Last month, I completed my first course in an Intelligence Studies masters program; I'll be sharing my work here, and on http://gradschoolfool.blogspot.com/ (my old grad school blog), for anyone interested in this kind of thing.
Today’s discussion is going to be an overview of theory and how theory can be applied to explain an activity within the Intelligence Community.
What is a theory? What are the requirements for an idea to be considered as a theory? What is the purpose of a theory?
In general terms, how should theory be applied to intelligence? What kinds of problems have been met in testing theory against the realities of intelligence? What kind of theories currently exist that examine intelligence?
Finally, I'll narrow things down and apply a specific theory to one aspect of intelligence in history.
Clauser (2008) notes that a model, which he states is also a theory, as “a concept that evolved in the physical sciences, but one that has application in many other nonscientific investigations and particularly in intelligence analysis and research...”. Treverton and colleagues (2006) at a RAND workshop discussing theory of intelligence define the bounds of theory;“It must have explanatory power, exhibit parsimony, and allow falsifiability.” Two additional remarks regarding theory by the Treverton group should be listed:
- All social phenomena are susceptible to theory.
- Theories are indispensable when it comes to explanation, since they
conceptualize causal mechanisms.
The purpose of a theory, simply stated, is to explain things.
So, how to explain things associated with the intelligence field? Can there be one overall theory? Lillbacka (2013) asks, “What is ‘knowledge’ in intelligence, and what counts as ‘true’ or ‘justified’ knowledge, if any?”
To define the theory, we have to know the purpose of what we study. Johnson (2003) sets the question in a practical question; “the core theoretical and practical question regarding intelligence—a nation’s ‘first line of defense’—is, similarly, how much is enough? How much clandestine knowledge about and action against adversaries does a modern nation require to defend itself, both at home and abroad?”
I return to my point from the last discussion: the primary duty/mission of the American intelligence community is the protection against threats to America.
However, Treverton et al bring this together succinctly:
To develop intelligence theory, it is important to first ask: “What is the point?” Is the point to develop theories of intelligence to help academics research intelligence, come to understand it, and better explain it to students and the public? Or should theories for intelligence relate immediately to the needs of practitioners—gatherers, analysts, and managers, along with consumers, politicians, and other executives? In one sense, there is no conflict between these two. A good theory of intelligence should, by definition, be useful for intelligence
...and in doing so highlight the one issue in the use of theory in intelligence practice. How to apply it.
Theory and practice may not always work together in reality. Intelligence may be considered a craft, or an art, and there is a similarity to police work in this regard. See Willis (2013) for a discussion of practitioner versus theorist in that environment. Scott and Jackson (2004) focus on institution versus institution; “For some academics the Ivory Tower should remain a sanctuary from the compromises of officialdom and provide a panorama (or, a camera obscura) on the world outside. For others, academics are there to tell the world about the world. Yet, while many academics aspire to policy relevance, intelligence is one area where officialdom may remain sceptical about the value of engagement
with the academy”
At one point in my notes, I had written, “IF expecting intelligence as a craft/art to be informed by intelligence studies as a science, then theories about intelligence must include practical application, otherwise (we are) chasing our tails.” Right on schedule ;>, within the next reading, Lillbacka supports my contention;“any workable theory of intelligence would not be merely a theory ‘about’ intelligence, but also support intelligence by providing directions for how it should be conducted”
And there is a second issue with using theory to analyze intelligence. That is how to prove it. Kahn (2001) claims that “no one has proposed concepts that can be tested.” The Treverton RAND study quotes Philip Davies of Brunel University as stating that “theory should be avoided wherever possible in the social sciences”. While I am not sure I agree with that position fully, I can see problems with issuing any grand unification theories.
The best approach would be to apply theory where it works! That is the suggestion from Scott and Jackson, and from Zohar (2013).
Theory can be discussed from many approaches, methodologies, and perspectives, and even within these distinctions, there can be many varied and competing theories. Our Lesson page (Week 2: Theory, n.d.) emphasizes that “theory can play a few separate roles within research.”
Returning to the scientific method which is the basis for solid theory, we should understand qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. From there, there are multiple ways to approach cutting the intel cake.
- Scott and Jackson
1 “ The first approach, favoured among international historians in particular, but also characteristic of theoretical approaches that seek to explain the relationship between organisational structure and policy making, conceives of the study of intelligence primarily as a means of acquiring new information in order to explain specific decisions made by policy makers in both peace and war”
2 “second approach strives to establish general models that can explain success and failure in the intelligence process.”
3“ third approach focuses instead on the political function of intelligence as a means of state control.”
- The Treverton workshop
“ Theories of intelligence may be explored in three main ways—historical, mathematical, and psychological.”
“I keep six honest serving-men
(They taught me all I knew);
Their names are What and Why and When
And How and Where and Who”
(Kipling, 1902)
Intelligence theory may be analyzed from the perspective of studying the WHO ( see Orton and Callahan,1995, for a discussion on organizational theories), the HOW (read Bell, 2003, for an overview of studying the theory of the deceptive method), or the WHAT ( looking at the focus on foreign policy and/or international relations -IR- by Johnson or Scott & Jackson).
Beyond the problem with applying theory as science to what may be an art, there may be also be problems with individual theory. Theories focusing on IR can miss other threats to the body politic. Johnson does recognize this when he asks “have matters of international economics now become more important than political or even military issues?” And while I can’t give a judgment on more important,I can quote Nando (2011)on economics, "National security depends also on soft power, the ability of a country to generate and use its economic power and to project its national values." I will also point out that domestic security is just as important in consideration, as I’ll discuss shortly.
How a theory is derived can also be a problem. Lillbacka gives constructivism ( and postmodern “thought”) the thrashing it rightly deserves, drawing on Popper, Heuer, and Clauser for support (as an aside, if you only have limited time to read for this week, I would suggest Lillbacka and the Treverton study as priority). I particularly found this quote regarding Davies to be high value:
Dr. Philip Davies’s warning about theoretical perspectives far removed from operational reality pertains:
The idea that the individuals advising the chief executives of nuclear armed states might become bogged down . . . over the relative merits of Marxism, functionalism, Lacanian psychoanalysis or whose viewpoint was false or emancipatory consciousness, simply does not bear thinking about.
For an example of applying theory to a specific activity within the sphere of American intelligence, let’s take a historical look at domestic intelligence: we will apply the bureaucratic politics model to how J. Edgar Hoover managed COINTELPRO operations.
Shickler (2010) examined the the bureaucratic politics model in the foreign policy field, and applied it to intelligence studies. She drew from the work of Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow, David C. Kozak, James M. Keagle, Morton H. Halperin, and Priscilla A. Clapp in order to summarize this model in decision making.
The final decision, therefore, is a compromised solution that meets the conflicting demands, interests, and goals of the actors involved. Importantly, the model reveals that national interests and goals are not unified within a bureaucracy and that the policy-making process is far from ideal.”
There are slight variations on this theory such as growth complex theory, or Pournelle's Iron Law of Bureaucracy.
I (Durchin, 2015) have argued previously that Hoover conducted the operations of the FBI in a manner designed to protect the FBI, not necessarily to protect the nation. His different handling of COINTELPRO operations in WHITE HATE and NEW LEFT demonstrated that Hoover often refused to take on certain responsibilities for the FBI or reduced operations that the Bureau was already conducting if he felt that the political situation required this to be done in order to protect the Bureau. The most striking difference in the use of these tactics in regards to COINTELPRO is that Hoover acquiesced to committing the FBI against the Klan (WHITE HATE) at the behest of LBJ, a reversal of Hoover's previous policy of withholding intervention in civil rights issues,. This is in contrast with Hoover's decision to curtail NEW LEFT operations after the break-in at the Media, Pennsylvania FBI office which could potentially (and later did in fact) expose extra-legal FBI operations including COINTELPRO. This reduction in domestic security operations had the greatest effect on NEW LEFT operations due to the timing of the decision.
The only way to approach intel theory is to understand it as an aid to intelligence operations, the point of which is to defend the nation. No one theory currently explains “intelligence”, and it is unlikely that there will be one. Some models can explain certain portions of intelligence, and are thus useful in intel ops. A lot of this theory is based on current organizational or IR theory, but that leaves out domestic security, natural disaster, organized crime, and economic prediction, all of which affect national security. These useful theories are all based on empirical models and on scientific method, and are not the theories based on relativist word-play.
REFERENCES:
Bell, J. B. (2003). Toward a theory of deception. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(2), 244–279. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600390198742
Clauser, J. (2008). An introduction to intelligence research and analysis (J. Goldman, Ed.). Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.
Durchin, S. (2015). The effects of Hoover’s bureaucratic tactics on COINTELPRO operations: A comparison between NEW LEFT and WHITE HATE. The American Society for Criminology, 71st Annual Meeting, 25. Washington, D.C.
Johnson, L. K. (2003). Preface to a theory of strategic intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16(4), 638–663. https://doi.org/10.1080/716100470
Kahn, D. (2001). An historical theory of intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 16(3), 79–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306220
Lillbacka, R. G. V. (2013). Realism, constructivism, and intelligence analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(2), 304–331. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.732450
Nando, D. (2011). Economics and national security: Issues and implications for U.S. policy. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 23, 2015 from http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41589.pdf
Orton, J. D., & Callahan, J. L. (1995). Important “folk theories” in intelligence reorganization. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 8(4), 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850609508435296
Scott, L., & Jackson, P. (2004). The study of intelligence in theory and practice. Intelligence & National Security, 19(2), 139–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/0268452042000302930
Schickler, B. (2010). U.S. intelligence reform: A bureaucratic politics approach. University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida.
Treverton, G. F., Jones, S. G., Boraz, S. C., & Lipscy, P. (2006). Toward a theory of intelligence: Workshop report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.
Week 2: Theory Integration in Intelligence Research. (n.d.). Retrieved October 13, 2019, from American Military University website: https://edge.apus.edu/portal/site/415305/tool/1cd254c2-0884-4d4e-a317-ae77f6a1f3f7/
Willis, J. J. (2013). Improving police: What’s craft got to do with it? Ideas in American Policing, 16. Retrieved from https://www.policefoundation.org/sites/g/files/g798246/f/201306/IAP16_Willis_2.pdf
Zohar, E. (2013). Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation of a Grounded Theory. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 26(1), 130–160. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2012.705659