Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
From the beginning of these posts, we’ve seen that the two occupying powers that divided Korea had somewhat different goals regarding the peninsula. Moscow’s aim was quite simple: to protect their eastern border they believed they needed a security buffer provided by a “friendly” Korean government. Of course, it would be best if this buffer were the entire peninsula, but if they could only control the northern half of Korea, that was not a bad solution. Therefore, when the United Nations began discussing how to create a Korean government in late 1947, Moscow simply dug in, protecting their position in the North while blocking any international action that might threaten it.
For the United States the situation regarding Korea was more complicated. The goal was also security, but this was not a simple matter of protecting a national border. Instead, resolving the Korean issue was seen as part of the larger effort to establish an effective system of collective security. The hyper-nationalism of Germany, Italy, and Japan had led to the catastrophic world war, which the ineffective League of Nations had been unable to prevent. Thus, as President Roosevelt laid the foundation for the United Nations Organization in 1945, he sought to prevent a new war over Korea by cooperating with the Soviet Union and China to create a government for the liberated country.
By the fall of 1947, with bilateral cooperation with Moscow having failed, the US turned to the United Nations to resolve the Korean issue. However, since it was clear to all observers that the Soviets were determined to retain control of the north, many UN members believed it would damage UN credibility to announce nationwide elections. Since such elections could only be held in the south, they be illegitimate and would lead to a permanent division of the country. This outcome would weaken the ability of the UN to effectively resolve other pressing problems, such as the future government of Palestine and Kashmir and various disputes in Europe.
For this reason, many UN member states, including close US allies, were reluctant to participate in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which was being created to oversee the elections. In December 1947 Canadian Prime Minister MacKenzie King strenuously opposed any involvement in the Korean affair, declaring to President Truman that the UNTCOK mission would be a “fool’s errand” since Soviet cooperation was extremely unlikely.
Truman was determined to press ahead, however, because he believed allied unity was essential to American security. He therefore instructed Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett to reply to Prime Minister King that a Canadian boycott would defeat the entire program of the United Nations. It would only advance Soviet interests while hindering the realization of Korea’s independence. More to the point, he argued that the US and Canada had to avoid even the appearance of discord because enemy nations would use such disunity to weaken the security of both countries.
King was not persuaded by the American argument, however, and sent Foreign Minister Lester Pearson to Washington to discuss the issue. Pearson explained to American leaders that Canada, like Great Britain, feared that involvement in the messy and violent Korea situation would weaken essential cooperation in the UN Security Council. Canada also opposed the American intention to exclude northern Koreans from the UN debate. With the issue unresolved, on 5 January 1948 Truman appealed again to King to support the UN resolution, emphasizing that international involvement was aimed at producing a settlement, not at increasing Soviet-American tensions, and that Canada’s boycott would lead other countries to question the viability of the United Nations.
In the next post, we will examine how Truman and King resolved this impasse and how UNTCOK was received when it arrived in Korea in January 1948.
[Sources: This post relies, in part, on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985).]
