In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
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President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency.
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The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 18.
(redacted) Russian Tactical-Operational Orders Also Indicated That Putin Prioritized Post-election Influence Operations, Rather Than "Aspiring" to Help Trump Win the Election. While the ICA only considered the one hypothesis that Putin "aspired" to elect candidate Trump, the alternative hypothesis that he preferred Secretary Clinton was not considered in the ICA. (redacted)
(redacted) That Putin had reasons to want Clinton elected is supported not only by Putin's actual behavior, but also by the timing and content of Russian operational orders that indicated that Moscow assumed they had unique leverage over Secretary Clinton that would more useful if she won the election.
(redacted) In (redacted) _2016, (redacted) instructed its regional directorates to conduct information
operations to disseminate negative news stories on Clinton, according (redacted).(redacted)The timing suggests the effects of the operations were intended to occur after the election.
(redacted) (redacted) issued orders to their field elements in Europe to "spread allegations about Secretary Clinton among European Union (EU) leaders" according to (redacted).(redacted)
(redacted) The allegations "included information on her purported tendency toward authoritarianism, violence, and coarseness in relation to partners and associates." The allegations would emphasize how extremely difficult it would be for EU leaders to work with President Clinton, as she only "took her own and US interests into account when forming opinions" that Secretary Clinton "then tried to impose on others."(redacted)
(redacted) The media influence themes of these orders appeared to mirror the contents of some of the particularly damaging DNC and Clinton Campaign materials that Putin held back as the election became close. (redacted)
(redacted) Such planted media articles with themes linked to the held-back emails would have laid the groundwork for subsequent leaks of the actual emails that would serve to validate earlier press speculation.
(redacted) The timing and targets of FSB and SVR covert media orders did not make sense if President Putin's intent was to ensure the election of candidate Trump.
Operations timed to launch after the election or that targeted European leaders would not be expected to influence the decisions US voters toward either candidate.
(redacted) The orders do make sense, however, in the context of laying a covert influence groundwork for the post-election leaks of the more damaging emails.
(redacted) Had Clinton been elected, these would have helped Russia undermine NATO perceptions of her competence to be President. They also would have provided rich propaganda opportunities for Moscow to denigrate the US democratic process.
There Were No Reliable Indications That Orders by Putin to Help Trump Win the Election Were Ever Issued, Which Further Makes the Case Far Considering Alternative Hypotheses. ICD 203 emphasizes the importance of considering alternatives when analysts must "contend with significant uncertainties." President Putin's intentions - in terms of preferring one candidate over the other, or having no preference for either candidate - fit the ICD 203 definition, given the nature of the intelligence and difficulty of ascertaining Putin's thoughts.
(redacted) Had Putin preferred Trump to win, then we also would have expected to see evidence from a variety of HUMINT or technical intelligence sources that mentioned Trump in campaign orders from Putin, his subordinate intelligence authorities, or else evidence suggesting these orders exists from observations of Russian activities or discussions of lower level operators.
Yet the available intelligence showed:
(redacted) No Putin orders directing or suggesting operations intended to elect Trump (by contrast, intelligence on Russian operations in German elections specifically mentioned Putin's goal of defeating Chancellor Merkel).(redacted)
(redacted) No observed Russian operations that could only be explained in the context of electing Trump (as opposed to efforts to undermine faith in US democracy or post-election themes).
(redacted) No evidence of attempts to covertly transfer money to the Trump campaign or otherwise directly assist the campaign.
(redacted) No discussions or activities among subordinate authorities or tactical operators suggesting they were attempting to help Trump win or had received orders to do so.(redacted)
(redacted) No indications of orders to not engage in activities that would damage candidate Trump, such as releasing the emails from Colin Powell that were critical of Trump's character.
The ICA Was Unable to Support Claims That That Russian Operations to Denigrate Secretary Clinton Were Also Intended to Elect Trump. The ICA offered no reliable intelligence that indicated or implied that Putin issued orders to conduct influence operations that denigrated Clinton with the goal of electing Trump. Moreover, all of the Russian leak operations could be attributed to Putin's objectives to undermine US democracy, or to weaken the expected, and possibly preferred, Clinton Administration, without regard for Trump's fate.(redacted)
By Assuming Putin's Public Statements Could Only be Truthful, the ICA Missed the Alternative Hypothesis That Russian Propaganda Organs Were Actually Pushing a Manipulative Post-Election Theme to Paint US Elections as Unfair.__ The ICA claims that the judgment that "Putin developed a clear preference for candidate Trump" is confirmed in part by "the public behavior of senior Russian officials and state-controlled media."
The ICA assumed - without citing any direct evidence - that the Russian state-controlled media coverage of candidates Trump and Clinton could only reflect what President Putin truly believed, as opposed to his manipulation of foreign audiences.
(redacted) In doing so, the ICA ignored the warning from the US Ambassador to Moscow - sent the week after the election - that addressed the danger of taking Russian statements literally, noting, "We caution that Russia must not be judged on what it says, only on what it actually does."(redacted)
The ICA did not consider the obvious alternative hypotheses that Russian state media might actually be another tool for deception and manipulation of world opinion (see box "Putin and Russian Media Said").(redacted)
What the ICA Says: Putin and Russian Media Said They Prefer Trump
In support of the judgment, "Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for [Trump]" the ICA said:
"Our high confidence in these judgment is based on a body [of classified evidence] ... and the public behavior of senior Russian officials _and state-controlled media."
"Putin publicly indicated a preference for (Trump's] stated policy to work with Russia." [ICA-U p.1 and ICA p.2]
Russia's state-run propaganda machine served as "a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences. State-owned media made increasingly favorable comments about [Trump] ... while consistently offering negative coverage of Secretary Clinton." [ICA-U p.3 and ICA p.1 and p.8]
Looking at public statements by Russian officials and propaganda organs from a more skeptical view - informed by the classified intelligence and observed Russian influence operations - Moscow's public line can be shown to be exploiting Trump's outsider and underdog status, rather than helping him win or publicizing Putin's personal views.
A positive portrayal of Trump would help Putin exploit him - after his expected defeat - as a "martyr" to the "corrupt" US democratic process and unfair Clinton election tampering.
Secretary Clinton, by contrast, would be presented as having unfairly won, and having benefited from media bias, establishment favoritism, or election tampering.