Introduction
In a recent study by Moneygeek, the cost of crime per capita was evaluated in 263 cities. Naperville, IL and Sunnyvale, CA were found to be the safest cities in America with a crime cost per capita of $156.i New York ranked 82 with crime costing $863 per capita, Los Angeles came in at 172 with $1,996, and Chicago was placed 240th with $4,060. Memphis, Baltimore, and Birmingham occupy 260th-262nd with costs in the $7,000 range. 263rd is, and has been for a couple of years now, reserved for a place near to my heart: St. Louis. The cost of crime per capita was $8,457 in 2023. As a St. Louisan, that number represents most people’s reactions when I tell them where I’m from. While there certainly is truth behind St. Louis’ infamous title, it isn’t entirely accurate.
St. Louis is, what the United States Census Bureau denotes as, an “independent city.” Though they often share similar demographics and economic goals; St. Louis City (hereinafter the “City”) and St. Louis County (hereinafter the “County”) are fully independent entities. The implications of such governmental organization are extensive, but the central principle is that St. Louis City it isn’t bound by county jurisdiction, only that of the state. There are only two major US cities with this abstract administration: St. Louis City, MO and Baltimore City, MD.
It is no coincidence that two of the three most dangerous cities in the United States are independent cities. Incorporated cities have the luxury of high populations spread over hundreds of square miles; the crime in a few bad neighborhoods can be easily outweighed by the lack thereof in the rest of the County. The reason St. Louis ranks so highly in “most dangerous cities” is because it only represents 10% of the greater St. Louis population, and less than 1% of its total area – the majority of it is those “few bad neighborhoods” – and it has significantly less people to bear that cost of crime.
Yet, unfavorable crime rates are just a minor symptom of the divide between the City and the County. This Great Divorce, as it has come to be known, isn’t just a chapter in the history of our city, but it truly is a defining motif that, as stated above, has extensively and invasively written itself into every decade.
Early History
What many consider to be “just another city in a fly over state,” was once a bustling economy for American hopefuls looking to conquer the west. In 1763, Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent paid Pierre Laclede for an expedition up the Mississippi to find a new location for his fur-trading operation. While there were many towns up and down the Mississippi already, Antoine de St. Maxent wanted to find a location that didn’t flood so often. The land that is now St. Louis was perfect because it overlooked the floodplain and drained efficiently. In early 1764, 30 of the Frenchman’s trappers were sent to live there, and so a city was born.
For the first few years of its life, St. Louis had no governing body; the town itself was floating between control of the Spanish west and the French midlands. Pierre Laclede took it upon himself to oversee the development of the City, and formal leadership wasn’t elected until 1808. The City’s location, nestled just under the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, was essential to its growth. The use of steamboats proved to be the ambassador of industry to the area, and news of ‘The American Dream’ drew many immigrants to the last stop on the road to the frontier. By 1870, the City was truly a hub of industrial activity, but St. Louis leaders didn’t see the railroad as a sustainable media of trade, and instead doubled-down on river business, even going so far as to decline rail bridges across the Mississippi.ii In 1875 St. Louis created another limit for itself, this time in a geographic sense. Some 300,000 citizens of St. Louis City voted against 27,000 in the County to set city boundaries and officially separate itself from ‘the boonies’ (west of Skinker Blvd. at the time).iii The City left plenty of room to grow, leaving the line at the western edge of the then-rural Forest Park. Tax-payers in the City feared that their taxpayer money was being used for public goods in the outlying municipalities. Election fraud plagued the vote, but by August 1876, the divorce prevailed. This border has stood the test of time, holding fast against numerous attempts to mend the divide over the decades.
Fast-paced growth and the shimmering frontier of the west continued to grow the City and eventually made St. Louis the fourth largest city in the United States. The County grew just as fast as the City, and an extensive street-car system connected suburbs at and across city lines. In this context, the city divide did little more than create a positive externality for those living in the County. They didn’t have to live or pay the taxes of the bustling city but could easily reap the economic benefits of the surrounding area. The City did not hesitate to contribute to these suburban areas, either. Many surrounding suburbs drew utilities like water from the City, paying only for the connection to city mains.iv These suburbs would not make the same mistake though, as places like Kirkwood and Webster Groves fought endlessly to annex surrounding areas for sufficient taxation.v By the end of the 19th century, the County was home to over 50,000 people; this shies in comparison to the City’s 570,000, but it would grow much faster than the City in the coming years.
Migration
The unavoidable truth of the time was that African American Homes decreased home value. As Blacks moved into white neighborhoods, whites moved away, fearful that they would lose equity in their home. This “white flight” was one of the driving factors behind migration from the City to the County. Restrictive deeds ensured that the migrant whites would have new white neighborhoods, and selective lending ensured that Blacks could only afford houses in black neighborhoods. Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude of this phenomenon.vi
Figure 2 - White flight from 1950-1960
IMG SRC [http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/map/]
Banks would still happily lend to Blacks, but only in very specific areas. In 1926, a line was drawn down Delmar Boulevard. South of the line was only to be housing for whites, north of the line was for everyone else. This issue was exacerbated by the post-war boom and G.I. bill spending,vii further segregating the City. Redlining did what it was intended to do and it continued to work long after desegregation – even after the practice itself was outlawed. Figure 3 depicts this with data
collected from the U.S. Census.
IMG SRC [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/LFQ2UPBKJYI6JCYQPWYSTF3KXM&w=296&h=400]
Notice that much of the County (including those above Delmar) aren’t dark green, or
even blue. This is because of the restrictive covenants mentioned above, and that dotted line meandering through the North County is a rough representation of the loaning boundaries of the banks. All of this selective zoning and lending was occurring while the St. Louis was gaining population, but most of that population was going to the County, not the City. The County received more tax revenue, and the City lost a portion of theirs to white flight. Population
data supports this with the City’s highest population reaching 856,000,viii then steadily declining over the next forty years. The St. Louis City website describes the overpopulation and
pursuant migration better than I: “After World War II, the City’s population peaked at 856,000 by 1950. This crowded City had no more room to grow within its fixed boundaries, and much of the housing stock had been neglected during the Great Depression of the 1930s and during World War II. Thus, any new growth had to occur in the suburbs in St. Louis County, which St. Louis could not annex.” Quite simply, the County and its many municipalities offered prospective residents more choices than that of the City. The County flourished as the City descended into disrepair.
The City fought effortlessly to combat urban decay, focusing heavily on urban renewal projects like the infamous Pruitt-Igoe. The 33 tower Pruitt-Igoe complex was intended to be affordable housing for middle-class families. Built in 1954, the urban housing project was a symbol of hope for the City. Yet, the complex grew to be an “economic and racial ghetto soon after it opened,”ix and was demolished just thirty years later in 1976. Often deemed a complete failure,x Pruitt-Igoe set expectations low for the future of St. Louis. The City itself recognizes the failure of its projects: “Urban renewal efforts and public housing development programs could not stem the tide of population loss, and in some cases contributed to the decline.”xi The City was hemorrhaging and couldn’t get a grip on its population issue, in turn losing tax revenue and the ability to mend itself. The population decline in the City lead to increasing and widespread inequality in the St. Louis Area.
City Cannibalization
An abstract perspective on the Tiebout model paints the inequality phenomenon in an interesting light. In their analysis of a City-County consolidation, Joshua Hall and Josh Hatti note that when functioning efficiently, the Tiebout model is bound to create inequality – which is to be expected, it’s a model focused on efficiency. However, they juxtapose that with the failure of the Tiebout model: “However, if the Tiebout model fails to function, the result can be even greater inequality.”xii That is exactly what has been happening in St. Louis for the past forty years. The assumption of mobility is not met due to limited financial resources of those in the City – the families that can leave (and want to) have already left. The assumption of size is not met due to the decline in population, and spillover from the City to the County and its’ inverse is unavoidable. All these factors contribute to the failure of the Tiebout model and the state of the City today. It is a bit sad to watch a once decadent City fall victim to urban decay, but if there is any upside to the great divorce, it is that it protects the County from being infected by the same virus.
As the County attracted an increasing number of residents, the City proved to be a hostile environment for businesses and residents alike. Hall and Hatti’s analysis take note of this too: “The exit of businesses and wealthy residents can leave behind jurisdictions with a limited tax base from which even the most basic services will be under-provided.”xiii This is noticeable today in the City. For example, I’m sure many residents have seen videos on social mediaxiv by Tony Bame standing in knee-deep potholes, urging the City to take action. Streets are one of the most basic services that government provides, yet the City clearly struggles to maintain them. Crime has been rather rampant as well. While they’re cooling relative to previous years, violent crime in the City was almost double that in the County in 2022 – property crimes show a similar relationship as well.xv Migration to the County and the resulting City environment is a self- sustaining process. As the City becomes worse, it motivates other businesses to seek refuge in the County. This very process is occurring in present day. In the past year, St. Louis City lost reputable businesses to the County: two notable law firms, and one of the City’s major broadcasting companies,xvi to name a few. Crime has been a major motivational factor to move, with one executive even saying that, “with the City refusing to prioritize safety, (as it has for more than a decade), public safety must take the front seat.”xvii His marketing company just recently moved to the County as well. If things progress in the same way they have been, this cannibalistic trend continue, and the City will lose its relevance. Stopping this trend means stopping crime.
County Adaptation
Residents have been buying up properties all over the County for the last sixty years, and while the same can be said for companies, many of them choose to make their home in the ‘downtown’ the County has created for itself. After the City seceded, the County needed a place to house its government, so they chose the closest town to the City border: Clayton, MO.xviii The St. Louis County Court House, Jail, Government Center, and Administration Department are all in Downtown Clayton. The area is also home to major companies like Enterprise Holdings and the Centene Corporation. The County’s downtown is so attractive that even out of state companies are opting for real-estate in Clayton instead of the City. Advantage Solutions, a $4 billion company just announced they will be relocating their headquarters to one of the high-rises in Clayton.xix
For years, the City and County had a mutualistic symbiotic relationship. The City had something the County didn’t: Industry, business, economies of scale. The County had comfortable residence and hospitality that the City did not offer. County residents could travel to the City and return to the County; Residents pay their income tax to the City, and property tax to the County,xx generally. However, with the City’s decline, the County has had to bear the burden of production to sustain any sort of equilibrium between the two entities. Now, both hospitality and big business exist in the County. The City just isn’t producing like it should – the symbiotic relationship is broken, and St. Louis City can’t efficiently distribute goods and services anymore – market failure. Figures 4xxi and 5xxii depict the relationship between the City and the County:
Figure 4 - Real GDP for All Industries in St. Louis County 2001-2021
IMG SRC [https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REALGDPALL29189]
Figure 5 - Real GDP for All Industries in St. Louis City 2001-2021
IMG SRC [https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REALGDPALL29510]
(since writing this, FRED does not list data older than 2017 for both City and County)
Urban Relief Policies
The City hasn’t been blind to the crime complaints. Under Kim Gardner, the Circuit Attorney’s Office made efforts to “end mass incarceration, reduce racial disparities and help the office be more accountable and transparent”xxiii in 2017. These efforts amounted to dismissing 25,000 pending cases, and enforcing a new policy requiring that all low-level felonies receive a summons rather than arrest.xxiv More arrests were made after this policy took effect,xxv though more summonses were used for felonies in 2018 and 2019. Bail reforms have been going through the Missouri Supreme Court, though their effect has been minimal in St. Louis, as many are placed on a “no bond hold.”xxvi Kim Gardner resigned earlier this year, “amid multiple efforts to remove her as murders reached a 50-year high,”xxvii and Gabe Gore took her place. Gore is now prosecuting cases that would have been dismissed, saying, “These are things that drive people out of the City.”xxviii The effects of Gore’s policy are yet to be seen, but twice the charges have been filed since he has taken office.xxix The current Mayor, Tishaura Jones, rolled out new crime laws in 2021 that put the focus on the offenders.xxx So far, crime rates are down in 2023, but resources are spread thin across Jones’ programs.xxxi
Government Failure
On a 2009 episode of the EconTalk podcast, Clifford Winston talks about his book, Market Failure vs. Government Failure. The book deals with the practice of government intervention in market failures. His conclusion is that governments shouldn’t be so quick to intervene: “It is certainly the case that markets do fail--we do have pollution, congestion; but there are other cases where it's hard to find evidence of the kind of market failure that would justify government intervention. More troubling is the lack of evidence of government interventions, whether justified or not, significantly turning things around.”xxxii Winston’s point expressly outlines what St. Louis has routinely done with the City. From denying railroads, to Pruitt-Igoe, it seems that often, St. Louis is suffering from government failure. Most recently, the City saw government action in the form of no action at all under Kim Gardner, but Winston isn’t referring to crime, and that makes St. Louis’ issue rather complex – as if it wasn’t already.
Proposition
St. Louis may be to a point that the only thing that can save it is government intervention. Plans for merging the City and the County have failed multiple times. The City economy is wasting more than it is producing. From an efficiency standpoint, it would be best if the City just ceased to exist – but that isn’t possible, nor is it fair. The issue St. Louis is dealing with is an issue as old as economics itself: efficiency versus equity. How can the City fit into an efficient yet equal relationship with the County at this point? Creating an inviting business environment seems to be a function of crime – but this isn’t a criminal justice brief (though it sure felt like it a couple sections ago). I think this new crime legislation is a good route, but that won’t reinvigorate the City on its own. Winston’s warnings against government intervention are valid and should be heard. We’ll never get back the booming river business of the 20th century, or the businesses that have already left for the County, but entertainment is strong in the City.
The Union Station renovation and developments like City Foundry are all receiving rave reviews. The new STLFC stadium is excelling – tickets are difficult to procure (I know from first-hand experience). If I can propose one thing, it’s that St. Louis should lean into this. Encourage this kind of development in the City with heavy tax incentives for entertainment businesses. Lower the risk for businesses to expand into the City. The City can’t directly control crime, but they can control how much risk businesses take on. If the cost of opening a new bar/lounge/etc. is $50,000 less, that may be just enough for a company to take on the risk of the City. More businesses will generate more tax revenue and in turn create a more inviting space for residents and companies alike. St. Louis City will always have its ambiance and history, the County will never have that. If the City uses it to their advantage, it might be the key to building an equal and efficient relationship between the County and City.
References
i “Safest Cities in America 2023: Violent Crime Rate Increases Drive Per Capita Cost of Crime” https://www.moneygeek.com/living/safest-cities/
ii “The Great Divorce: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the City/County Split” https://www.riverfronttimes.com/news/the-great-divorce-everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-the-city- county-split-2594707
iii Op. cit.
iv The St. Louis Republic. [volume] (St. Louis, Mo.), 05 Jan. 1901. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress. https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84020274/1901-01-05/ed-1/seq-16/ v Op. cit.
vi “Mapping Decline” http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/map/
vii “75 Years of the GI Bill: How Transformative It’s Been”
https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/article/1727086/75-years-of-the-gi-bill-how-transformative- its-been/
viii “A Brief History of St. Louis” https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/visit-play/stlouis- history.cfm#:~:text=By%201940%2C%20over%20800%2C000%20people,and%20during%20World%20War%20II. ix “Pruitt-Igoe: the troubled high-rise that came to define urban America” https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-rise-urban-america-history-cities
x Op. cit.
xi “A Brief History of St. Louis,” op. cit.
xii Hall, Joshua and Matti, Josh, “City-County Consolidation in St. Louis: An Analysis” (2018). Center for Economics and the Environment. 20. pp.6 https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=cee
xiii Michael Howell-Moroney, “The Tiebout Hypothesis 50 Years Later: Lessons and Lingering Challengest for Metropolitan Governance in the 21st Century,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 1 (2008): 97-109, cited by Hall and Matti, op. cit.
xiv “Worst Roads in America” https://fox2now.com/news/missouri/worst-roads-in-america-st-louis-man-makes-viral- videos-in-push-for-change/
xv “Crime Reporting” https://showmecrime.mo.gov/CrimeReporting/CrimeReportingTOPS.html
xvi Op. cit.
xvii “Marketing firm cites break-ins” https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2022/11/15/marketing-firm-latest-to- say-leaving-downtown.html
xviii “History” https://www.claytonmo.gov/government/history
xix “This Fortune 1000 company is moving its global headquarters to St. Louis County” https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/local/business-journal/advantage-solutions-fortune-1000-company-st-louis- headquarters/63-74885b25-93b7-4ae3-ba23-a74ccd2d3556
xx “Individual Earnings Tax” https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/collector/earnings-tax/individual- earnings-tax-info.cfm#:~:text=The%20one%20percent%20earnings%20tax,within%20the%20City%20of%20St.
xxi https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REALGDPALL29189
xxii https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/REALGDPALL29510
xxiii “Criminal Justice Reform Efforts” https://www.rstreet.org/commentary/criminal-justice-reform-efforts-and-rise- in-crime-spotlight-on-city-of-st-louis-mo/
xxiv Op. cit.
xxv Op. cit.
xxvi Op. cit.
xxvii Koenig, Melissa. https://nypost.com/2023/09/15/charges-in-st-louis-doubled-since-exit-of-soros-backed- prosecutor/
xxviii Gabe Gore, cited by Koenig
xxix Melissa, op. cit.
xxx Byers, Christine https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/crime/st-louis-mayor-elect-tishaura-jones-crime-plan- experts/63-91a55f83-8e8b-409d-80ec-8b9c39059a87
xxxi Byers, op. cit.
xxxii Winston, Clifford https://www.econtalk.org/winston-on-market-failure-and-government-failure/#audio- highlights