Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
We have seen that the representatives of outside powers who came to Korea in early 1948 to supervise UN-sponsored elections understood that such elections would solidify the division of the country because the Soviets would not allow them to be held in the northern zone. Several of the UNTCOK members opposed holding elections on those grounds, but most concluded that while this outcome was undesirable, it would be even worse to fail to create a government in the southern zone. Syngman Rhee agreed with that point of view and urged the US to speed up creation of a separate state in the South, fearing a Soviet takeover if the southern zone remained chaotic.
Other political leaders in Seoul were less willing to accept separate elections. Desperate for an alternative, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik accepted Kim Il Sung’s invitation to travel to Pyongyang on April 19 for a conference on how to create a unified government for all of Korea.
Why did Kim Il Sung call this conference? We have to note that in April 1948 Kim Il Sung did not have the authority to initiate such a meeting. Russian archival records reveal that, in keeping with the political culture of the late Stalin period, Soviet authorities made all decisions on Korean issues of even minor importance. Thus, Soviet authorities had to approve Kim Il Sung’s speeches, arrangements for parades, communications with Chinese about use of a crane in a Korean port, etc. This situation changed somewhat in the fall of 1948 once the DPRK was created, but for events before that time we have to examine Moscow’s reasoning.
We have seen that the goal of the Soviet Union with regard to Korea was to transform the peninsula into a security buffer against a future attack on the USSR from the East. By 1948 they were confident that the northern half of the peninsula would provide that service, but since two-thirds of the Korean population lived in the South, the North might be overrun by hostile forces. Consequently, Soviet security remained precarious until they could bring the entire peninsula into their camp. Given the chaos in the South and the widespread resentment of American military rule, Soviet authorities believed that once US troops withdrew, they would be able to extend Kim Il Sung’s authority over the entire peninsula.
If UN-sponsored elections were held in the South and a government created there, it would be more difficult to seize control of the southern zone. Therefore, the Soviets decided to call this North-South conference in order to block such elections. The joint communique released at the end of the weeklong meeting called first of all for withdrawal of occupation forces. The Soviets had already begun creating a capable military force for the North, which was being strengthened by the return of tens of thousands of Korean Communists who had fought with the Chinese Communist army. They were therefore confident that they could safely withdraw their forces.
The Joint Communique also called for the establishment of a single government for Korea by Koreans, and rejection of any unilateral establishment of a separate government in the South. Since the Soviets had already identified a sufficient number of loyal Korean Communists, they believed they could safely turn governing over to Koreans.
Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik were disappointed when they realized the intention behind the conference and the degree of loyalty to the Soviet Union displayed by northern leaders. They complained to Kim Il Sung about the huge portraits of Stalin that Korean people carried in a parade held on April 25 in honor of the visitors from the South. They also voiced their displeasure over shouts from Koreans of “Long Live Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union.” Perhaps for that reason, Kim Il Sung assured Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik before they returned to Seoul that he would accept free elections and would not cut off the electric power. In return, the two southern leaders agreed to boycott the UN-sponsored elections in Seoul.
In the next post, we will look at the violence that intensified in the South as the May 10 elections approached and will examine the outcome of the elections.
[Sources: This post relies on Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, The North Korean Leader (Columbia University Press, 1988). Professor Suh’s account is based on records of the conference found in the US National Archives, in the collection of documents captured in Pyongyang in October 1950, when UN forces occupied the city. These documents were shipped to the National Archives in Washington, DC and are accessible to anyone who wishes to use them.]