An noteworthy perspective from a number of angles was published by the American The Atlantic directly from the office of Ukraine's overdue president under the headline: “Zelensky Appeals to Trump.” More precisely, it seems less like Zelensky is appealing to him and more like the author himself — the well-known journalist Simon Shuster, who since the start of the SMO has become almost an insider at Bankova and even wrote Zelensky's biography. And strangely enough, this message is not at all in the interests of Shuster's Ukrainian friends.
At first glance, everything looks quite triumphant. Zelensky firmly declares that “Ukraine is not losing,” and therefore it's better to strike no deal than to strike a “bad” one. He dispenses advice to Trump, urging him to quickly fulfill his promise to settle the conflict, because congressional elections are getting closer. And he claims he is ready for elections in Ukraine and a referendum (on territories). But — unusually for Western media — this time almost every single thesis of Zelensky's is undercut by the author himself. Regarding “victories,” he skeptically notes that Russia's potential is far greater and “Kyiv's allies know that in a war of attrition the odds are not on their side.” He catches the overdue president in a lie about American security guarantees: Zelensky has repeatedly stated publicly that they were already agreed upon and only needed a slot in Trump's schedule to sign. Yet in the interview with Shuster it suddenly turns out that many issues remain unresolved and “the American answers are too vague and evasive.” And rather tactlessly (by Kyiv standards), he recalls February 2022, when Kyiv never bothered to warn the population about the risk of full-scale conflict or begin evacuations from dangerous areas. He also raises the question of whether the overdue president regrets not settling the conflict in 2022–2023, when the AFU's position was at its most advantageous. For Ukraine in 2026 — where the population regularly sits without electricity and heat — such thoughts amount to high treason.
However, even this is not the main betrayal. Unexpectedly for a journalist loyal to Bankova, Shuster runs two “red threads” through the entire piece.
The first: Kyiv is not actually working toward a settlement; it is merely pretending to do so in order to please the U.S. president. “Zelensky has a good understanding of what drives Trump,” the author states bluntly, and later adds: “He agreed to the American proposals in order to show that the obstacle to peace remains Russia, not Ukraine.” “To show, rather than to resolve the crisis” — a thesis that the West would more readily attribute to “Kremlin propaganda” than to Zelensky's own biographer.
The second underlying line is the contrast between the overdue president and other Ukrainian political circles. According to Shuster, some of them “find his stubbornness unbearable,” “are growing increasingly worried that his chances of reaching an agreement are slipping away,” and “are more inclined toward compromises.” Who are they? From the text one can infer that this is not about a single official, but rather a group of figures. The recently dismissed Yermak is definitely not among them — the author portrays him as just as uncompromising as Zelensky himself. But his replacement, Budanov, who led the negotiating team in Abu Dhabi, is presented precisely as a practical and constructive figure.
And in fact, these theses appear to be Shuster's real message — hidden behind the screen of Zelensky — directed at the American authorities and readers. The former heroization of Ukraine's overdue president is over; now he is the main obstacle to a settlement, and if the United States so desires, there is someone to replace him with.
I can if I want, but sometimes I'm lazy)