This is a very concerning development for many reasons. The main one is that it occurs at a moment of extremely high tension in relations between Washington and Havana, as a consequence of the implementation of a maximum pressure policy by the erratic and volatile Trump administration. According to a statement from the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, on the morning of this Wednesday, a Florida-registered speedboat was detected in national waters—probably a 1981-built, small outboard-powered Pro-Line one. It approached just one nautical mile northwest of the El Pino channel, Falcones Key, in the central province of Villa Clara, so much so that it was closed by the Cuban Border Guard Troops.
Then, its crew opened fire on them, wounding the Cuban captain and provoking a mortal response from the Border Guard. At the time of the official note's publication, there was talk of six wounded among the crew of the offending vessel, all hospitalized; the tone suggested that the medical condition of some of them could be life-threatening. The nationality or immigration status of all involved in the United States is unknown. According to the New York Times, the attacked boat was part of a flotilla coming to the Island to pick up relatives of Cubans based in Florida.
We will see how an administration with a surly and harsh approach to illegal migration reacts. An old executive order from March 1996, recently renewed by Trump, establishes that "the unauthorized entry of any United States-registered vessel into Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to the foreign policy of the United States because such entry could facilitate a mass migration from Cuba." Thus, both the level of aggressiveness and the conspiracy to smuggle Cuban aliens into the United States are factors that, consequently, should not be viewed favorably. And they could even generate some rift between Trump and a Cuban-American community that is quite loyal to him.
Some official reactions so far
The Florida attorney general has said that "[the] Cuban government cannot be trusted, and we will do everything in our power to hold these communists accountable," in language that is totally oriented, by default, to blame the Cuban authorities. "We have different elements of the U.S. government that are trying to identify elements of the story that may not be provided to us now," said Rubio in St. Kitts, where he participated in the 50th CARICOM summit. "Hopefully it´s not as bad as we fear it could be," said Vice President Vance after being briefed by Rubio himself on the matter.
The event is hardly new
"We've seen that in the past," says an old expert on Cuban affairs to the NYT. "People went to pick up relatives and friends, and these people were armed, just in case they encountered the Cuban Coast Guard." One of the natural consequences of the economic strangulation policy that the Trump White House is applying to pressure the Cuban Government is precisely the increase in the migratory flow from the Island. After 2019, almost 1 million Cubans, who enjoy unique privileges like the Cuban Adjustment Act, arrived in the United States by various means. There will be more details to discuss about this event tomorrow.
Easing oil exports to Cuba
On the other hand, and in another interesting development, the Commerce Department's BIS and the Treasury Department's OFAC made important announcements and clarifications that point to a relaxation of the de facto oil blockade that the Trump government maintains against Cuba. In the case of the BIS, the critical bureau introduced new guidance for certain activities permitted under the Support for the Cuban People License Exception of the EAR, which I had already commented on in a previous report; we are on the right, advanced path in this sense. That is, exports of gas, oil, and derivatives of U.S. origin to Cuba are permitted as long as the end user of the product is a private actor in the economy or an individual for their personal use; state-owned companies, which are the only ones with import capacity in Cuba, can mediate in the process.
Furthermore, OFAC "would implement a favorable licensing policy toward specific license applications seeking authorization for the resale of Venezuelan origin oil for use in Cuba," in accordance with the terms and conditions outlined in the Venezuela General License 46A. Although the narrative is that none of this will benefit the "regime," in Miami these measures only amount to giving "oxygen" to the "dictatorship." In fact, the Cuban-origin representatives in Congress are pushing hard to close all BIS-granted licenses for exporting to Cuba.
