Abstract
Disbelief... What is it? Is it a non-belief that can be substantiated in pure reason? Or a type of belief that is contrary or a negation of an original belief? Maybe it is radical skepticism that itself for itself is beyond simply being an atheist in religion and apolitical in a still political world?
With all these questions, it does raise up one similarity: it is against believing for believing's sake, and this can be called poetic faith... But this immediate entrance of poetic faith can only get an immediate exit from disbelief. Poetic faith itself can only exist in the conditions for when the negation of disbelief must be involved as to continue the acceptance of the work of fiction as it was said in the past. This is fine to where the immediacy of a condition that is in and for disbelief cannot be sustained in the realm of knowledge, especially when the particular that is the work in itself be disturbed by disbelief. But these conditions makes out disbelief not to be nothingness in poetic faith's existence but to be skepticism in its most practicality that is subdued by suspension of it. Skepticism is the fine conclusion of this particular of Disbelief since this acts as a universal that can negate any poetic faith when the material conditions do give rise to it.
But why must Skepticism, in the universal of Disbelief, be suspended in the realm of works of fiction when conditions give rise for itself to experience to be this? Why does Suspension of Disbelief (the universal) seem to be the only contemporary answer as to accept any meaning in a work of fiction?... Or is itself just a misguidance from other solutions?
The Problems
The necessity to suspend Skepticism from times when Poetic Faith is present in times when doubt can be present brings problems of its own:
- The suspension of such exists to cover up a inconsistency that cannot be resolved from the materials in the Work.
- That the Evolution of the Work processed an inconsistency that is an unintended consequence of the Work.
- The inconsistency itself can not justify its existence with the Work, but can be at the same time be resolved in it.
With all these problems mentioned, they share one thing: inconsistency and its struggle with the Work. This inconsistency is a particular of the work, for itself can only be existing in the Work, but the Work itself does not get the same interaction as recognizing what it is in itself as with the particular. For the Work contains all the consistencies and inconsistencies that are in it, and can only be recognized like this, for everything else wouldn't be the Work itself like it was without the inconsistencies. And with denying the existence of the inconsistency, we subtracted from our view creates deception of the Truth (the View of such) of what the Work is.
For when we, the reader or viewer and so on and so on, impose this upon ourselves, deception is processed in the perception of the work.
So, how can one not subtract anything to one's perception in consciousness when viewing an object, and, in this problem, retain the knowledge in the work of fiction?
Solutions
J.R.R. Tolkien: One solution is to take know and understand J.R.R. Tolkien's "Second Belief" theory when viewing works of art. This theory does avoid all the problems of simply Suspending Disbelief by which a "secondary belief" (though it can be called virtual consciousness). This is created for the consistencies of the Work itself that leads up to justify everything that has happened and itself can only be negated by an inconsistency. Yet, unlike the Suspension of Disbelief, it doesn't justify the inconsistencies in it, it only accepts that every consistency cannot justify it nor resolve it. So: Perception must accept that it must suspend disbelief, which needs not repeating for why it has problems, to ignore it if necessary or accept that this inconsistency is a contradiction (classical logic) that must be paradoxically included with the consistencies. The first and the last option makes the secondary belief is shattered either way. Ignoring, though briefly mentioned here, is a particular solution, and at that it can only serve to be fruitful when the inconsistency is not a major point of the Work.
(This will be a problem in the next solution as well.)
Dialectics: Like aforementioned, you can learn and grasp Dialectics as to understand how things came to be and why they came to be. All elements and consistencies in the Work just doesn't come from a vacuum, nor does things that are aufheben are cancelled from existence but rather are sublated in the higher stages of the Work. In the twist of turns, whether you look at Marxist or Hegelian Dialectics, the inconsistencies are organized in a different matter altogether. For inconsistencies are rather the contradictions that are inherent in the rivaling antagonisms between distinct two objects. Not only are the nuances of inconsistencies expanded, but are avoiding the previous problems and reveals a darker condition that simply suspending disbelief cannot solve. So what remains of our narrow inconsistencies identified above? They are treated as either externals that do not truly affect the dialectical change of the Work, or mishaps that was infected in the work and will take time to root out.
Concrete
Again, this problem came back to haunt Dialectics as it did with "Secondary Beliefs." But Suspending Disbelief which tries to solve this problem by making viewers/readers to not use skepticism and to try to figure out why it came to be and spoil the emotions they had for the book. The solutions choose to either ignore it outright if it can't be accepted, and the fault is of an author for making the inconsistency.
With all the spiel said here, there's one thing that contemporary suspension of disbelief seems to be mistaken for: willingness to just be poetic faith for itself only, and to stunt progress of analyzing a work. Secondary Belief or a Dialectical understanding of a work can help better analyze what makes what, despite some pitfalls, and these are more specified than what people are crediting Suspension of Disbelief for. And this disbelief is skepticism of an inconsistency, but skepticism isn't a solution in this case. For skepticism only seeks to see why the(se) inconsistency(ies) cannot fit with the consistencies in the Work, and to prove that the consistencies in the Work cannot be as it is. All-in-all, Suspension of Disbelief needs an update with theory in our times, or be discarded for other plausible and better solutions...