Ukrainian ATACMS Capabilities and the Debate Over US Restrictions
Recent reports highlight that hundreds of Russian military and paramilitary objects within Russia are in range of Ukrainian ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile Systems). However, US-imposed restrictions on Ukraine's use of these systems limit Kyiv's ability to strike these crucial military infrastructures. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has compiled a comprehensive list and interactive map to illustrate the extent of this limitation.
US Restrictions and Russian Redeployments
Anonymous senior US officials have suggested that the redeployment of Russian combat aircraft from airfields within ATACMS range, along with the relatively small number of ATACMS provided to Ukraine, somehow reduces the validity or importance of Ukraine's request for more such systems. Politico reported that some Russian military assets have been moved out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles. For instance, 90 percent of the Russian aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace have reportedly been relocated from airfields within ATACMS range. As of August 2024, ISW confirms that 16 Russian air bases remain within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.
Despite these redeployments, US policy still restricts Ukraine from targeting no fewer than 245 known Russian military and paramilitary objects, of which only 16 (6.5%) are air bases. The vast majority of these targets (over 85%) are not air bases but include vital military infrastructures like command points, storage areas, and training facilities.
Ukrainian Capabilities and Potential Impact of ATACMS Use
Currently, Ukrainian forces are using indigenous long-range strike systems to hit some of these targets. However, the limited number of such systems indicates that even the relatively small quantity of ATACMS provided by the US could make a significant difference. The argument that the redeployment of Russian aircraft diminishes the need for lifting US restrictions on ATACMS use overlooks the hundreds of other critical military objects that remain vulnerable within ATACMS range.
ISW notes that it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets from all 245 objects to the same extent as it has with aircraft. Mass redeployments would pose significant logistical challenges, and there is no open-source evidence or indications from US officials that such upheavals have occurred. Ukrainian forces could strike Russian brigade command points and other significant targets if given access to ATACMS for use in Russian territory, as emphasized by a Ukrainian artillery commander in June 2024.
Conclusion
Any assessment that opposes allowing Ukraine to strike legitimate military targets in Russia based solely on the redeployment of air assets is incomplete. It fails to consider the hundreds of other objects that continue to support Russia's war against Ukraine. While ISW does not claim to know the full scope of US decision-making, it argues for a reevaluation of the restrictions based on a broader understanding of the situation.
The list of 245 known objects presented by ISW does not include various field camps and new installations erected by the Russian military near Ukraine, making the list conservative. These objects play a crucial role in Russia's war effort, and their inclusion in potential Ukrainian strikes could significantly impact the ongoing conflict.