaty-obliging Indians participated, but in terms of breaking the legality of the treaty, the Indians were the most reoccurring offenders. Most of the disdain from the citizens mainly came from bands who did not care about the Treaty of 1868.(42) Some bands of Sioux had agreed to allow the construction of a railroad, but the multiple failed attempts to establish a railroad proved that some Indians, such as the followers of Sitting Bull, did not want to allow this and were willing to forcefully defend this belief. These failed attempts hindered the economy, and the Grant administration started to look at the Black Hills situation as an embarrassment, which he noted in his address to congress in 1875. The media refused to acknowledge that these Indians, who were raiding the Northern Pacific Railroad attempts and private citizens, were not the same Indians who signed the Treaty in 1868.

If you do believe in backroom conspiracies, then you do not have to look far to see that many of the generals involved in Grants administration were not pro-Indian, and did not express any desire to ensure their well-being. For example, in a letter from General Sherman to General Sheridan when speaking of the failed attempts of the Northern Railroad in 1872, wrote “The Indians will be hostile to an extreme degree, yet I think our interest is to favor the undertaking of the Northern Pacific Railroad, as it will help to bring the Indian problem to a final solution.” Another example is General Sherman, who in 1867, wrote “We are not going to let a few thriving, ragged Indians stop progress. We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux even to their extermination-men, women and children.”(43) Some of these statements were made in the heat of battle, and of course context matters. It does prove though, that there was a personal negative bias which caused a lack of empathy towards the Sioux tribe. These men were commissioners for the Treaty of Fort Laramie, and oversaw the approval of the expedition. There are no legal documents that prove the United States acted with malintent and purposeful viciousness to break the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Along with General Custer’s statements of, “Men going to the Black Hills to engage in agriculture or stock raising pursuits need not fear disappointment.” Shows a very hopeful willingness early on to incentivize emigration to the area. Still, the government had good intentions to uphold the Treaty of Fort Laramie or otherwise would not have rigorously debated legalities of the treaty and defended the Indians from their own citizens. It is unlikely that these tensions and conflicts were due to a backroom conspiracy and more accurately accredited to a clash of cultures which were unable to accurately communicate, and the willingness of the administration to make deals it is unable to uphold.

The United States, by this point, has already completely butchered the treaty making process with the Indians. This is absolutely the case with the Treaty of Fort Laramie. This treaty was the case of almost all disputes prior to the Great Sioux War. Since the beginning of the United States, the government has treated Indians as sovereign foreign nations, until Justice Marshall found in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that Indians should rightfully be considered, “domestic dependent nations”.(44) Almost 30 years after this decision, the United States was still making treaties with Indians treating them as sovereign nations, overpromising their rights as an independent nation. This is exactly what happened in the Treaty of Fort Laramie, which established a huge tract of land in the United States. By the treaty, this tract of land was established that, “no white person or person shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same, or, without consent of the Indians first had and obtained, to pass through the same;”. This certainly, to the Indians of the reservation, did not mean 1,000 soldiers, professionals, and miners invading their most sacred land without their permission. Though, expressly allowed in the treaty to survey the land at any point, this expedition was certainly violating the nature of the document, and the previous notion of the Indians being sovereign nations which had given the Indians a belief that they were not intertwined with the United States. The United States, expressly stated by Justice Marshall, did not believe this. When it came time to “survey” the Black Hills, the United States looked at as we have the right as the government, who allowed this deal, to expressly enforce the contract to its fullest terms.

Though the United States had the legality of the treaty on their side, they violated the spirit of treaty which established a tract of land that the Indians controlled where, in their minds, no “white man” was allowed. This leads to the conclusion that there was some confusion in the treaty negotiation process. One possible conclusion is that, because there were so many different bands of tribes involved – seven just within the Sioux – miscommunication happened when having to take the treaty to each tribe individually. Possibly, the Sioux did not know exactly what they agreed to, due to the precision that lawyers in the United States would have compared to the generality of the language in Indian culture. If the United States had taken more time to adequately guarantee that all tribes understood the full terms of the Treaty, it would have insured that these kinds of misunderstandings did not arrive. If the United States had treated the land they gave as a reservation, as a private sale while providing a deed to the property, they would have been able to more adequately govern and enforce the United States laws. The United States government over-promised what they were capable of doing. By this time, the United States was fully aware of the expansionist mind set and the goals. We had settled coast to coast and were interested in expanding across the whole continent. We should have never treated the Indians as sovereign nations, specifically after Justice Marshall found them to be domestic dependent nations. Perhaps, if the United States had not treated the Indians of the Black Hills as a sovereign nation when they undeniably wielded overwhelming power over them, and negotiated the content of the document to a more reasonable state, we would have been able to abide by the full terms and spirit of the treaty, and possibly avoided the Great Sioux War.

The mindset of both cultures were radically different. In the end these pretenses were bound to happen with the dominant belief in the country being Manifest Destiny. The United States should have been more truthful in the sense of its raw power and ambition. Some revisionist will attempt to make the Indians seem as victims, which truly they were just the losers in this period of conquest and expansion of the dominant culture. That does not morally justify any deceit, or injustice done to any group. The more you learn about the world, the easier it is to see that intent does not matter, but the events do. Evil means to a good and ethically wrong end is morally unjustifiable. No side here is completely innocent. The Sioux did not always seek peaceful resolutions first, the same as Americans. No group of people have made every decision based on reasoning. Sometimes feelings distract from reason. Right before this period, the United States slaughtered 620,000 of its own citizens. Humans are not always innocent. Unreasonableness is a part of human nature which can easily lead to violence. No one wanted this conflict but neither side was willing to abandon their beliefs or surrender their culture. The fact both sides took the time to try and resolve this peacefully shows good intent. However, what the Sioux needed were good results.

SOURCES:

1. Henry Newton, Walter P. Jenney, Report on the geology and resources of the Black hills of Dakota, with atlas (Internet Archive: 1880), https://archive.org/details/reportongeologyr00geog. 1.
2. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 363, Paragraph 19.
3. Jerome A Greene, Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.) XIV.
4. Charles J. Kappler, “Treaty of Fort Laramie with Sioux, etc., 1851” in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 595.
5. Jerome A Greene, Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.) XV.
6. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 565, Paragraph 49.
7. Arthur Spirling. US Treaty-making with American Indians, (Princeton.edu: 2011), 7.
8. Jerome A Greene, Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.) XV.
9. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 687, Paragraph 70.
10. Charles J. Kappler, “Treaty with the Sioux-Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho, 1868” in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 1001.
11. Charles J. Kappler, “Treaty with the Sioux-Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho, 1868” in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 1002.
12. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 776, Paragraph 77.
13. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 776, Paragraph 80.
14. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 24.
15. J.S. Radabaugh, Custer Explores the Black Hills 1874, (Military Affairs: 1962), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uta.edu/stable/pdf/1985611.pdf, 168.
16. Terry Mort, Thieves Road: the black hills betrayal and custer’s path to little bighorn, (Prometheus: 2017), 205.
17. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 23.
18. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 24.
19. Charles J. Kappler, “Treaty with the Sioux-Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho, 1868” in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 1000.
20. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 23.
21. Terry Mort, Thieves Road: the black hills betrayal and custer’s path to little bighorn, (Prometheus: 2017), 206.
22. Ibid., p. 205
23. Charles J. Kappler, “Treaty with the Sioux-Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho, 1868” in Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties. 1002-1003.
24. J.S. Radabaugh, Custer Explores the Black Hills 1874, (Military Affairs: 1962), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uta.edu/stable/pdf/1985611.pdf, 170.
25. Terry Mort, Thieves Road: the black hills betrayal and custer’s path to little bighorn, (Prometheus: 2017), 205.
26. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 17-18.
27. Theodore Ewert, Journal of Private Theodore Ewert July 2 to Aug 30 1874.
28. Terry Mort, Thieves Road: the black hills betrayal and custer’s path to little bighorn, (Prometheus: 2017), 203.
29. J.S. Radabaugh, Custer Explores the Black Hills 1874, (Military Affairs: 1962), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uta.edu/stable/pdf/1985611.pdf, 168.
30. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 808, Paragraph 81.
31. J.S. Radabaugh, Custer Explores the Black Hills 1874, (Military Affairs: 1962), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uta.edu/stable/pdf/1985611.pdf, 170.
32. Donald Jackson, Custer’s gold : the United States Cavalry expedition of 1874, (Lincoln: Univ, of Nebraska Press, 1972), 23.
33. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 808, Paragraph 81.
34. William Ludlow, Report of a reconnaissance of the Black hills of Dakota, made in the summer of 1874., (United States Army: 1874), 42, 51.
35. J.S. Radabaugh, Custer Explores the Black Hills 1874, (Military Affairs: 1962), http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uta.edu/stable/pdf/1985611.pdf, 169.
36. The Bismarck Tribune, August 12 1874, (Bismark Tribune: 1874).
37. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 808, Paragraph 81.
38. Paul L. Hedren, “The Long Road to An Inevitable Sioux War,” in Powder River: disastrous opening of the Great Sioux War. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), Location 865, Paragraph 89.
39. James D. Richard, “Seventh Annual Message” in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Location 7121, Paragraph 85.
40. Jerome A Greene, Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876-1877, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.) XV.
41. James Calhoun, With Custer in ’74: James Calhouns Diary of the Black Hills Expedition, (Bringham Young University Press: 1979), 104.
42. Terry Mort, Thieves Road: the black hills betrayal and custer’s path to little bighorn, (Prometheus: 2017), 211.
43. Ibid., p. 130-131.
44. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 5 Pet. 1 1 (1831)