Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

In August 1945 when it became clear that the Pacific war would soon end, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan began a frantic race over how to secure their interests in the postwar world. Immediately after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, Stalin moved up the date for declaring war against Japan to August 9, desperate to join the war before Japan surrendered so that he could get the territorial gains promised him at Yalta. Japan’s political leaders signaled urgently to the US that they would soon surrender, to ensure they would be occupied by the Americans rather than the Soviets. As we discussed in some of the first posts, the US suddenly became concerned about Soviet expansion into Manchuria and Korea and therefore took the fateful step of proposing a division of Korea into two occupation zones. The Soviets accepted this proposal because they were frantically trying to gain as much control as possible over postwar Japan, hoping to persuade the Americans to grant them an occupation zone or at least a greater voice in the Allied Control Council for Japan.

January 1948 was a similar moment for Korea. As we discussed in the last post, the arrival of UNTCOK signaled to all interested parties that the question of Korea’s future government would soon be decided. Consequently, in order to counter the expected elections in the south, the authorities in the north prepared to issue a new constitution for the whole country. On February 16 the People’s Committee in Pyongyang announced that it would form a government for all of Korea within the next few months. Leftist parties in the south cooperated by organizing strikes and sabotage throughout the American zone to prevent elections from being held. Over the next four months, these actions led to nearly 300 deaths and more than 10,000 arrests.

General Hodge’s harsh reprisals against leftist saboteurs followed from his belief that it was urgent to contain the influence of Communists in the South. However, his actions alarmed many members of UNTCOK. George Patterson of Canada and S.H. Jackson of Australia began to press the rest of the Commission to investigate the American commander’s tactics. Only Liu Yu-wan of China and Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour of France were willing to accept that the elections would be imperfect and would exclude Koreans living in the northern zone.

Syngman Rhee was desperate to ensure that a separate government would be established so that the South could withstand attempted subjugation by the Soviet-backed North. He therefore threatened to organize demonstrations and political violence unless elections were held soon. General Hodge was eager to expand the Korean Constabulary into a regular army and prevent Koreans of any political leanings from subverting the new government and security forces.

Hodge’s urgency was partly the result of the extensive demobilization of US military forces that had been underway since the end of the war. His 6th Infantry Division had decreased from 16,000 officers and men in early 1947 to 3,200 in early 1948. Without the help of Korean police and Constabulary, the 6th Division could not even protect itself, much less southern Korea. Given this precarious security situation, Hodge agreed with his political advisor Joseph Jacobs that it would be disastrous if UNTCOK referred the Korean issue back to the United Nations.

UNTCOK, however, realized that separate elections would solidify the division of Korea and lead to a bloody civil war. Therefore, on February 6 the Commission decided to refer the matter back to the UN Interim Committee for reconsideration, recommending that the UN authorize the election only of consultants who would assist in determining Korea’s future government. The Indian delegate K.P.S. Menon traveled to New York to deliver UNTCOK’s report.

In the next post, we will examine the debate over Korea in the UN in February and the continuing scramble for advantage on the peninsula.

[Sources: This post relies on Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Harvard University Press, 2006: James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985); and Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945-1950, A House Burning (University Press of Kansas, 2005).]

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