The Agreement doesn't require that the DAO pay the Company in DEC, nor is there a requirement for the Company to accept DEC for payment for core set packs or anything else, or even for the Company to pay the DAO the sales revenue value in DEC regardless of what forms of payment it decides to accept for anything, so while I can see the issue you mention being possible, it is not inherent in this deal.

I support the agreement generally, but want revisions to the payments section, which, notwithstanding any DEC shenanigans, is written almost entirely to the benefit of the Company. I understand legalese, and here's my quick take on the Agreement:

The summary in this post says the DAO will pay in "HBD then DEC or other liquid tokens": however, that is not what the agreement states. Section 3.2 Form of Payment (a) Approved Payment Tokens:
"Company shall maintain and provide to Client [the DAO] a list of cryptoasset tokens approved for payment..." "The Approve Token List shall be provided to Client concurrently with the execution of this Agreement."

...which means we don't know what tokens will be accepted and won't until the agreement is executed. I would revise that section - the DAO should have that list before signing the agreement. It also says the Company can revise the list at will in the future without limitations or agreement from the DAO - I think the DAO should get some say in that, such as mutual agreement on some tokens (for example, at least 3 mutually acceptable tokens, like SPS, DEC and HBD), how many tokens need to be on the list (the Company could limit it to 1 token the day payment is due as written), and a time restriction, such as must provide a revised list 30 days in advance to coincide with the billing cycle.

At (b) in the same section, it essentially says the Company can refuse payment in the form of tender the DAO pays "for any reason", but it does state at the end of (a) that "Client shall make all payments...solely in tokens appearing on the then-current Approved Token List", so the Company has to accept payment in one of those tokens and can't refuse them all at least, but the DAO does not have any control at all over which particular token the Company will accept as payment - as noted above, the Company could limit the approved list to 1 token at the last moment. The DAO needs some say in that to avoid being victimized by or possibly benefited from token price changes. Lots of ways to possibly revise that section, especially with the other suggestions above, but a ranked order of acceptance of particular tokens, which must include the mutually-agreed tokens whatever they are or a certain number of tokens. There is no reason to give the Company sole discretion over what form of tender it will accept!

Further in Section 3.2, at (e) it lays out that the Company will not suffer at all if the tendered token price falls within 48 hours after payment - the DAO has to make up the difference and pay the shortfall. That section also says if the tendered token price increases, the Company keeps the overpayment. There is no reason to accept that condition. It allows the Company to utilize the absolute control the agreement currently gives it over payment forms to maximize its benefits to the detriment of the DAO. At the very least, if the DAO has to make up a shortfall due to token price falling, the Company should have a reciprocal obligation to convert a token price increase windfall into a credit for the DAO.

The agreement in general I think is a good deal for the Company and for the DAO. There's just no reason to have these payment issues be so one-sided against the DAO. The DAO is sitting on a large pile of assets it doesn't do anything with, and the Company really wants a stable and reliable revenue source and is willing to give up IP and share revenue to get it. Past experience with pack sales has shown that the DAO doesn't lose money on this type of deal, so seems like both sides do benefit. The Company asked for this agreement, and while there is obviously co-dependency here, the DAO is not entirely without leverage. Giving up some of the game revenue (perhaps 10% or 15% instead of 20% over the total DAO contribution recoupment?) could even be something the DAO could use as a sweetener to negotiate some control over payments issues?