13
Menninger Decl., Ex. H at 205:15-206:10.
This testimony directly placed Plaintiff’s attorney-client communications and work
product at issue in the Dershowitz Case. Edwards and Cassell took the affirmative position that
Dershowitz’s statements that Edwards and Cassell helped Plaintiff fabricate her stories were
false and defamatory. See Menninger Decl., Ex E, p. 2 (“Dershowitz went so far as to repeatedly
accuse Edwards and Cassell of criminal misconduct in actively suborning perjury and fabricating
the allegations of misconduct against him - acts that would warrant their disbarment from the
legal profession. . . . Put simply, Dershowitz has made highly defamatory allegations that have
no basis in fact”). Communications between Plaintiff and her attorney were a central issue in the
claims brought by Edwards and Cassell, and Plaintiff voluntarily testified regarding those
communications.
Plaintiff was acutely aware of how the information was being utilized in the Dershowitz
Case. According to Plaintiff, she is a party to a joint defense or common interest agreement with
Messrs. Edwards and Cassell. When the Dershowitz Case was filed, a mere week after the filing
of the Joinder Motion on Plaintiff’s behalf, Edwards and Cassell represented Plaintiff, who
Dershowitz had also threatened to sue. Thus, Edwards and Cassell allegedly act both as
Plaintiff’s attorneys and her joint-defense or common interest partners. Plaintiff was aware that
what was, or in this case was allegedly not, said between her and her attorney would be
affirmatively used by her counsel/joint defense partners in support of their claims. She
authorized the disclosure and testified, both with the assistance of McCawley.

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Plaintiff, on behalf of her joint defense partners, provided evidence to support the factual
claim neither Edwards or Cassell (nor anyone else) asked Plaintiff to lie about her stories of
alleged sexual abuse and trafficking. The only way the truth of that issue can be tested is
through the examination of all her communications about her stories, with attorneys or
otherwise. See Bowne v. AmBase Corporation, 150 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd by
161 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (otherwise privileged communications put in issue where party
“asserts a factual claim the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of a privileged
communication”); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991) (“[a] defendant
may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected
communications for self-serving purposes. Thus, the privilege may implicitly be waived when
defendant asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.”);
In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101–02 (“[I]t has been established law for a hundred years that
when the client waives the privilege by testifying about what transpired between her and her
attorney, she cannot thereafter insist that the mouth of the attorney be shut. From that has grown
the rule that testimony as to part of a privileged communication, in fairness, requires production
of the remainder.”); United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (criminal defendant
who testified that she was never advised by her attorney of the fifth amendment implications of
proceeding pro se put at issue all communications with her former attorney and her knowledge
of the law as informed by her attorney-client communications).
“[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword. . . . A
defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected
communications for self-serving purposes.” Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted); Locascio, 357 F.Supp.2d 536, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The privilege

15
may not simultaneously be used as a shield and a sword; where a defendant opens the door by
waiving the attorney-client privilege, . . . the [party] cannot open the door only to the information
he would like to admit.”) Plaintiff has used her attorney communications as a sword on behalf of
her joint defense partners, and therefore her communications with her attorneys are no longer
shielded.
Plaintiff also testified that she shared her conversations and communications with
Edwards to unrelated third parties. In particular, she shared her communications with a reporter
for the Daily Mail Online, Sharon Churcher. See Menninger Decl., Ex. K, at 297:5-300:6. There
is no doubt that sharing attorney-client communications with a third-party, particularly when that
third party is a member of the press, acts to waive any claim of privilege. Schaeffler v. United
States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2015). (“A party that shares otherwise privileged communications
with an outsider is deemed to waive the privilege by disabling itself from claiming that the
communications were intended to be confidential.”).
b. Edwards and Cassell’s Waivers of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege in
the Dershowitz Case
In addition to Plaintiff’s direct waiver, Plaintiff’s counsel/joint defense partners Edwards
and Cassell waived both attorney-client privilege and protection of their work product by putting
those matters at issue in the Dershowitz Case. The scope of the subject matter put at issue in the
Dershowitz Case could not be broader. Edwards and Cassell pleaded and argued at every
conceivable turn that: 1) they had a good faith belief that Ms. Giuffre’s allegations –
communicated to them by Giuffre -- were true; 2) they conducted a thorough investigation of
Ms. Giuffre’s claims (their work product regarding Plaintiff and her allegations); 3) that Ms.
Giuffre and her story were credible; 4) they did not have any communications or encourage

16
Plaintiff to fabricate facts or portions of her stories; and 5) they were not motivated in taking
their actions by potential financial gain . Edwards and Cassell point to both communications
with Plaintiff and their own work product in an attempt to prove their claims.
By way of example, in the Motion for Summary Judgement in the Dershowitz Case,
Edwards and Cassell make the following assertions, citing attorney-client-privileged
communications and work product documents in support of their claims and defenses:
 “Ms. Giuffre has submitted a sworn affidavit, not only attesting to the truthfulness of her
allegations against Dershowitz but also about the fact that she told her lawyers about
these claims.” (emphasis supplied) (attorney-client communications);
 “The assertions of sexual abuse are more than adequately corroborated by compelling
circumstantial evidence which is detailed at length by Cassell in his deposition.” (work
product/investigations);
 “Regardless of whether Dershowitz sexually abused Ms. Giuffre, Edwards and Cassell
clearly had a good faith basis for relying on the sworn representations of their client.”
(attorney-client communications, attorney thought process);
 “Edwards and Cassell had clearly conducted extensive investigation into the basis for Ms.
Giuffre's allegations” (work product);
 “the undisputed record evidence establishes that Edwards and Cassell had every right
following their detailed investigation to rely on Ms. Giuffre's credibility” (attorney-client
communication, work-product and investigations, thought process and credibility
assessments);
 “The good faith basis for Edwards and Cassell's reliance on Giuffre's allegations is laid
out in detail by Professor Cassell in more than 50 pages of sworn testimony during his
deposition. See Depo. Transcript of Paul Cassell (Oct. 16 & 17, 2015), at 61-117 (Exhibit
#3)” (attorney investigative activities, work-product and attorney thought process based
on what they “knew” through attorney-client communications).
 “Edwards and Cassell clearly had a powerful basis for believing their client's allegation
that she had been sexually abused by Dershowitz, particularly where she had made this
allegation to them as far back as 2011” (attorney-client communications)
 “Dershowitz made false and defamatory statements by alleging that two experienced and
capable attorneys who thoroughly investigated and believed Ms. Giuffre's allegations in
good faith should be disbarred” (work-product, investigation of alleged acts and
investigation of credibility).
Menninger Decl., Ex E, at 1-13.