SUMATRA DROWNED BY FLOODS

I must write this here, for this is the only platform that cannot be censored or silenced. At the very least, I am grateful that I have spoken the truth amid the chaos of disaster, even as life in Sumatra—especially in Aceh—remains uncertain and far from normal. One truth must not be forgotten: when leaders rely solely on statistics to guide policy, there will always be citizens left behind, treated as second-class in their own country.

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^{Due to the disruption of roads and bridges, residents of Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah regencies are forced to walk to Bireun Regency, Lhokseumawe City, and Aceh Utara Regency. They carry various farm produce (such as chili, potatoes, etc.) to sell, and staple goods (such as rice, eggs, cooking oil, etc.) to bring back home. They travel tens of kilometers on difficult terrain. Photo from my personal gallery, taken near the Aceh Utara–Bener Meriah border.}

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^{Roads and bridges were cut off due to the devastating flash floods. The location is near the border between Aceh Utara and Bener Meriah regencies.}

An Open Critique of the Neglected Victim Response and the Politics of Disaster Narratives by Indonesia’s Central Government.

I. Major Flooding, Countless Victims, and a Situation Yet to Return to Normal

In late November 2025, three provinces on the island of Sumatra—Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra—were struck by flash floods and landslides on a scale unseen in the past decade. Extreme rainfall reached its highest levels in six years in several areas, triggering river overflows, landslides, and the isolation of road access.

According to BNPB (the National Disaster Management Agency), casualty figures have continued to change as search and rescue efforts progress. However, compiled statistics indicate that more than 1,000 people had died as a result of floods and landslides across the three provinces by mid-December 2025. The number of displaced people is estimated to have reached hundreds of thousands.

In another data update dated 6 December 2015, BNPB reported 914¹ confirmed deaths, with hundreds of others still missing. Meanwhile, media accounts recorded more than 1,140² fatalities, making this flood one of the deadliest disasters in Sumatra in recent years.

^{Aerial photo of the conditions before the flash flood. Image Source Google Earth}

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^{Aerial photo of the flood conditions on November 29, 2025, in Aceh, showing the towns of Lhoksukon and Panton Labu surrounded by flash floods. Image Source www.copernicus.eu}
Damage to basic infrastructure has also been severe: thousands of homes were damaged, hundreds of educational and health facilities were destroyed, and dozens of bridges collapsed—conditions that clearly demonstrate that the loss of normal living space is not mere rhetoric, but an undeniable reality on the ground.

II. The Central Government: Downplaying the Disaster or Failing to Respond?

Failure to Declare a ‘National Disaster’ Status

The most controversial point is the central government’s decision not to designate the Sumatra floods as a “national disaster,”³ even though casualty figures had already reached hundreds to thousands of lives, and the damage was massive. The government argued that regional disaster status was sufficient, despite the scale clearly exceeding local response capacity.

Within Indonesia’s bureaucratic system, this decision has far-reaching consequences:

National contingency budgets and reserve resources are not automatically mobilized,
The reallocation and acceptance of international assistance becomes more complicated, and
The public perceives the government as deliberately downplaying the urgency of the crisis to avoid attracting international attention.

This reluctance is widely viewed by many observers as a political narrative strategy rather than a humanitarian consideration, resulting in a slow response and delays in the deployment of resources that should have been provided much earlier.

III. Evidence of Several Central Government Missteps

1. Narratives That Minimize Foreign Assistance

When the government stated that foreign assistance was “insignificant,³” it drew sharp international and domestic scrutiny—an assertion that triggered harsh criticism even from parties offering help. Critics argue that such statements reflect a prioritization of prestige over the safety and well-being of affected citizens.

This narrative subsequently fueled negative perceptions that the government was more concerned with preserving its image than saving lives, even though the statement was later clarified⁴ by the official, who insisted that there was no intention whatsoever to belittle assistance from other countries.

2. A Focus on Technocratic Statistics Rather Than Humanitarian Concerns

Amid the crisis, several government statements placed greater emphasis on statistical figures—such as the percentage of electricity⁵ expected to be restored or the readiness of certain transportation⁶ assets—while thousands of residents remained displaced, homes were destroyed, and basic services had yet to return to normal. This emphasis was widely felt to be misaligned with the lived reality of public suffering. Critics argue that such responses appear to frame the situation as being under control without addressing the root humanitarian problems.

IV. Public Narratives: A Suffering People and an Explosion on Social Media

Public sentiment on social media reflects a powerful wave of anger and disappointment toward the government, including accusations that issues such as deforestation, natural resource management, and economic policy priorities have been placed above the protection of people and the environment.

Residents who lost their homes, displaced communities (children, women, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups)who have been living in evacuation shelters for more than a month, along with the destruction of critical infrastructure, have reinforced the narrative that this disaster is not merely a matter of extreme weather, but a failure of state mitigation. Many feel a deep sense of injustice, as the government’s narrative is perceived to obscure the true scale of the crisis.

V. Chaotic Structural Government Policies

Environmental Governance and Disaster Risk

Prior to the disaster, several environmental organizations had warned about the extensive deforestation and land conversion in Sumatra for economic activities such as oil palm plantations and mining developments, which are scientifically proven to increase the risk of flooding and landslides.

However, government policies that allowed environmentally destructive resource extraction (whether legally permitted or even illegal) ultimately exacerbated the natural impacts of extreme rainfall. The central government appears to have failed to protect the ecological functions of Sumatra’s forests as water absorbers and soil binders, contributing significantly to the scale of this monumental flooding.

VI. The Reality of the Crisis: Damaged Infrastructure, Lost Homes, and Severed Road Access

The latest statistics indicate that the physical impact of this disaster has been severe:

Approximately 147,236 homes⁷ have been damaged, ranging from minor to severe destruction.

More than 1,600 public facilities⁸ have been damaged, including healthcare facilities, schools, houses of worship, government offices, and bridges.

The death toll has reached over 1,059 people⁹, with thousands injured and hundreds of thousands still displaced.¹⁰

This is a reality that cannot be concealed: communities continue to live in temporary shelters while the basic infrastructure that sustains daily life has yet to be restored.

VII. Concluding Remarks: Critical Reflections for the Future

The Sumatra floods are not merely a natural disaster—they are a disaster of policy, narrative, and misguided priorities. The central government’s reluctance to openly acknowledge the scale of the catastrophe, to mobilize international support, and to place citizen protection as its foremost priority has created a portrait of a state that values image over the safety of its own people.

How long must affected communities wait for normalcy to return? The answer lies not merely in statistics, but in a series of policies that are, quite evidently, still inadequate.

Temporal Framework of Analysis

The flood event occurred on 26 November 2025. This evaluation is conducted on 2 January 2026—approximately 37 days after the disaster—constituting a critical analytical timeframe for assessing the adequacy of governmental response, the effectiveness of policy implementation, and the extent to which disaster management has transitioned from emergency response to recovery and early rehabilitation.

PHASE 0 — Pre-Disaster Period (Before 26 November 2025)
Known Risks, Deliberate Neglect

The vulnerability of river basins (Daerah Aliran Sungai / DAS) across Sumatra has been extensively documented in scientific assessments and policy reviews¹¹ over many years. Despite this well-established body of evidence, land-use governance and licensing practices¹² continued without substantive correction in the period preceding the rainy season, reflecting a pattern of regulatory inertia and institutional tolerance toward risk.

Early warning mechanisms and community preparedness systems were neither adequately expanded nor effectively resourced in proportion to the foreseeable threat. This failure disproportionately exposed riverine and low-income communities to preventable harm.

Analytical note: Where risks are clearly identified yet systematically ignored, the resulting harm cannot be framed as an act of nature. It constitutes a failure of governance and a breach of the state’s obligation to protect the right to life, safety, and adequate living conditions.

PHASE 1 — Disaster Onset (26 November 2025)
Widespread Flash Floods, a State Left Behind

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^{Photo taken at Keude Sampoiniet, Baktiya Barat District, Aceh Utara Regency on November 26, 2025. Documented personally}
Extreme rainfall triggered widespread flash floods and landslides across Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra. Telecommunications collapsed¹³ in multiple areas during critical early hours, severely undermining emergency coordination and access to life-saving information.

Evacuations¹⁴ were largely carried out through community self-mobilization, while road access to several affected locations was severed, delaying the arrival of formal emergency assistance.

Immediate suffering: Information blackouts and delayed rescue efforts in remote and isolated areas, exacerbating preventable loss and distress.

PHASE 2 — Initial Emergency Response (First 72 Hours)
Accelerated Narratives, Withheld Status

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^{Photo taken at Meunasah Hagu, Baktiya Barat District, Aceh Utara Regency on November 30, 2025. Documented personally.}

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^{Emergency supplies for refugees at Meunasah Pante, Baktiya Barat District, Aceh Utara, December 2, 2025. Funded personally and with friends. Around 100 families—including children, elderly, and pregnant women—had run out of food and clean water, taking shelter on the roofs of mosques, meunasah, and nearby houses. Documented personally}

^{Conditions in Pidie Jaya Regency after the flood, with mud burying 15 villages to a height of over two meters. Image Source rri.co.id}
Early official statements emphasized that the situation was “under control¹⁵,” framing extreme weather¹⁶ as the primary cause while downplaying systemic and governance failures. Despite the cross-provincial scale of the disaster and the evident strain on local response capacity, a national disaster status was not declared.

Policy blunder: Withholding formal disaster status during a critical response phase effectively constrained access to full-scale resources, inter-agency coordination, and international support—costs that were ultimately borne by affected communities.

PHASE 3 — First-Week Response and Coordination
Open Contradictions Between Central and Local Authorities

Several local government leaders publicly acknowledged their inability¹⁷ to manage the scale of impacts without maximum support from the central government. However, a single, integrated public data dashboard was absent; figures on casualties and damage shifted over time without transparent or consistent methodological explanations.

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^{One of the official letters highlighting the local government’s inability to manage the floods that devastated infrastructure and public facilities in Pidie Jaya Regency. Image Source www.bithe.co}

Public suffering: Displacement increased significantly, access to clean water remained limited, and the provision of basic services was uneven and inadequate.

PHASE 4 — Second-Week Response and Early Recovery
Strengthened Optics, Lagging Functionality

Public attention focused on official visits, the deployment of security forces, and air and ground transportation efforts. However, heavy equipment for mud removal and the restoration of public facilities had yet to reach all affected locations.

Technocratic statements (regarding electricity¹⁷, logistics¹⁸, and similar¹⁹ indicators) were issued before basic needs were met equitably across communities.

Communication failure: Partial indicators were used to claim progress, obscuring the persistence of real and widespread suffering on the ground.

PHASE 5 — Beyond Media Attention
Aid Slows, Mud Remains

The distribution of basic relief assistance remained uneven for weeks after the disaster. Agricultural lands—including rice fields, fish ponds, and smallholder plantations—were severely damaged, with no clear guarantees of recovery support or compensation.

Controversy emerged over the presence of post-flood timber debris: affected residents were prohibited from collecting logs, while testimonies circulated regarding nighttime transportation of timber by unidentified actors²⁰.

PHASE 6 — Community and Civil Society Responses
Collective Disappointment Becomes a Political Language

Social media platforms were inundated with firsthand testimonies from affected communities, accompanied by sharp public criticism of official responses. In Aceh²¹, protest symbols emerged as visible expressions of prolonged frustration and unaddressed grievances.

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^{Local residents hoisted historical flags during the delivery of aid to Aceh Tamiang Regency. Image source bbc.com}

Public trust in the central government’s narrative eroded significantly²², as lived experiences on the ground increasingly contradicted official²³ claims and representations.

PHASE 7 — Restriction of Public Criticism
Intimidation, Silent Terror, and Coordinated Buzzers

Activists and citizen journalists reported anonymous threats, doxing, and systematic efforts at delegitimization. Coordinated buzzer networks framed public criticism as political manipulation rather than as legitimate expressions of concern and accountability.

No firm or unequivocal public guarantees were issued to affirm that criticism, whistleblowing, and independent reporting would be protected.

Several activists who were targeted include DJ Donny²⁴ (influencer), Sherly Annavita²⁵ (influencer/activist), and Iqbal Damanik²⁶ (Greenpeace activist), with potentially many others whose experiences have yet to surface in the media.

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^{A terror letter sent by an irresponsible individual targeting DJ Donny. In addition to the letter, the perpetrator also threw a Molotov cocktail at DJ Donny’s house.

The letter contained the following threat: ‘ADAM!! WATCH YOUR MOUTH! ESPECIALLY ON SOCIAL MEDIA. DO NOT DIVIDE THE NATION OR YOU WILL END UP LIKE THIS CHICKEN! YOU WILL BECOME LIKE THIS CHICKEN IF YOUR WORDS AND SOCIAL MEDIA BEHAVIOR ARE ANIMALISTIC!! DO NOT TAKE THIS LIGHTLY.’ This is an immoral and violent threat. Image source www.tvonenews.com}
Harsh assessment: Silencing criticism during a disaster erases life-saving feedback mechanisms and undermines the state’s capacity to prevent further harm.

PHASE 8 — Partial Remediation and Adjustments (Through 2 January 2026)

What Has and Has Not Been Achieved
As of 2 January 2026, the following have been restored or addressed:
✅ Electricity has returned to normal.
✅ LPG gas supply is now available again (after approximately two weeks of shortage).
✅ Temporary Housing Units (Huntara) are nearly completed in Aceh Tamiang.
✅ Emergency Bailey bridges have reopened key roads for traffic.
✅ Mud has been cleared from national highways.
✅ Fuel supply (BBM) has begun to resume, although in some regencies it remains limited.

Outstanding Issues / What Has Not Been Achieved (Critical)
❌ Distribution of basic relief assistance remains uneven.
❌ Recovery of livelihoods (agriculture, fish ponds, and MSMEs) remains unclear.
❌ Loss compensation lacks a transparent framework.
❌ Data on casualties and damages have not been consistently published.
❌ Root-cause audits (river basins / land-use management) have not been disclosed.

Conclusion

The floods that struck Sumatra on 26 November 2025 exposed a crisis that extends far beyond natural hazards, revealing deep-seated weaknesses in governance, preparedness, and disaster response. Withholding national disaster status during the most critical phase proved to be a political decision with severe human costs, delaying the mobilization of resources and the coordination necessary to protect lives and livelihoods.

Throughout the response, optics often outweighed functionality. Partial progress indicators were highlighted to project a sense of achievement, while the full scale of human suffering and infrastructural damage remained obscured. Structural root causes—such as river basin vulnerabilities and flawed land-use policies—were largely sidelined; without meaningful corrective measures, the conditions that produced this disaster remain unaddressed, leaving communities exposed to future hazards.

At the same time, civic space for criticism and independent reporting was systematically constricted precisely when it was most needed. Activists, citizen journalists, and local observers faced intimidation and silencing, undermining life-saving feedback mechanisms and accountability.

Even 37 days after the disaster, normalcy has yet to return for affected communities. Distributions of basic aid remain uneven, livelihoods remain uncertain, compensation schemes lack transparency, and data on casualties and damages are inconsistently reported. The Sumatra floods thus illustrate a compounded disaster of both nature and governance, emphasizing the urgent need for proactive risk mitigation, transparent communication, protection of civic space, and enforcement of the state’s obligations to safeguard the rights and well-being of its citizens.

Mandatory Recommendations

National Public Dashboard: A unified, publicly accessible dashboard for casualties, damages, budgets, and timelines must be maintained.
Reevaluation of Disaster Status: Disaster status should be reassessed based on local capacity and cross-provincial impacts.
Prioritize Function Over Ceremony: Essential services—water, irrigation, heavy equipment, and compensation—must take precedence over optics or ceremonial appearances.
Protection of Critical Voices: Delegitimization and coordinated attacks on critics, activists, and citizen journalists must cease immediately.
River Basin Audits & Permit Moratorium: Conduct audits of vulnerable river basins and impose a moratorium on land-use permits in high-risk areas, with results publicly disclosed.