Damn, guys, this was really painful to read. You are either completely misunderstanding how EOS works, or you are willfully trying to deceive people. Both options are really bad from a BP which has been

Really nice to see that you are moving to the right direction with your thinking! But there was still a little bit of misunderstanding in your proposal. I like that they have removed the EOS Core Arbitration

The original intention of arbitration is to enforce "Intention of Code is Law" to enable recovery of funds due to the result of bugs resulting in the lost of funds similar to the DAO hack case

Recently I wrote two articles on EOS governance works: All blockchains are governed blockchains How to understand dispute resolution in EOS Those might be helpful for understanding better how the system

No matter how many threats they make against ECAF it doesn't have any effect. If the case is not a dispute over certain articles in the constitution, ECAF can't do anything about it. ECAF simply doesn't

Censorship of an onchain dapp - as per the example in the article. But how exactly they would convince ECAF that censorship must happen? There must be a dispute over an article of the constitution. Which

My point is that talking about immutability of a blockchain in this kind of case doesn't make sense. The technical immutability is preserved, and on the level of token amounts the concept of immutability

Great proposal! It has my support.

In theory, ECAF could effect the immutability of the blockchain depending on what precise point they intervened. No, this is not possible even in theory. If the immutability of a blockchain is broken,

thus having control over the immutability of the EOS blockchain. ECAF doesn't have the power to control users' accounts, but BPs have. ECAF can only propose transactions which are finally made by BPs.

A thief steals someones tokens and the token holder calls ECAF to step in - ECAF agrees to step in and freezes the account (highly unlikely as it's not set up to act this quickly), the thief has not agreed

There are a few misunderstandings here. ECAF is not a police or an enforcer. It's the judge. What does it judge? Disputes. What kind of disputes are under its jurisdiction? All kinds of disputes in the

I think it would be good to make a distinction between UBI as an app on EOS and a UBI as a core feature of EOS. Nobody should oppose a smartcontract which distributes its own tokens as a UBI for its users.

The main reason speculation can be harmful in this particular case is that unlike many other tokens - RAM is “backed” by a scarce resource (memory) which cannot be practically rented. An analogy would

Unfortunately this is not so simple. Basically my suggestion was simply to force self-voting whales into risking their investments (i.e. needing to manage their funds across thousands of addresses via

What article II really says: "Don't scam." It doesn't apply in this situation. It has been also made clear that all BPs have the right to decline what arbitrators propose for them. Arbitrator's

Thus appointment of arbitrators needs to be a part of smart contract that is voted upon, as only then a given arbitrator has any mandate to operate. I think this could be very problematic. If arbitrators

Arbiters and the ECDR are skilled professionals providing a service to token-holders and should be compensated for those services. But, to compensate them by any other means than through free market forces

Inter-blockchain communication is great and we should encourage projects who want to do that. But it doesn't mean the EOS community should shoot itself in the foot by encouraging scams or other stupid

Is there anywhere a good explanation how sidechains will actually work? I had the understanding that sidechains would need some cooperation of BPs of both chains to function. But this might be from your