Mandatory force of norms and their validity. It is extremely important to note that not every norm has binding or binding force. The binding force of a rule is determined by its practical functioning as a rule of conduct in a social community. Not only general recognition, however, determines what is correct and what not, but also the establishment of the rule of normative authority. It is not easy to find appropriate criteria for which norm can be considered mandatory in a given social environment. The justification of the norms is two types - theological and axiological. The former is formal, presupposes the binding of the obligating force with an authority that is able, with the force of compulsion, to impose its implementation. In the second type, compliance with a norm is regarded as good or positively valuable, according to some estimates. It has a substantive or material character. The division of norms according to their formal or substantive justification was first introduced by Polish law theorist C. Zamenierovski. These two types of justification determine the effect, validity of the legal rules. J. Vrublewski also discerns a systemic, factual and axiological notion of action in terms of legal norms. Two descriptive and one descriptive understanding of their validity is also pointed out by Builidzhin.
Ontological concepts for the essence of norms. They are often subject to different classifications. One of them belongs to Jan Volenski and distinguishes the following theories: 1. linguistic, 2. naturalistic, 3. platonic and 4. non-linguistic. Argentinian researchers Carlos Albuñron and Eugenio Bujiddinvinded as two main conceptions in the discussion - Expressionist and Heletic. The first norms are the result of the descriptive use of language. For this concept, they are essentially commands, duties are commanded by the will of some supreme power. For the concept of hilleris, norms are the meanings of normative sentences, they are extra-linguistic, abstract, purely conceptual essences. Obligations and prohibitions are objectively existent, ideal, independent of their linguistic expression or psychological perception. For Alf Roes, the direct meaning is the concept of content, understood as a pattern of behavior. It introduces a deonic operator d. K. Alhuron and E. Buglidgin associate the concept of the essence of norms with the names of J. Kalinovski and O. Weinberger. Their explanation of norms mixes the naturalistic with the linguistic approach. In the classification of the Volen Linguistic Concept corresponds to the expressionist. But the problem is rather the differentiation of the naturalistic concept that treats the norm as an objective relationship between the addressee and authority. In the concept of Polish logic, the relationship between the normative authority and its addressee, which corresponds to the normative sentence, exists objectively. David Hume specifically warns of the impossibility of a sentence of reality with "e" or "not" to draw a directive into behavior, including "must", from actually concluding about what is due. Morality can not derive from reason or experience. This fact casts doubt on the misinterpretation of the naturalistic and the platonic concept. The above classifications of the various ontological concepts of norms suffer from a common logical flaw - there is no general principle of their removal. Such is the decision of K. Opalek, who shares the solutions of linguistic and non-linguistic solutions. The difference between them is whether they regard norms as linguistic entities. Within the first, the opinions of cognitivism and non-cognition are opposed. The norms themselves are descriptive sentences that refer to some empirical or ideal reality. The non-linguistic concepts of the norms are varied, in general, they are released in one way or another from being viewed as language formations. We distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive approaches.
Standards and assessments. At the root of any norm is a certain assessment of social facts. It belongs to the normative authority, which strives to influence the change of the current state of the world, to submit it to the accepted due. The assessment justifies the objective pursued by the establishment of a rule. Evaluations express a certain attitude of the subject to an object or phenomenon in view of a relevant criterion. They are formed as a result of a cognitive process, through which they act in the act of a definite, based on this process of approval or disapproval of something, the values are constructed. The result of this is the assessment judgment. The Polish philosopher of the Lviv-Warsaw School, Tadeusz Chejovski, admits that evaluative statements can be objective in the same measure as all such empirical claims. Throughout the history of logic, factual judgments are strictly distinguished from evaluation judgments. Assessments can be seen as experiences, as they also include an element of subjective attitude, but the discursive element is dominated by them. It is a face and descriptive element in them. The role of bridge between norms and assessments plays the so-called "impersonation" norms such as "The window needs to be opened". Ineligible regulations differ from personal directives.