This is the translation of my Polish article which is available here
Edmund Husserl introduced the distinction between natural and philosophical science. Natural science flows from the natural posture; philosophical, however, from a philosophical spiritual attitude. The natural posture does not introduce problems related to the critique of cognition. We take into account the object given to us visually, regardless of the way in which it appears and regardless of the source from which it comes, but that it is given to us by itself. So we have an object that is part of the world, which is partly given to us by experience, partly by memories, and the rest is undefined. It is about this world, according to Husserl, that we judge, anticipate and investigate the relationships between things. We generalize observations and conclude about things we know little about. This knowledge is partly due to our experiences as well as to the deductive method, which results in the formation of logical relations between objects of cognition and their properties. Husserl emphasizes that cognition takes place in a specific order. We combine the various components of deduction into larger ones, which gives us the basis for infering phenomena. He defines phenomenon as the thing that is given to us visually. This process strengthens the logical power of the world's conclusions. The logical potential, however, does not give us absolute certainty. It often happens that there are contradictions between courts, which can be solved through a deeper analysis, change of foundations, which are accepted premises or can not be solved at all. Then there is the process of degradation of compounds which, compared to others, have less logical power. In this way, we update our knowledge about new applications that meet our expectations in relation to the world that we have seen visually. In other words, we expand our potential cognition of reality which is a natural path for the development of natural sciences, humanities or mathematics. As for the latter, they operate with ideal objects and a priori data. Natural cognition solves problems in a logical manner and minimizes the power of sets of premises whose logical value is questionable. Edmund Husserl opposes this kind of naturalism to philosophical cognition and puts a clear demarcation line between them.
At the moment when we reflect on the problem of the cognitive relation to the object, deep and extensive difficulties arise. At the moment, knowing which is naturally something clear becomes a mystery. For reasons of clarity about the effectiveness of cognition, natural cognition quoting Husserl
There is no reason to ask any questions about the possibility of getting to know.
Husserl speaks of cognition in ontic terms as a natural and psychological phenomenon, which gives grounds for the possibility of examining it on the basis of naturalistic sciences as a property of organic beings. According to him, he is therefore able to describe the structural and genetic cognition of various individuals. Moving forward only when opposing knowledge with pure logic and ontology arise the deepest problems that include the possibility of knowing the object. He assumes that cognition is a mental experience which is quite understandable; but how can cognition go beyond itself and reliably describe a physical object? In a naturalistic sense, being a given object of cognition in cognition is unclear. The thing that is perceived by me must be given directly. I can see and touch her, but perception is only the experience of a conscious subject. It is similar with my memories and various types of thinking, which gives me a direct way of getting to know being, but quoting Husserl
How do I, knowing, know where and how can I reliably know that there are not only my experiences, these cognitive acts, but also what they learn, that there is something that can be opposed to cognition as an object?
With this type of problem, even logic itself becomes problematic. In natural thinking, logic, of course, retains its durability and undeniable certainty, but if man has evolved on the path of evolution through natural selection, and consequently his intellect and all its forms, including logical forms, is it not that it belongs to everything to the intellectual sphere of man and in the future may take other forms? Knowledge according to Husserl is therefore a human cognition based on his intellectual sphere, which could be different if only natural selection favored other evolutionary forms; he is incapable of learning things himself; things in themselves. Then a new problem arises related to the universality of views. If we use this type of cognition, does it retain its universality if logical laws are subject to such relativization? It is clear that when we penetrate the problems of cognition, abandoning the naturalistic approach, we wander in a maze of contradictions. The field that studies this type of problem is the theory of cognition, or epistemology. She is skeptical about the nature of the natural cognition and objectivity of the existence of cognition. Thanks to it, we will be able - if only sufficient methods are developed - to criticize naturalistic attitudes in relation to being that we are able to know sensually and intellectually. As soon as we focus our thoughts on the epistemology of cognition and the object of cognition, then we will have to deal with the phenomenology of cognition and the object of cognition, which will give us grounds for a completely new way of thinking about phenomenology.