Well, I might actually read it if it's free and not that long!

I think my solution has room to accommodate his objections. If God knows every possible action we could all possibly choose to take, He can know what He plans to do in each of those situations as well.

I may not be being strictly logical here, but I do try to fit what the Bible teaches about God into my thinking. It seems pretty clearly taught in the Bible that there are times when God changes His mind, and God can change His mind because of human prayer, then it must be assumed that He knew what He would do if one thing happened, and He knew what He would do if the other happened, yet He didn't actually know which one of the two courses of action He would take until the man, as a free will being, made his choice and acted.

I hope that's not too convoluted to follow.

I have heard of Molinism, through William Lane Craig, and it is interesting, but for me ultimately unconvincing.

As I understand it, and as explained by WLC above, God knows what every free will being will do in any given circumstance. This doesn't really make sense to me because in the Bible, God is constantly warning people, specifically the Israelites, that if they don't repent of some thing, then some judgment will fall upon them. If God knew in advance that the Israelites were not going to heed His warnings and would then face judgment (think Babylonian exile), then His warnings seem ineffectual, calling into question His omnipotence, or intentionally ineffectual, calling into question His goodness and honesty.

I think it more likely that if humanity had any free will at all, then there is in some sense things that God cannot know. He cannot know them because they are logically impossible. Omnipotence means God can do all things logically possible, so too does omniscience mean that God knows all things logically possible to know. God can no more make a stone so heavy that He can't lift it then He can know what a free will being will do in any circumstance for sure. He can know every possible choice, and every possible outcome, but it seems logically inconsistent to say He can know what a free will being will do before he does it.

After saying all that, I think I did misunderstand Stefan's argument the first time. After re-reading a few times, I think my answer is a lot shorter. Gad can still know what will happen in the future for certainty because He knows what He will do. If He knows the future and He knows what He will do, so that any change He makes He intended to make, and He knew He would make them.

Thanks for the enjoyable conversation.