Good is what is liked by mind only through the concept. We call it good (useful) what is liked as a resource; good in itself, however, what it likes for its own sake. In both cases the notion of any purpose is always included, ie the attitude of reason to (at least possible) will, hence the pleasure of the existence of an object or an act, some interest. To judge something good, I must always know what the subject should be, ie. I have to have a concept for it. To find beauty in something, I do not need that. Flowers, free drawings, no purpose braided into each other under the ornament name mean nothing, they do not depend on any particular concept and yet they like it. The pleasure of the beautiful must depend on the refection on an object that leads to some notion and it also differs with that from the pleasure that rests entirely on the sensation.
In many cases, the pleasant one looks the same as the good. This is usually said: every (especially prolonged) pleasure is in itself good; which roughly means: long-pleasant or good to the same thing. But this is just a mistaken replacement of words, as concepts that fit exactly to these expressions can not in any way be changed with each other. The pleasure, which as such presents the object only in relation to the senses, must first of all be placed under the principles of reason through the notion of a goal to be called good as an object of will. But that we have a completely different attitude then to pleasure, when I call good what it amuses, it is clear from the fact that the good question is always whether it is only mediocre - good or immediately - good (whether useful or in itself good); while, on the contrary, this is not a good thing, because the word always means something that is immediately liked.
Even in the most ordinary language, the difference between pleasure and goodness is distinguished. For a dish that arouses the flavor of spice and other supplements, it is said without hesitation that it is enjoyable and, at the same time, admits it is not good, because it really satisfies the senses, but it is mediocre by reason that takes into account the consequences, does not like it. Even in the assessment of health, this difference can be noticed. It is immediately enjoyable for anyone who owns it. But to say that health is good, it must still be directed through reason to goals, namely that it is a state that makes us fit for all our affairs. Regardless of the difference between pleasure and goodness, they still agree that they are always associated with some interest in their subject: not only the pleasant and indirect good (the beneficial) which is liked as a means of some kindness, but also absolutely and in every respect the good, namely the moral one, which includes the highest interest in it. Because good is the object of will (ie, a mind-defined ability to desire). But want something and have pleasure in its existence, ie. to be interested in it is the same thing.