Let us now clarify this concept upon which everything here rests – a concept that can be grasped
and explained only negatively(since to call something “primary” means precisely that it is not derivable
from anything else, and to call it “grounded in and through itself” means precisely that it is not grounded
through anything else). – Everything that is dependent, that is conditioned and grounded through
something else, can, to that extent, also be cognized mediately, that is, through the cognition of what
grounds it. If, e.g., a ball is set in motion by a push, then I can certainly see the ball move immediately; I
can perceive the point from which it starts and the point at which it comes to a rest, as well as the speed
at which it moves. But I could also infer all of these things, without any immediate perception, simply
from the force with which the ball is impelled, provided I knew the conditions under which the ball itself
stands [IV, 25]. For this reason, the movement of the ball can be considered to be something dependent
or secondary. What is primary and grounded through itself would thus have to be such that it simply
could not be cognized mediately or indirectly through something else, but only immediately through
itself. Such a thing is the way it is, simply because this is how it is.
Insofar as willing is something absolute and primary, therefore, it simply cannot be explained on the
basis of any influence of some thing outside the I, but only on the basis of the I itself; and this
absolutenessof the I is what would remain following abstraction from everything foreign.
Remark
It is a fact of consciousness that willing, in the indicated sense of this term, appearsas absolute.
Everyone will find this within himself, and
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anyone who does not already know this cannot be taught it from outside. From this, however, it does not
follow that this appearance itself might not need to be further explained and derived, which would mean
that the appearance of absoluteness itself would be further explained, in which case it would cease to be
absoluteness, and the appearance thereof would be transformed into an illusion – just as it indeed also
appears to be the case that certain things exist in space and time, independent of us; and yet this
appearance is further explained by transcendental philosophy (though it is not transformed into an
illusion, for reasons that do not concern us here). To be sure, no one will be able to provide such an
explanation of willing from something else nor even to say anything comprehensible in that regard.
Nevertheless, were someone to claim that willing might still possess a ground outside of us, albeit a
ground that remains incomprehensible to us, then, even though there would not be the least reason to
assent to such a claim, there would also be no theoretical reason to object to it. If one nevertheless
decides not to explain this appearance [of the will’s absoluteness] any further and decides to consider it
to be absolutely inexplicable, i.e., to be the truth, and indeed our sole truth, according to which all other
truth has to be measured and judged – and our entire philosophy is based on precisely this decision [IV,
26] –, then this is not because of any theoretical insight, but because of a practical interest. I willto be
self-sufficient, and I therefore take myself to be so. Such a taking-to-be-true, however, is faith. Our
philosophy therefore begins with an item of faith, and it knows that it does this. Dogmatism too, which,
if it is consistent, makes the claim stated above [namely, that it can explain the appearance of the will’s
absoluteness], starts with faith (in the thing in itself); but it usually does not know this. (Cf. the
introduction to the new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehrein the fifth volume of the PhilosophicalJournal, vol. V, p. 23.)7In our system, one makes oneself into the ultimate basis [ Boden] of one’s philosophy, and that is why this system appears “baseless” to anyone who is unable to do this. But we
can assure such a person in advance that if he cannot procure this basis for himself and cannot be content
with this, then he will be unable to
7 J. G. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (1797–1800), ed. and trans.
Daniel Breazeale (Indianapolis/Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett, 1994) [Henceforth = IWL], p. 18 ( SWI: 433; GAI/4: 194).
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find such a basis anywhere else.