Even Stalingrad, in spite of its more apocalyptic and tragic aura, does not stand comparison in terms of forces employed and the gigantic open-field battle of Kursk.
Introduction
Recently on the Godfrey Bloom Official channel Col Douglas Macgregor outlined what he sees as an historical comparison to current events in Ukraine;
There were several Soviet offensives in 1942 and 1943 against the Germans. One near Moscow which was just a terrible disaster for the Soviets, and then one that came later with Stalingrad, even though Stalingrad turns into a German defeat, the losses the Soviets took with some estimates are a million during the entire campaign.
The Chief of the General Staff understood this and Stalin, much like Hitler, was always demanding attack, and anybody who refused to attack was essentially on the way to the wall to be shot. However, this Chief of Staff stood up to Stalin and said we can’t do that. So Stalin brought in Zhukov and several other Soviet general officers and asked what do you think? Despite being scared to death of Stalin they had the strength to say we agree with the Chief of Staff. This is not the time for us to attack we should go to the Strategic Defence and let the Germans attack us. Stalin said to the Chief what makes you think the Germans will attack and of course the answer was because I know the Germans and offensive warfare is their trump card that’s where they win, only this time they won’t because they’ll be unable to maneuverer we will present an impregnable defence. He was right – it was called the Battle of Kursk.
The Germans broke off the battle, some would say prematurely because they were winning it, you know that’s one school of thought, but the fact is they did break it off and what followed Kursk was a major offensive and that offensive broke the southern flank of the Germans in Russia and I think what you’re going to see [in Ukraine] is something similar with Kursk. Where the Ukrainians have expended themselves, they pull back to whatever defensive line they think they can man which is not going to be very good they won’t have much left and the Russians will simply roll right over them in great numbers...
It is ironic that on the 80th anniversary of the largest tank battle in history at Kursk in July 1943 German Leopard tanks are currently being destroyed in Ukraine’s ongoing summer offensive in combat with Russian forces. Just as in 1943 these much hyped ‘wunderwaffe’ have failed to break Russian defences much to the chagrin of the collective West.
Leopard 2 Tank and Destroyed Leopard 2A6s in Ukraine
The Hour of the Tank
Eighty years ago, following the calamitous defeat at Stalingrad in early February, the German Wehrmacht faced a series of Red Army offensives which were designed to bring about the destruction of Army Group Centre and Army Group South as well as the lifting of the siege of Leningrad.
These simultaneous assaults on all three German army groups, across a thousand mile front, envisaged the liberation of Ukraine, the second largest republic in the USSR. These over ambitious attacks tore great holes in the German front lines as the Red Army advanced 150 miles westward. The German armies, which had threatened Moscow during 1941-1942, had been driven westward removing the threat to the capital of the USSR. The offensives in the south led to the capture of major cities in Eastern Ukraine such as Kharkov, the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the north the southern shore of lake Ladoga was swept clean of German units and a land corridor was established between the starving inhabitants of Leningrad and the rest of the country.
As the Wehrmacht was being mauled all along the entire front, Field Marshall Manstein, commander of Army Group South, observed how the Red Army had over extended itself with its over ambitious offensives and launched a series of counter-attacks which led to the recapture of Kharkov. The Red Army’s attempt to liberate the Donbass and reach the Dneiper river had been frustrated. Once the spring thaw (Rasputitsa) had set in, a large salient, about half the size of England, jutted into the German front. At the centre of this salient lay the city of Kursk.
Created map - here showing the salient with Kursk at it's centre
Unable to move in the spring mud the Wehrmacht and Red Army set about refitting experienced units and training new formations for the battles to come that summer.
During this period both Hitler and Stalin, together with their generals, pondered their next moves.
German plans for summer offensive 1943
The Wehrmacht was in bad shape after its disastrous loss of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad and the loss of several Axis armies. All told it had lost nearly a million men while the Red Army kept growing in size. Besides the terrible loss in manpower the Luftwaffe had taken very heavy losses and the armoured forces of the Wehrmacht had been savaged. The German army had been forced to retreat 435 miles across a 750 mile front.
Hitler and his general staff realised that the Wehrmacht did not have the strength to launch wide scale offensives like it had done in the summers of 1941 and 1942. The German army, which was a shadow of its former self, only had enough strength to launch an attack across a very limited front which greatly restricted Hitler’s options for the summer of 1943.
Manstein suggested to Hitler that the Wehrmacht withdraw to the Dnieper and then use its panzer forces to counter attack the expected Red Army thrust from Kharkov in the flank. According to historian John Erickson;
This backhand chop would slice up Soviet troops and pin them down for destruction on the sea of Azov.
However, it was rejected by Hitler as being too defensive in nature.
Apparently, General Heinz Guderian, newly appointed Inspector of Panzer forces, suggested that the Wehrmacht hold off any major offensive in 1943 using the time to rebuild its armoured forces for offensive action in 1944. Not surprisingly, such a course of action had no appeal to Hitler who was acutely aware of the possibility of a second front opening up in the West. He wanted to inflict a crushing defeat on the Red Army in the Kursk salient which would also shorten the German front and buy the Wehrmacht some time before it had to deal with an Anglo-American second front in Western Europe.
The German summer offensive for 1943 was code named Zitadelle, or Operation ‘Citadel’, and envisaged a two pronged pincer attack on the northern and southern shoulders of the Kursk salient. This salient presented opportunities for the Red Army to strike into the flanks of Army Group Centre and Army Group South. Concentric attacks would encircle and destroy the large number of Red Army armoured formations in the salient. Once Kursk was captured the German front would be considerably shorter and the Red Army would be forced to retreat back into the depths of Russia.
Soviet plans for summer 1943
In Moscow the Stavka debated military operations for the upcoming summer.
Stalin in discussions with his generals expressed his natural instinct to launch a pre-emptive attack against the build up of German formations near the Kursk salient. General Vatutin played a key role in persuading the Generalissimo that a Red Army offensive to spoil the German attack on Kursk would be pointless and dangerous.
Vatutin’s operational thinking envisaged that the Central and Voronezh Fronts would strictly remain on the defensive and absorb the brunt of the German attack and grind the enemy down in attritional battles. Once the German assault had lost its momentum then a reserve Soviet army behind Kursk would launch a decisive counter-attack against the Wehrmacht.
This counter-attack envisaged the liberation of Eastern Ukraine and the industrial region of the Donbass. At the same time further north, the Bryansk and Western Fronts would launch an offensive aimed at the capture of Orel and advance to the liberation of eastern Belorussia and in the process destroy Army Group Centre.
During April extensive discussions between Stalin and his Front commanders led to the refinement of the plans for the defence of the Kursk salient. It was agreed that to give operational depth to the defensive action that a powerful reserve would be set east of Kursk. This became known as the Steppe Front consisting of five rifle armies, one tank army, an air army and six reserve corps.
Apparently, despite these plans Stalin, who had the disastrous defensive operations of 1942 still in mind, held gloomy thoughts about the prospects of the Red Army fighting a defensive battle around Kursk.
Red Army prepares its defences
During late spring the Central and Voronezh Fronts completed their deployment for a defensive battle. Artillery poured into the Kursk salient. By June over 20,000 guns and mortars, 6,000 anti tank guns and 920 Katyushka rocket batteries were in position. This was supplemented by 9 anti-aircraft artillery divisions and the building of 110 airfields which housed 3,500 aircraft of which 2,000 were fighters, 800 were ground attack aircraft and 700 were bombers. An additional 40 dummy airfields were built which were to spare the Red Army many losses in July. Red Army engineers put down 503,663 anti tank mines and 439,348 anti personnel mines mines to protect the more than 3,000 miles of trenches that had been dug.
Lloyd Clark in his account of the battle has observed that the Soviet defences presented a formidable obstacle for the upcoming German offensive. Their purpose was to;
… catch the German Blitzkrieg in a cobweb of defences, where it would tire and struggle before the Soviets attacked.
On the ground during May both sides were frantically preparing for the battle to come while the war in the air became very intense. German bombing raids on the Soviet front lines together with extensive reconnaissance by the Luftwaffe stretched the 16th Air Army to the limit. The air battles involved upwards of 1,000 aircraft on both sides.
As the air war raged overhead Soviet authorities mobilized over 300,000 civilians to build the defence works, such as anti-tank ditches, that were essential for the upcoming battle. Each rifle army built three defensive lines with a depth of up to ten miles. This defensive system was connected by communication trenches which were also fitted out with firing points. Anti-tank defences comprised of five anti-tank guns, five anti-tank rifles every half mile along with a unit of sappers and a squad of tommy gunners supported by mobile anti-tank blocking squads. Meanwhile, every kilometre of front had an average density of five to seven tanks, many of them dug into the ground.
The traumatised civilian population in Kursk and the surrounding countryside was forbidden from leaving the Kursk salient and told to carry on with their daily lives whilst helping with digging latrines and burying signals cables for the Red Army.
Lloyd Clark recalls the genocidal activities of German troops in Kursk;
In the 14 months that they had occupied Kursk, the Germans has plundered, raped and murdered their way into the nightmares of the remaining inhabitants.
The situation in the countryside was just as bad, if not worse, as German troops had engaged in a frenzy of murderous destruction. Catherine Merridale describes:
The hardship in the countryside was indescribable … the areas of the occupation had been plundered, the people’s livestock slaughtered or driven away, their crops destroyed or looted, suspected partisans had been hanged, and then their neighbours - entire communities - had been punished for good measure. A total of nearly 40,000 houses, over half the region’s entire stock, had been burned to the ground. Many able-bodied adults had been dragged off to work for the Reich as forced labourers. There was no one left to rebuild the houses, dig the fields or gather what was left of last year’s crop.
While the civilian population was engaged in building defences, infantry and tank formations were put through an extensive training programme, which included instructions on how to deal with the new German ‘wunderwaffe’: Tiger tanks. It is worth noting that most of the rifle armies in the Kursk salient were veteran formations many of which had fought in Stalingrad.
German Tiger Tank of the 2nd SS Panzer Division
Each day Stalin carefully monitored the defensive preparations and organized the work of the General Staff on a 24 hour basis. He received twice daily reports on the progress at the Kursk salient after which he would dictate directives to the various armies.
As planning and preparations continued apace for the battle to come, the battle of production was swinging decisively in favour of the Soviet Union. Stalin had made it clear to the Central Committee and Red Army leadership that, “The war will be won by industrial production”. The planned economy was undergoing a gigantic effort to massively increase both the quantity and quality of weaponry for the Red Army. Mass line output rapidly swelled the production of new bombers, escort fighters and anti-tank ground attack aircraft. There was a big increase in the production of the new KV heavy tank and the newly improved T-34 tanks. For example, the Kirov tank factory had 64 production lines, and was producing the newly developed self propelled guns SU-122 and SU-152.
KV-15 of the 9th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment
Infantrymen became walking arsenals heavily equipped for anti-tank fighting. By June 1943 over 1,450,000 anti-tank rifles and 21,000 small calibre anti-tank weapons had been distributed to the infantry. The Red Army also benefited from a huge influx of US Lend Lease jeeps of which around 183,00 had been received by mid 1943.
The Soviet armed forces also underwent considerable revision. One example of this being the decision to abandon tank armies which were composed of armour and infantry. New tank armies were formed that were composed of tanks alone. On the eve of Kursk these new tank armies had a collective strength of 9,918 tanks. These were seen as an armoured spearhead designed to breakthrough enemy front lines and penetrate deep into the German rear. In volume 2 of his history of the Eastern Front John Erickson has observed that by mid 1943:
… two armies were emerging in the Soviet establishment, the army of ‘quality’, the elite tank arm, the Guards and the crack formations, behind which the army of ‘quantity’ formed up in its solid ranks.
On the eve of Kursk it was clear that both in terms of ‘quantity and quality’ the Wehrmacht was outmatched by the Red Army. The Red Amy’s leadership had learned from its painful defeats in 1941-42 and begun to master the art of combined arms warfare which it was to employ to great effect in the battles that consumed the Wehrmacht in the second half of 1943.
Richard Overy in his book Russia’s War has noted how the modernization of the Red Army and the updating of its fighting methods meant that;
The gap in organisation and technology between the two sides was narrowed to the point where the Red Army was prepared to confront the German forces during the summer campaigning season in the sort of pitched battle of manoeuvre and firepower at which the German commanders had hitherto excelled.
German preparations for Zitadelle
On 16 June Hitler gave the order for Operation Citadel to go ahead in early July.
Even though the impending battle made Stalin’s ‘stomach turn over’ with anxiety about the high stakes of the offensive ahead. Many senior German commanders shared their Fuhrers anxiety over the gamble being taken to stake their armoured reserves on an operation in which the Wehrmacht had ‘little to gain’ but ‘much to lose’. General Mellenthin commented that the attacking German force of 770,00 men, 2451 tanks, (over 40% of the Wehrmacht’s entire armoured strength) and 7,417 guns was a formidable array of forces to risk on the upcoming offensive:
From the strategic aspect Zitadelle was to be a veritable “death ride” for the whole of the operation reserve was to be flung into this supreme offensive.
The lack of artillery firepower meant that the Wehrmacht were to rely very heavily on the Luftwaffe to smash Soviet defences and create a path forward for the advance of panzer units. The German high command supplied the upcoming offensive with 1,830 aircraft which represented 70% of the Luftwaffe’s entire strength on the Eastern Front. Luftwaffe engineer Ludwig Schein recalls;
Our superiors told us that the skies held the key to success in Zitadelle, but that our success was not assured and to expect no end of hard work. We were told to expect a massive air battle.
The Luftwaffe was further hampered by the shortages of fuel, oil and lubricants which affected its performance in the battle to come.
On the eve of battle both sides caught their breathe in anticipation of the very heavy fighting to come. One Red Army tank veteran recalls watching his friend slowly spread fat over a slice of bread. His friend said;
Don’t rush me. I’m going to enjoy this. It’s the last meal I’ll eat in this world.