Zachariah Levitan
1 January 2018

Polluter Pays Principle vs. Beneficiary Pays Principle: Perspectives On Environmental Damage Compensation

Henry Shue and the Polluter Pays Principle

Henry Shue addresses what he believes to be a fair outline of how to allocate the cost of repairing environmental damages caused by pollution. He does this by introducing three principles of equity. Each of these claims support Shue’s core argument—that developed countries have a greater responsibility to pay for the effects of pollution than developing countries. Shue sees through a historical lens and holds that developed countries should incur greater tolls because they are responsible for damaging the atmosphere, especially by means of industrialization. “Now the rich have realized that their own industrial activity has been destroying the ozone in the earth’s atmosphere and has been making far and away the greatest contribution to global warming” (Shue, 1999, p. 394). Shue maintains that in order to take an equitable approach to ameliorating the effects of climate change, developed nations have to take responsibility as polluters, and maintain dignity and respect for all other countries.

The first principle of equity that Shue discusses is that nations (like people) have a moral obligation to “clean up their own mess” (Shue, 1999, p. 395). Shue argues that historically, because developed nations—such as the United States—have contributed the most to total greenhouse gas emissions, they should bear the cost of their actions by internalizing the externality. This means that the United States has a moral duty to compensate developing countries for the environmental harm that they have caused and profited from. “If whoever makes a mess receives the benefits and does not pay the costs, not only does he have no incentive to avoid making as many messes as he likes, be he is also unfair to whoever does pay the costs” (Shue, 1999, p. 395). Shue asserts that if industrialized nations are not made to internalize their externalities, then the industrialized nations will continue to pollute and allow poorer nations to bear the cost both environmentally and financially. Thus, it is moral to impose reimbursement on the polluters in an effort to stabilize the atmosphere that they brought to imbalance.

There are three counter-arguments to Shue’s first principle. The first is that the developing nations have benefitted from the developed countries’ industrial achievements. Shue states “Yet it is maintained that...medicines and technologies made possible by the lifestyles of the rich countries have also reached the poor countries, bringing benefits that the poor countries could not have produced as soon for themselves” (Shue, 1999, p. 396). Shue disputes this claim as it does not address the concern for equity, being that the developed nations have still out-benefitted the developing nations, and the damage is indisputable. Furthermore, the medical advancements that developing nations received did not come without a financial price, and often this price was a heavy burden. “Yet this dispute does not need to be settled in order to decide questions of equity...except for a relative trickle of aid, all transfers have been charged to the recipients, who have in fact been left with an enormous burden of debt, much of it incurred precisely in the effort to purchase the good things produced by industrialization”(Shue, 1999, p. 396).

The second counter-claim that Shue discusses is that the developed nations did not make advancements in technology with mal-intent toward the environment. “Whatever damage has been done, it is said, was unintentional” (Shue, 1999, p. 397). This argument is founded on the notion that because industrializers did not know that their actions were damaging to the environment, they cannot be held responsible for causing harm. Shue refutes this rationalization by stating that compensation is not a punishment, it is taking responsibility. In other words, one does not need to cause harm intentionally in order to be held liable for their actions. “It is not fair to punish someone for producing effects that could not have been avoided, but it is common to hold people responsible for effects that were unforeseen and unavoidable” (Shue, 1999, p. 397).

Lastly, some argue that it is unjust to hold industrialized nations accountable for polluting the atmosphere because the people currently alive in those actions did not emit the greenhouse gases of the past, contributing to historical measurements of pollution. “Perhaps Europeans living today are responsible for atmosphere-damaging gases emitted today, but it is not fair to hold people responsible for deeds done long before they were born” (Shue, 1999, p. 397). Shue considers an argument of this nature to be reasonable on other subjects, but holds it to be irrelevant in the discussion of polluter responsibility (Shue, 1999, p. 398). Shue takes a collectivist approach—arguing that not only is the modern generation in developed nations enjoying a higher standard of living because of their ancestors’ lifestyle, they have continued the damaging practices over the years. “First...the industrial states’ contributions to global warming have continued unabated long since it became impossible to plead ignorance (Shue, 1999, p. 397).

Next, Shue introduces the second principle of fairness in assigning responsibility for climate change to developed nations. This is that industrialized nations have a greater ability to pay for the restoration of the environment. Shue describes this method of payment as being progressive, and relays that “insofar as a party’s assets are greater, the rate at which the party should contribute to the enterprise in question also becomes greater” (Shue, 1999, p. 398). Shue argues against the common counterargument that a flat rate of compensation is more fair—on the account that a flat rate does not consider the financial impact of all parties in the end, leaving the industrialized nations better off. “While flat rates appear misleadingly fair in the abstract, they do so largely because they look at only the first part of the story and ignore how things turn out in the end” (Shue, 1999, p. 399). Shue further states that progressive rates “tend to accommodate final outcomes and take account of whether the contributors can in fact afford their respective contributions” (Shue, 1999, 399). Shue also explains that progressive rates may or may not be strictly proportional to the nation’s wealth (Shue, 1999, p. 398).

Shue’s final principle of equity is that there be a guaranteed minimum of resources needed to survive the effects of climate change for all nations. This is a form of combating radical inequality. Shue argues that while some nations have more resources than needed—other nations have less than needed—and it is morally wrong to deny the poorer nations their minimum means for survival (Shue, 1999, p. 401). Shue describes that this principle can be accomplished via a variety or a combination of approaches—including local, national, and global efforts. Furthermore, Shue explains that to enforcing the third principle of equity can have two meanings: “a weaker requirement (a) not to interfere with others’ ability to maintain a minimum for themselves; or a stronger requirement (b) to provide assistance to others in maintaining a minimum for themselves” (Shue, 1999, p. 401-402).

Lastly, Shue argues that there is a moral duty to oppose radical inequality, even if that means defying sovereign political boundaries. “Radical human inequalities cannot be tolerated and ought to be eliminated, irrespective of whether their elimination involves the movement of resources across national political boundaries “(Shue, 1999, p. 402-403). This is also morally just as the wealthy nations desire that the poorer nations will cooperate and not engage in the same damaging, industrializing practices that the developed nations operated to achieve their financial superiority. Due to this, industrialized nations should provide developing nations with guaranteed minimum resources needed for survival because “Any lesser guarantee is too little to be fair, which is to say that any international agreement that attempts to leave radical inequality across national states untouched while asking effort from the worst-off to assist the best-off is grossly unfair” (Shue, 1999, p. 403).

Simon Caney and the Beneficiary Pays Principle

Caney critiques the polluter pays principle espoused by Shue, and explicates the Beneficiary Pays Principle, which he supports. The beneficiary pays principle is an individualist and temporally present approach to allocating the costs of climate damage, unlike the polluter pays principle, which is collectivist and historical. Caney describes the beneficiary pays principle: “Where A has been made better off by a policy pursued by others, and the pursuit by others of that policy has contributed to the imposition of adverse effects on third parties, then A has an obligation not to pursue that policy itself (mitigation) and/or an obligation to address the harmful effects suffered by the third parties (adaptation)” (Caney, 2005, p. 695). Caney also states that the beneficiary pays principle is an abandonment of the polluter pays principle, as “It would justify imposing a burden on someone who cannot, in any conceivable sense, be said to have brought about an environmental bad but who nonetheless benefits from the policy that caused the environmental bad” (Caney, 2005, p. 695). Using this model, Caney details the four types of duty to endure the price of reversing climate change. He also discusses the assigning of quotas assigning how many greenhouse gases people in developed and developing nations may emit.

The first duty relayed by Caney is intertwined with his concept of allocating quotas to individuals. Caney states “All are under a duty not to emit greenhouse gases in excess of their quota” (Caney, 2005, p. 704). In regards to obtaining a fair quota, Caney says that the principle needs to be distributive, and that it needs to “balance persons’ interests in engaging in activities that involve the emission of GHGs, on the one hand, with persons’ interests in not suffering the harms listed in (P2), on the other” (Caney, 2005, p. 705). “P2”, as previously alluded to, is “excusable ignorance” (Caney, 2005, p. 704-705).

Moreover, in discussing what makes a fair quota, Caney expresses his belief that “the least advantaged have a right to emit higher GHGs emissions than do the more advantaged of the world” (Caney, 2005, p. 705). Caney argues that affluent individuals need to bear most of the burden of repairing the climate, and this means that they will have less greenhouses gas use allocated to them than poorer individuals that may need more than their current rate of usage to survive. Caney also stresses that he is talking about individual people, and not nations, unlike Shue (Caney, 2005, p. 705).

The second duty that Caney details is the duty of individuals that exceed their quota—have exceeded their quota since 1990—to compensate for individuals that have not done so, by means of mitigation or adaptation (Caney, 2005, p. 704). Interestingly, Caney also describes this as being “a revised version of the ‘polluter pays’ principle” (Caney, 2005, p. 704). Subsequent to explaining this duty, Caney also addresses three principles that are the foundation for the third and fourth duties. These principles are: one—that past generations of individuals no longer living cannot be held responsible for their actions; two—that some individuals were unaware of the negative effects of their actions; and three—there are polluters that cannot be forced to pay for their damages (Caney, 2005, p. 704). Caney next outlines a duty relating to each of these principles.

The third duty is of the advantaged to address the the harms of climate change on the environment, both by mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation is accomplished when benefactors of industrialization diminish their greenhouse gas emissions, thus decreasing the ongoing accumulation of pollution . Adaptation is achieved by taking active measures in ameliorating the damage already caused by pollution. Caney notes this as an “ability to pay principle” (Caney, 2005, p. 704-705).

The final duty that Caney relays is the advantaged individuals must “construct institutions that discourage future non-compliance” (Caney, 2005, p. 705). This duty is also based on the principle that those who can pay more should pay more. This duty also directly addresses the principle of individuals that “cannot be made to pay” (Caney, 2005, p. 704). The effects of establishing institutions to deter defiance would mostly impact the wealthy individuals that may seek to shirk their responsibilities.

In utilizing all four of these duties to address the three principles stated above, Caney holds that his hybrid is a morally-based “hybrid account” (Caney, 2005, p. 705). By this, Caney means that it fills in the holes left behind by the polluter pays principle by mandating that those who have been made advantaged by the current system of destroying our environment compensate those who have not reaped the benefits, and yet have faced the damages. Furthermore, Caney maintains that this is a moral construct as the monetary repercussions are allocated to those who can afford to pay them. “The most advantaged can perform the roles attributed to them, and, moreover, it is reasonable to ask them (rather than the needy) to bear this burden since they can bear such burdens more easily” (Caney, 2005, p. 705). While Caney acknowledges that the current individuals financially benefiting from climate change did not cause the problem to begin with, they still have the moral duty to facilitate the environment’s repair.

My Views on the Polluter Pays Principle and the Beneficiary Pays Principle

Both the polluter pays principle and the beneficiary pays principle have considerable facets, however I most side with the polluter pays principle, as detailed by Henry Shue. First, this is because I hold that an individualist approach is immoral to apply within a society. It is an act of class warfare to expect the advantaged within a society to compensate for environmental damage while allocating a larger environmental footprint to the poor. This will result in the wealthy resenting the poor—who are already at a socio-economic disadvantage—and will have devastating results. That is one reason that I oppose Caney’s first duty of adhering to individualized greenhouse gas emission quotas.

I also oppose the notion of individual quotas on the grounds that it is complacent in the idea of accepting that there is limited environmental health remaining, and instead of doing all that is possible to preserve the environment, the system divides up who gets to stab Mother Nature in the side ‘x’ number of times until she bleeds out. Whether or not this is argued to be a temporary solution while green technology is developed, getting comfortable with the idea of using all of the unpolluted atmospheric space left is unethical.

Another reason that I believe Caney’s argument is weaker than Shue’s is that, Caney holds that the beneficiary pays principle is “an abandonment” (Caney, 2005, p. 704) of the polluter pays principle, but he shows this to not be the case in detailing the duties that compose the beneficiary pays principle. In fact, the beneficiary pays principle is only coherent because it is indeed a revision of the polluter pays principle. Moreover, it is a conversion of the polluter pays principle from a historical perspective to a present-time perspective—while providing a method of compensating for past generations’ environmental abuse. One example of the beneficiary pays principle not being an abandonment of the polluter pays principle is that both philosophies incorporate an “ability to pay” argument (Shue, 1999, p. 398; Caney, 2005, p. 704-705). It is evident that the polluter pays principle was not only influential in the development of the beneficiary pays principle, but it was an instrumental tool.

Furthermore, Shue does make the case that the beneficiaries of past generations’ environmental degradation are to provide compensation. In response to the argument against his stated moral obligation to clean up one’s own mess—that the perpetrators are no longer alive—Shue states that current generations have both been benefiting from the decisions of previous generations and have also been continuing to pollute the atmosphere after learning of its dangers (Shue, 1999, p. 397). The fundamental difference between Shue’s argument and Caney’s argument is that Shue takes a collectivist approach, which I hold to be most accurate. One does not need to be an elite in the United States to benefit from the polluting activities of previous generations. For example, a struggling older sister with financial debt that takes the bus to and from school and work in order to get an education and help support her family is still benefiting from the electricity and fossil-fuel mining projects that began prior to her life. Without these advancements she would be possibly be farming locally and maybe reading a book on occasion, if she were even alive ((Parfit, 1984) would argue that she would not be alive without these advancements in technology). Additionally, society at large has been aware that our current practices have been detrimental to the planet’s health, and yet we have not elected national public representatives with strong plans and unabashed zeal for innovating new technologies, although opportunities have been plentiful. Thus a collectivist approach for assigning compensation is morally just, and those that have benefited most from past greenhouse gas emissions also participate in current emissions.

On a final note—I am opposed to inequality of opportunity, not inequality of outcome. That being said, I believe that there is systemic injustice at hand when there are some people with so much monetary and resource wealth that they do not know what to do with it, while there are others dying of starvation and heat exhaustion. Therefore, I support Shue’s argument against radical inequality and for the obligation of developed societies to provide developing societies with the minimum resources that they need to survive. Furthermore, this act can be productive for the entire planet. If developed nations—such as the United States—help undeveloped nations, such as Ethiopa, obtain necessary food and shelter while sharing technological innovations produced in their stride for a green industry, Ethiopa would be able to generate an enormous sum of solar energy, which could be used in a trade to benefit both nations. I believe that a collectivist approach is the both moral and rational. Such a turn of events is of course an arduous task, and will require a historic consciousness shift toward moral humanism, and away from political tribalism.

References

Caney, S. (2005). Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change*. Leiden Journal of International Law. 18. pp. 747-772, 774-775.

Sue, H. (1999). Global Environment and International Inequality. International Affairs 75. pp. 531-545. Publisher: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Parfit, D. (1984). Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem. In Pojman, L. P., Pojman, P., and McShane, K. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. (7th Edition, 2017, pp. 50-60). Wadsworth Publishing.

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