Late on Thursday night, Cuba announced that it will release 51 prisoners as a sovereign act and, at the same time, a sign of respect towards the Vatican. Historically, the latter is a key, seasoned, and well-known broker when it comes to advancing certain complex political and diplomatic endeavors here, on many occasions—such as in 2014 and now—related to the United States. The number of released individuals is not significant per se, considering the estimates of alleged political prisoners put forward by some civil society organizations, in many cases financed by the United States itself. Thus, it will be crucial to evaluate the specific list of beneficiaries, potentially improving the image of the Cuban government in the current context.
Following the recognition this same Friday, by the Cuban president, that there have indeed been negotiations with the Trump administration—which is pressuring probably more aggresively than any other in history for changes in the Cuban political system—, it is clear that the move to release prisoners is directly connected to the protracted bilateral conflict, and particularly to an ongoing attempt to achieve a certain détente. Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson of the Army General and historical leader of the Cuban Revolution Raúl Castro, was present at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba where the Cuban president reported on the state of the conversations, and also at a press conference he offered very early this morning. Both cues would confirm, de facto, his active involvement in the conversations, despite his having no formal role in the State or the high political leadership—a problem that the top authorities must address immediately. Raúl's leadership in the process was directly recognized. He also has no formal role in the government, although he is a legislator.
Thus, for the moment, the narrative that major media such as USA Today, Axios, the Miami Herald, and Bloomberg have been promoting is being confirmed by the facts, pointing to a non-violent resolution of this crisis, which keeps Cuban society immersed in a state of almost total socioeconomic helplessness. The key point, then, is to continue discovering in real time the face of the agreement being reached by the parties, the measures adopted here and there. From Florida, the bet is on the extremes, that is: the overthrow of the political regime as a non-negotiable, immediate, and no-half-measures goal, even vetoing a Venezuelan-style move, which in truth is quite far from being applicable, in practice, to the Cuban case. The most expected changes on Cuba's side, I think, will be economic, aimed at expanding the participation of the private sector, and favoring foreign investment with a legal framework that is less bureaucratic and unburdened and, consequently, more attractive while at the same time safe for the investor. These are changes that Cuba has owed itself for a long time and that, unfortunately, it is undertaking amidst pressure.
The red line for revolutionary Cuba, in this dangerous curve of its trajectory, would be in the announcement of big, representative changes in the political system, particularly regarding concrete democratic development. For example, issues such as the place of the Communist Party in our politics, the electoral system, and other critical ones. Again, a strong or medium-level shake-up in this sense would indeed be in the interest and desire of political actors in Florida, the so-called "historical exile", and would constitute a harsh, unpalatable emotional blow for those who do not consent to or condone the slightest impairment to the principle of self-determination and independence of the country. We will be very attentive to this development as new elements emerge. Stay tuned.
