Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
From 1945-1948, as the victorious powers emerged from the cataclysm of the second world war, they faced the task of organizing governments in territories that were now or soon would be independent. In three of these areas, the great powers carried out what they considered to be the solution of last resort – partition. India, Palestine, and Korea remain tragically divided, bringing lasting conflict and grievous harm. Moreover, since Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all acquired nuclear weapons, and South Korea has been protected by US nuclear weapons, these regional conflicts carry the risk of global conflagration.
In Korea, the danger of such broader ramifications was always in the minds of the occupying powers, as the US and the USSR directly faced each other across the supposedly temporary divide at the 38th parallel. Thus, in the spring of 1948, as US authorities prepared for UN-supervised elections, they were afraid that moderate and leftist parties would boycott the election. If the new government in Seoul were exclusively rightist, the international community might regard it as illegitimate. In that case, the elections would fail to bring stability to the peninsula and would instead open the door to Soviet takeover of the South.
The international members of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) also worried about a possible boycott of the elections, as well as about the likelihood that rightist groups would use violence to force an outcome in their favor. After heated debate over these concerns, they agreed to a compromise proposed by the Syrian representative, though Canada and Australia dissented. UNTCOK would supervise elections in southern Korea on May 9, but only if there was an atmosphere conducive to freedom of choice. This decision meant that once a new government was created through this process, the United Nations would have a moral obligation to defend it. This laid the foundation for UN intervention two years later when North Korea attempted to unify the country through a military offensive.
Even before this decision by UNTCOK, the US military government began a remarkably energetic effort to encourage Koreans living in the South to participate in the democratic process. They used radio broadcasts, classroom lessons, pamphlets, handbills, loudspeakers, and exhibits traveling by train. This campaign was successful; by April 14 more than 90% of eligible voters had registered.
The Soviet authorities in the North were naturally alarmed by these American efforts, since the establishment of a non-communist government in Seoul with broad popular support would make it much more difficult to gain control of the South. Therefore, they tried to present the governing bodies they had already been created in the North as a legitimate government. On March 17 Soviet Commander Korotkov informed General Hodge that he would no longer act as mediator between the United States and the population of the North. In other words, the Americans would now have to deal directly with Kim Il Sung and his officials. To solidify this new position, Korotkov transmitted a letter from Kim Il Sung informing the AMG that the government in Pyongyang would stop the flow of electricity to the American zone because the US had not paid its bills.
A week later the proto-government in the North took more direct action. It called for a North-South Conference to be held in Pyongyang on April 14 to discuss holding nationwide elections and securing the withdrawal of foreign forces and invited thirteen leaders from the South to attend, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. Since he was understandably suspicious of the intentions behind this meeting, Kim Kyu-sik informed the northern leadership that he would participate only under the condition that the conference did not advocate dictatorship, nationalization of industries, or less than free elections. After the northern leaders agreed to these conditions, Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku traveled to Pyongyang.
In the next post, we will examine the weeklong North-South Conference and its aftermath.
[Sources: This post relies on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985).]
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